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Abstract 
Formal semantics constitutes the framework of this thesis, and the aim is to characterise the 
semantics of the progressive, as it appears in sentence (1). 
(1) Max was running towards the station 
Among the problems is one known as the "imperfective paradox". According to intuitions, sentence 
(1) entails (2), but no entailment holds between (3) and (4). 
(1) Max was running towards the station 
(2) Max ran towards the station 
(3) Max was running to the station 
(4) Max ran to the station 
Since (1) and (3) would seem to have the same logical form, they ought to have similar entail- 
ments. Why is this not so? 
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part, containing chapters 2 to 5, evaluates the 
current formal theories that tackle the imperfective paradox. Solving the imperfective paradox con- 
sists of two tasks: the first is to characterise a semantic distinction between (2) and (4), and the 
second is to supply a semantic analysis of the progressive that is sensitive to this distinction and so 
results in a solution to the imperfective paradox. According to how the current theories tackle these 
two tasks, they can be classified into three camps which I will name as follows: the Heterogeneous 
Strategy (adopted by Dowty, Taylor and Cooper) provides one approach for fulfilling the first task, 
the Eventual Outcome Strategy (adopted by Dowty, Cooper and Hinrichs) provides an approach for 
defining the semantics of the progressive, and the Event-based Strategy (adopted by Parsons and 
Bach) provides a further alternative for achieving the two tasks at hand. All these strategies are 
intuitively motivated, but we will argue that they are ultimately untenable. The Heterogeneous 
Strategy and the Event-based Strategy fail to mesh with the treatment of point adverbials such as 
"At 3pm", and the Eventual Outcome Strategy produces a definition of the progressive that is 
viciously circular. Thus although the current theories that tackle the imperfective paradox are 
highly intuitively motivated, we will ultimately show that the formulations of these intuitions give 
rise to conflicts and tensions when it comes to explaining the natural language data. 
The second part of the thesis, containing chapters 6 and 7, offers a new approach for tackling 
the imperfective paradox. This new approach invokes two tools; the interval-based temporal logic 
IQ (Richards 1986), and Moens' (1987) event-based AI model of temporal reference. IQ is an 
interval-based temporal logic with several innovations. First, unlike the previous interval-based 
theories, IQ maintains a high level of homogeneity: an atomic sentence is true at an interval I only 
if it is true at all subintervals of I. Second, IQ offers a technique whereby temporal expressions can 
have representations that receive their semantic interpretation with respect to context. 
We use the roles of homogeneity and context in IQ to characterise the semantics of aspect, 
where the characterisation is based on Moens' model. This provides an arena in which to tackle the 
imperfective paradox anew. We explain the entailment between (1) and (2), and at the same time 
explain why no entailment holds between (3) and (4). Furthermore, we overcome the problems 
concerning the treatment of adverbials such as "At 3pm" that are encountered in the Heterogeneous 
Strategy and the Event-based Strategy, and, since we do not adopt the Eventual Outcome Strategy 
in defining the progressive, we overcome that strategy's problem of circularity. Hence our solution 
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The Progressive and the Imperfective Paradox 
1 Aims 
The research pursued in this thesis fits into a programme the aim of which is to supply the 
formal semantics of natural language. The assumption underlying this venture is that the meaning of 
a given sentence can be characterised by defining all its possible logical consequences. The particu- 
lar task is to supply a formal semantic analysis of the progressive, as it appears in sentence (1). 
(1) Max was running towards the station 
Among the problems is one known as the "imperfective paradox". According to intuitions, sentence 
(1) entails (2), but no entailment holds between (3) and (4). 
(1) Max was running towards the station 
(2) Max ran towards the station 
(3) Max was running to the station 
(4) Max ran to the station 
Since (1) and (3) would seem to have the same logical form, they ought to have similar entail- 
ments. Why is this not so? 
The imperfective paradox has serious implications for more general questions concerning 
natural language, for example the relationship between syntax and semantics. The progressive 
involves a uniform syntactic operation, and so from the perspective of formal semantics, one would 
expect it to be related to a uniform semantic operation. But (1) and (3) have different semantic 
import. The problem is: how can the uniformity of the progressive in syntax be squared with its 
semantic ̀ irregularity'? 
Answers to questions (a) and (b) are desiderata for solving the imperfective paradox. 
(a) How can we characterise the semantic distinction between (2) and (4), which is revealed in 
natural language by their different behaviours with the progressive? 
(b) How should the progressive itself be characterised, so that it is sensitive to the semantic 
distinction between (2) and (4) and results in a solution to the imperfective paradox? 
Answers to (a) and (b) should supply an answer to (c). 
(c) Which semantic features of a non-progressive sentence determine its relationship to the 
corresponding progressive form? 
Our aim is to solve the imperfective paradox. We want a principled solution that meshes 
with a theory of other temporal phenomena, and to this end, we will not in some cases be evaluat- 
ing previous solutions to the imperfective paradox ̀ head on', but may sometimes evaluate how that 
solution fits together with an account of other temporal expressions. We will do this in order to 
tease out the essential reasons why these accounts fail, and thus also the essential characteristics 
that should be embodied in the alternative theory. 
The thesis can be divided into two parts. The first part, containing chapters 2 to 5, evaluates 
the current formal theories that tackle the imperfective paradox. These formal theories are, in the 
main, highly intuitively motivated. We will show, however, that the formulations of the intuitions 
give rise to conflicts and tensions when it comes to explaining the natural language data. This, in 
fact, is a central theme in the thesis. The second part of the thesis, containing chapters 6 and 7, 
offers a new approach for tackling the imperfective paradox. This new approach will offer answers 
to the puzzles posed in the first part of the thesis. 
2 The Distinction Between (2) and (4) 
The first problem connected with the imperfective paradox is that of specifying the semantic 
difference between (2) and (4). 
(2) Max ran towards the station 
(4) Max ran to the station 
How is this to be achieved? 
One might want to place this task within a larger setting. There is a long tradition of work, 
usually associated with Vendler (1967), in which linguistic expressions are divided into aspectual 
classes according to their different temporal behaviours. The strategy is to invoke metaphysical dis- 
tinctions between the classes. In the case of (2) and (4), there are different underlying metaphysical 
structures, which are meant to explain their different temporal behaviours. 
Vendler divides verb phrases into four aspectual classes: activities, accomplishments, achieve- 
ments and states. Activities (cf. "run towards the station", "walk") are processes in time, each part 
of which is itself a process. In contrast, accomplishments (cf. "run to the station", "write a thesis") 
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are more than processes; they essentially involve a 'conclusion' or `culmination'. Thus any part 
which doesn't include the 'culmination' cannot be an accomplishment. Achievements (cf. "win a 
race", "reach the summit") also invoke a culmination point, but they differ from accomplishment) in 
that they do not invoke a 'prior' process to the culmination. States (cf. "love Mary", "know the 
answer") can occur over a period of time, but they are not processes. 
Sentences (2) and (4) have distinct underlying metaphysical structures, in that the former is an 
activity and the latter is an accomplishment. So in Vendler's terminology, the imperfective paradox 
can be restated in the following way: the progressive form of a sentence denoting an activity entails 
the corresponding non-progressive form, but this is not the case for accomplishments'. 
One strategy, then, for characterising a semantic distinction between (2) and (4) could be to 
formulate Vendler's metaphysical theory on the classification of aspect into a semantic environment. 
The result, of course, may or may not be relevant to a definition of the progressive. Vendler does 
not provide any clues as to how to define the semantics of the progressive itself. He merely gives 
us one strategy for achieving the first task connected with the imperfective paradox; i. e. maintaining 
a semantic distinction between (2) and (4). It remains to be seen whether the result is a semantic 
distinction that can form the foundations of a definition of the progressive that accounts for the 
imperfective paradox. 
A formal characterisation of Vendler's classification of aspect has been attempted within the 
framework of interval-based semantics. In these theories, the truth of a sentence is defined relative 
to an interval of time. Using this framework, one could capture Vendler's claim that an accom- 
plishment such as (4) occurs over an interval of time. 
(4) Max ran to the station 
If (4) is true at an interval I. then there is an interval J earlier than I where the tenseless sentence 
"Max runs to the station" is true; this reflects the idea that the accomplishment occurs over the 
2 interval J. 
I This is not quite how Vendler would have put it, since he was concerned with the aspectual classification of verb 
phrases and not sentences. However, as Verkuyl (1972) and Dowty (1972), and Vendler himself in a footnote observe, the 
subject noun phrase can affect the aspectual classification, and therefore Vendler's classification must be one of whole sen- 
tences. In addition to accomplishment sentences, there are some sentences denoting achievements where the progressive 
form does not entail the corresponding non-progressive form. This is glossed over for now, but shall be returned to later. 
2 We have assumed here, as Dowty (1979) does, that "Max runs to the station" is a tenseless sentence, i. e. its represen- 
tation will not invoke a tense operator. This sentence intuitively has a habitual reading: i. e. Max has the disposition of run- 
ning to the station (every morning, say). But since we classify "Max runs to the station" as tenseless, it can have an accom- 
plishment reading, in order that the past tense may operate on it to produce an accomplishment reading of (4). 
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Suppose that the interval-based framework is heterogeneous. That is, a sentence A may be 
true at the interval I and false at subintervals of I. This allows for the possibility that "Max runs to 
the station" is true at J, and false at K where K is a subinterval of J; this reflects exactly Vendler's 
claim that not every part of an accomplishment is itself an accomplishment. On the other hand, the 
truth of "Max runs towards the station" at an interval J may entail its truth at all subintervals of J 
(up to a certain limit in size); this reflects Vendler's claim that every part of a process (up to a cer- 
tain limit in size) is itself a process. Hence heterogeneity provides the foundations on which to 
build semantic distinctions between (2) and (4) which reflect Vendler's metaphysical distinctions 
between them. So this strategy of invoking a heterogeneous interval structure, which I call the 
Heterogeneous Strategy, supplies the tools for formulating Vendler's classification of aspect3. 
Inspired by the heterogeneous interval-based frameworks of Cresswell (1977) and Bennett and 
Partee (1972), Dowty (1979,1986) follows the Heterogeneous Strategy to provide a semantic 
interpretation of the classification of aspect. For Dowty, sentences denoting activities and accom- 
plishments are true only at intervals larger than the minimal (i. e. smallest) ones (and hence are 
heterogeneous). This is intended to capture Vendler's metaphysical claim that activities and accom- 
plishments describe processes that take time. Dowty's representation of accomplishments differs 
from that of activities, in that the truth value at an interval I of a sentence denoting an accomplish- 
ment is determined by what happens at the endpoints of I, i. e. the culmination points. This is not 
the case for activities. 
The Heterogeneous Strategy will be examined in detail in chapter 2. I shall argue that hetero- 
geneity cannot yield a satisfactory semantic characterisation of point adverbials, like "At 3pm" in 
the sentences (5) and (6) (the natural meanings of these sentences will be discussed in chapter 2). 
(5) Max ran at 3pm 
(6) Max won the race at 3pm 
It will thus be shown that the Heterogeneous Strategy is not satisfactory. One needs to represent a 
semantic distinction between sentences of different aspectual classes by some other means. The 
puzzle is: how else may one formulate the classification of aspect, so as to characterise the semantic 
distinctions between (2) and (4)? 
3 In chapter 2, we will offer a more general version of the Heterogeneous Strategy, that relates to event-based frame- 
works as well as interval-based ones. 
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(2) Max ran towards the station 
(4) Max ran to the station 
3 The Definition of the Progressive 
So far, we have discussed one strategy for characterising semantic distinctions between (2) 
and (4). The next question connected with the imperfective paradox is: can a unified semantics be 
formed of the progressive? Given the semantic distinctions between (2) and (4), Dowty is still 
stuck with the problem of explaining why (3) does not entail (4). 
(3) Max was running to the station 
(4) Max ran to the station 
To do that, Dowty introduces the notion of inertia worlds in the definition of the progressive. This 
is meant to capture the following intuition: sentence (7) is true if the eventual outcome is that Max 
is the winner of the race, provided the current state of affairs (whatever that is) `continues without 
interruption'. 
(7) Max is winning the race 
Dowty's semantics for the progressive does not invoke conditions that concern what is going on 
now, instead they concern the eventual outcome of what is going on now. I call this strategy of 
defining the progressive the Eventual Outcome Strategy. In addition to Dowty (1979), this strategy 
has been adopted by Hinrichs (1983) and Cooper (1985). 
The definition of the progressive under the Eventual Outcome Strategy involves modality of 
the 'counterfactual' kind, because one has to look at what would happen if the current actions 'con- 
tinue uninterrupted'. Dowty introduces inertia worlds to define the appropriate notion of modality, 
i. e. an explanation of the phrase "if the state of affairs continues uninterrupted". 
The motivation behind the Eventual Outcome Strategy is to avoid placing conditions directly 
on the states of affairs that make sentence (7) true. There is an abundance of states of affairs that 
correspond to (7). (7) may be true when Max is ahead in the race and running the fastest, or Max 
may be third, but running faster than the athletes in first and second place. If Max has a good repu- 
tation as an athlete, then (7) may be true even if Max is last in the race, but his strategy for win- 
ning is going according to plan. The puzzle is: What is the common property among these states of 
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affairs, that makes sentence (7) true? The Eventual Outcome Strategy defines the common property 
as one of eventual outcome, the eventual outcome being the one described in the corresponding 
non-progressive sentence. The Eventual Outcome truth conditions of the progressive yield an 
interpretation of (7) that avoids talk about what Max is actually doing at the current time; his posi- 
tion in the race, how fast he is running and so on. Instead, the truth conditions of (7) concern only 
the eventual outcome of the current state of affairs. 
In spite of intuitive motivation for the Eventual Outcome Strategy, I argue in chapter 3 that 
one cannot provide a satisfactory definition of the progressive in terms of eventual outcome. But 
how else may the progressive be defined, so as to avoid the imperfective paradox? 
Intuitively, one can think of sentence (8) as denoting an event that can be divided into phases; 
it is a process which leads to a culmination point. 
(8) Max won the race 
The progressive sentence (7) refers to that process, but it does not assert that the culmination 
occurs. This is the intuition underlying what I will call the Event-based Strategy in defining the 
progressive. Event-based theories of tense and aspect construct event ontologies to take into 
account the internal structure of events (Bach 1986, Hinrichs 1985, Moens 1987, Parsons 1984, ter 
Meulen 1982,1984). They try to account for the imperfective use of the progressive by specifying 
the relation that holds between the incomplete event (as described by the progressive) and the com- 
plete event (as described by the simple past sentence). So what is called for is an ontology in 
which events can be decomposed into their constituent parts or assembled into more complex 
events. 
According to event ontologists, accomplishments constitute a process and a culmination point. 
The eventual outcome of the process, provided it continues uninterrupted, is the culmination point. 
This structure is brought about by the way the ontology for events is set up. The event ontology 
thus provides the potential means to achieve one of the tasks connected with the imperfective para- 
dox: defining the progressive. The event-based semantics of "Max was winning the race" will refer 
to the process that is assigned in the event ontology to (8)'s culmination. 
Unlike the Eventual Outcome Strategy, the concept of a prior process (that is, a process that 
leads to a culmination) is not brought out purely by a modal semantics for the progressive. Instead, 
there are more ontological commitments: culmination points are assigned prior processes in the 
ontology. Hence constructing an event ontology provides a natural alternative to the Eventual 
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Outcome approach. The concept of eventual outcome that is defined explicitly in the semantic 
definition of the progressive under the Eventual Outcome strategy now appears as part of the the 
event ontology; i. e. it is one of the idiosyncratic things that is given as part of the model, rather 
than being defined in terms of rules. 
Moreover, the Event-based Strategy provides an alternative to the Heterogeneous Strategy for 
distinguishing the semantics of (2) and (4). The Heterogeneous Strategy involves invoking a 
heterogeneous interval structure in order to formulate the classification of aspect. The Event-based 
Strategy does not do this. Instead, the distinct semantics of (2) and (4) is explained in the event 
ontology by assigning the underlying events different metaphysical structures. Thus the Event- 
based Strategy provides a way of fulfilling both of the tasks connected with the imperfective para- 
dox: distinguishing the semantics of (2) and (4) and providing a definition of the progressive. 
In chapter 4, I will examine the consequences of the Event-based Strategy. I will study Par- 
sons' (1984) event-based solution to the imperfective paradox in detail. I will argue that Parsons' 
theory also fails to capture the semantics of point adverbials such as "At 3pm", as it appears in sen- 
tence (5). 
(5) Max ran at 3pm 
4 Our Solution to the Imperfective Paradox 
We will present a new approach to solving the imperfective paradox that invokes two tools; 
the interval-based temporal logic developed by Richards and known as IQ, and Moens' event-based 
AI model of temporal reference. 
IQ is an interval-based temporal logic with several innovations. It was originally designed to 
provide a formal semantic treatment of tense and temporal quantification in English (Richards 
1986). The tenses in IQ are the three traditional logical tenses: past, present and future. The tem- 
poral quantifiers include frequency adverbials such as "always", "sometimes" and "exactly twice". 
IQ offers a technique whereby temporal expressions can have representations that achieve their 
semantic interpretation with respect to context. This technique allows Richards to achieve a Russel- 
lian interpretation of tense, where there is deictic reference to speech time, while maintaining a 
Priorean interpretation of temporal quantification, where there is reference to time, but not neces- 
sarily speech time. Thus IQ is innovative in that it combines the Russellian and Priorean accounts 
within a single formal framework. The theory of IQ is further developed in (Oberlander 1987a) and 
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(Oberlander 1987b), where several other applications of IQ to natural language are suggested. 
IQ, unlike its predecessors such as (Dowty 1979), is an interval semantics which maintains a 
high level of homogeneity (which is the converse property to heterogeneity). That is, the truth 
values for the expressions of IQ are such that the definition of truth will yield the homogeneity pro- 
perty (9) for truth functional combinations of atomic sentences. 
(9) An atomic sentence A is true at an interval I only if A is true at all subintervals of I. 
Because of the homogeneity property (9) that is part of the framework IQ, one cannot formulate in 
IQ the Heterogeneous Strategy: that is, one cannot assert that "Max runs to the station" is true at an 
interval I and false at subintervals of I. The question for us is: can homogeneity yield a semantic 
distinction between sentences (2) and (4), as a preliminary to solving the imperfective paradox? 
This thesis presents the first theory on aspect that is given in a homogeneous interval-based 
framework. Using homogeneity, we represent semantic distinctions between sentences (2) and (4), 
where the underlying characterisation is based on Moens' (1987) classification of aspect. This is in 
sharp contrast to Dowty's Heterogeneous Strategy for providing semantic distinctions between sen- 
tences (2) and (4). 
We build on the distinction between (2) and (4) in IQ with a definition of the progressive that 
is also based on Moens' model of temporal reference. The role context can play in logical form in 
IQ is used to reflect the role of context in Moens' model. This gives rise to another important ori- 
ginal feature of this research: context plays a non-trivial role in characterising the semantics of 
aspect4. This provides an arena in which to tackle the imperfective paradox anew. One can 
explain the entailment from sentence (1) to (2), and at the same time explain why no such entail- 
ment holds between (3) and (4). 
(1) Max was running towards the station 
(2) Max ran towards the station 
(3) Max was running to the station 
(4) Max ran to the station 
4 We take the position established by Kaplan (1977) and Kamp (1979). that the effect of context on the meaning of an 
utterance is an issue for semantics in certain cases, rather than pragmatics. 
8 
Furthermore, one is able to account for the natural meanings of (5) and (6) (the natural mean- 
ings of these sentences will be discussed in the subsequent chapters). 
(5) Max ran at 3pm 
(6) Max won the race at 3pm 
Thus the solution to the imperfective paradox in IQ overcomes the inadequacies of the Heterogene- 
ous Strategy, and the inadequacies of the current event-based theories. Moreover, our definition of 
the progressive is not subject to the problems concerning the Eventual Outcome Strategy, for it does 
not invoke a concept of modality. 
5 What the Thesis does not Cover 
There are many facets to the meaning of the progressive in English. This thesis concerns 
itself with just one of those facets; the imperfective paradox. I will largely ignore other natural 
language phenomena associated with the progressive. For example, I will not discuss futurate pro- 
gressive sentences such as (10). 
(10) Max is leaving town tomorrow 
I will also ignore the role of the progressive in discourse, which is discussed at length in (Kamp 
and Rohrer 1983) and (Dowty 1986). These researchers observe that the presence of the progres- 
sive can affect the temporal relations between events which are present in discourse. For example, 
discourse (11) is interpreted so that the event of Max arriving at the house occurs before the event 
of Mary running into the driveway. 
(11) Max arrived at the house. Mary ran into the driveway. 
Discourse (12), on the other hand, demands that the time of the event of Max arriving at the house 
be included in the time when the progressive state holds. 
(12) Max arrived at the house. Mary was running into the driveway. 
To explain these phenomena by building on our semantic representation of the progressive is 
a matter for further research. Oberlander (1987a) provides in IQ a representation of the so-called 
"simple present futurate" tense, as it appears in sentence (13). 
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(13) Max leaves town tomorrow 
It would be interesting to see if his representation of the simple present futurate and our representa. 
tion of the progressive can capture the meaning of sentences such as (10). Richards (1987) suggests 
how IQ may represent temporal connection in discourse. It would be interesting to see if our 
representation of the progressive and his strategy for representing temporal phenomena in discourse 
would yield an explanation of the difference between discourses (11) and (12). There is every indi- 
cation that following this route would prove fruitful. 
6 How the Thesis is Divided Up 
In chapter 2.1 will argue that the Heterogeneous Strategy for formulating the classification of 
aspect cannot yield natural interpretations of sentences (5) and (6). 
(5) Max ran at 3pm 
(6) Max won the race at 3pm 
In chapter 3. I will argue against adopting the Eventual Outcome strategy in defining the pro- 
gressive. I will demonstrate that a modal definition of the progressive cannot capture the intuitions 
we desire. 
In chapter 4, I will study the consequences of the Event-based Strategy for solving the imper- 
fective paradox. I will examine Parsons' (1984) formalisation of the Event-based Strategy. and 
argue that it falls short on the analysis of point adverbials, such as "At 3pm". He cannot account 
for the natural meaning of sentence (5). 
In chapter 5, I will investigate the behaviour of the progressive with universally quantified 
noun phrases. I will show that Parsons' Event-based Strategy cannot account for these natural 
language data, while Dowty's Eventual Outcome Strategy in defining the progressive can. This 
yields a puzzle: how can one combine the Eventual Outcome Strategy's advantage on the analysis 
of these data with an account of the progressive that does not suffer its fatal flaws that are eluci- 
dated in chapter 3? 
In chapters 6 and 7, I present a new account of aspect and aspectual taxonomy that features 
two innovations. First, the interval-based framework in which the account is stated is homogeneous 
and so is, potentially at least, not subject to the problems of adverbial modification encountered in 
heterogeneous theories. Second, context plays a non-trivial role in the semantic interpretation of 
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aspect and aspectual taxonomy. I solve the imperfective paradox in our theory. I will also show 
how one is able to give a satisfactory analysis of sentences (5) and (6), and thus our account will 
transcend the problems encountered in the Heterogeneous Strategy and the Event-based Strategy. 
The theory will also explain the natural language data introduced in chapter 5, demonstrating that 
the data can be explained without adopting the Eventual Outcome Strategy. Thus our solution to 
the imperfective paradox presented in chapters 6 and 7 will provide answers to the puzzles posed in 
the earlier chapters of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
The Heterogeneous Strategy 
1 Introduction 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, solving the problem of the imperfective paradox con- 
sists of two tasks. The first is to represent a semantic distinction between sentences (1) and (2). 
(1) Max ran towards the station 
(2) Max ran to the station 
The second is to provide a definition of the progressive that is sensitive to this distinction, and so 
results in a solution to the imperfective paradox. This chapter addresses the first task. 
I mentioned in the previous chapter what I call the Heterogeneous Strategy for characterising 
a semantic distinction between (1) and (2). I will show how this strategy is formulated in the 
theories of Bennett (1981), Dowty (1979), Taylor (1977,1985) and Cooper (1985), and I will argue 
that the strategy is ultimately untenable. The crucial test will be how the formulation of the 
Heterogeneous Strategy in the respective theories meshes with the treatment of point adverbials, 
such as "At 3pm". 
It must be stressed that I am not looking at the semantics of the progressive in this chapter. I 
am discussing only the task of distinguishing the semantics of (1) and (2). Whatever distinction 
between these sentences one ends up with, it must not only fit with the definition of the progressive 
that solves the imperfective paradox, but it must also fit with a satisfactory analysis of temporal 
adverbials such as "At 3pm". I will be testing the Heterogeneous Strategy against the analysis of 
"At 3pm", and not against the analysis of the progressive. 
2 Using intervals 
The task is to characterise a semantic distinction between (1) and (2). 
(1) Max ran towards the station 
(2) Max ran to the station 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Vendler's (1967) classification of verbs provides clues for how 
one might do this. Vendler divides linguistic expressions into aspectual classes according to their 
different temporal behaviours. The idea is to invoke metaphysical distinctions between the classes. 
In the case of (1) and (2), there are different underlying metaphysical structures which are meant to 
explain their different temporal behaviours. So one strategy for characterising a semantic distinc- 
tion between (1) and (2) could be to formulate Vendler's metaphysical view on the classification of 
aspect within a semantic theory. 
Vendler claims that an activity such as (1) and an accomplishment such as (2) both occur 
over an interval of time. This suggests that one should think about the semantics of (1) and (2) in 
terms of intervals. Some theories have attempted to formalise the classification of aspect by invok- 
ing an interval structure (Dowty 1979, Bennett 1981, Taylor 1977,1985, Hinrichs 1985, Cooper 
1985). Bennett and Dowty, for example, formalise the classification of aspect in an interval-based 
semantics: In their theories, the truth of a sentence is defined relative to an interval of time. Using 
this framework, one could capture Vendler's claim that an accomplishment such as (2) occurs over 
an interval of time. If (2) is true at an interval I, then there is an interval J earlier than I where the 
tenseless sentence "Max runs to the station" is true; this reflects the idea that the accomplishment 
occurs over the interval J. 
Suppose that the interval-based framework is heterogeneous. That is, the truth of a sentence 
A at the interval I does not entail its truth at subintervals of I. This allows for a heterogeneous 
analysis of "Max runs to the station": i. e. one where "Max runs to the station" may be true at J and 
false at K where K is contained in J. This reflects exactly Vendler's claim that not every part of an 
accomplishment is itself an accomplishment. On the other hand, heterogeneity permits a 
`homogeneous' analysis of certain classes. The truth of "Max runs" at an interval J may entail its 
truth at all subintervals of J (up to a certain limit in size); this reflects Vendler's claim that every 
part of a process (up to a certain limit in size) is itself a process. 
Inspired by the heterogeneous interval-based frameworks of Cresswell (1977) and Bennett and 
Partee (1972), Dowty (1979) and Bennett (1981) use heterogeneity to provide a semantic characteri- 
sation of Vendler's aspectual classes. Dowty's representation of accomplishment sentences differs 
from that of activities, in that the truth value at an interval I of a sentence denoting an accomplish- 
ment is determined by what happens at the endpoints of I, i. e. the culmination points. This is not 
the case for activities. In the case where the endpoints of an interval I satisfy the truth conditions 
This analysis of accomplishments arises from the way Dowty analyses achievements. The analysis of achievements 
will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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for an accomplishment sentence A, whereas the endpoints of an interval J contained in I do not, A 
will be true at that interval I and false at the interval J contained in I. In other words, Dowty's 
analysis of accomplishments is heterogeneous. 
Bennett (1981) presents the distinction between sentences denoting accomplishments and 
those denoting activities as one between open and closed intervals. Bennett defines sentences 
denoting atelic events (activities and states) as true only on open intervals: this captures Vendler's 
idea that activities do not invoke culminations (so they do not have definite endings). On the other 
hand, telic events (accomplishments and achievements) are true only on closed intervals. This is 
meant to reflect Vendler's idea that accomplishments and achievements invoke culminations (so 
they have defininte endings). Bennett's analysis of sentences denoting atelic events is heterogene- 
ous: For suppose a sentence A denotes an atelic event, and let A be true at the interval I. We know 
that A is false at every closed interval, and so A is false at every closed interval contained in I. 
Thus A is true at I and false at certain subintervals of I, i. e. the closed intervals, and so the analysis 
of A is heterogeneous. A similar argument shows that Bennett's analysis of sentences denoting 
telic events is heterogeneous. 
I call the strategy for characterising the semantics of aspectual classes by using a heterogene- 
ous interval structure the Heterogeneous Strategy. This general strategy has been formulated in 
three different ways. We have briefly explained how Dowty and Bennett use the strategy in an 
interval-based semantics. In addition, Taylor (1977,1985) formulates the strategy in an event-based 
framework that also invokes intervals, and Cooper (1985) formulates the strategy within the realm 
of situation semantics. 
Taylor assigns predicates an argument place that is reserved for intervals of time. For exam- 
ple, the predicate "build" is a three-place predicate, taking as its arguments a builder, what he built, 
and the time taken up for building. Taylor defines postulates for predicates from the different 
aspectual classes that characterise the kinds of intervals that the predicates can take as arguments. 
For example, the postulates assert that if the formula build(max, house, l) ("Max builds a house over 
the interval I") is true, then build(max, house, J) is false if J is contained in I. This reflects Vendler's 
idea that no part of an accomplishment is itself an accomplishment. On the other hand, the postu- 
lates stipulate that if an activity such as run(max, I) ("Max runs over the interval I") is true, then 
run(max, J) is true for all intervals J (up to a certain limit in size) that are contained in I. This 
reflects Vendler's idea that every part of a process (up to a certain limit in size) is itself a process. 
Taylor is invoking a heterogeneous interval structure to analyse the aspectual classes. His represen- 
tation of "build" is heterogeneous because if the formula build(max, house, I) is true then 
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build(max, house, J) is false where J is contained in I. Hence Taylor is following the Heterogeneous 
Strategy for interpreting the aspectual classes6. 
Cooper (1985) provides a further formulation of the Heterogeneous Strategy for characterising 
the semantics of expressions from different aspectual classes, this time within the framework of 
situation semantics. Individuals, relations and locations constitute the primitive objects of Cooper's 
semantic framework. Locations play the role of intervals of time. One constructs facts from these 
primitive objects: the fact <l, r, xt,.., xn, true> is interpreted as "the relation r holds of individuals 
xt,.., xn over location 1". 
Cooper offers a series of postulates which describe the kinds of locations that facts from the 
different aspectual classes can take as arguments. For example, the postulates stipulate that if a his- 
tory (i. e. a set of facts) contains the accomplishment fact d, build, max, house, true> (i. e. Max builds 
a house over location 1), then it does not contain the fact d', build, max, house, true> for any location 
1' contained in 1. This is a heterogeneous interpretation of accomplishments, and reflects Vendler's 
idea that no part of an accomplishment is itself an accomplishment. On the other hand, Cooper's 
postulates assert that if a history contains the activity fact d, run, max, true> (i. e. Max runs over loca- 
tion 1), then it also contain the facts d', run, max, true> for every location 1' contained in 1; this 
reflects Vendler's idea that every part of a process is itself a process. 
Although Cooper's and Taylor's theories are stated in different frameworks, they are strik- 
ingly similar. The kinds of locations that accomplishments and activities can take as arguments 
according to Cooper's postulates are equivalent to the kinds of intervals that they can take accord- 
ing to Taylor's postulates. 
3 Testing the Heterogeneous Strategy 
We have reviewed three different ways in which to formulate the Heterogeneous Strategy for 
distinguishing among linguistic expressions of different aspectual classes, associated with Dowty 
and Bennett, Taylor and Cooper respectively. In order to examine the implications of the Hetero- 
geneous Strategy, let us evaluate Dowty's formalism. The consequences of this evaluation can be 
6 Hinrichs' (1985) theory on the classification of aspect is similar to Taylor's. Like Taylor's, Hinrichs' framework is 
Davidsonian, and his representations of verbs feature an extra argument place reserved for spatio-temporal locations, where lo- 
cations in Hinrichs' theory play the same role as intervals in Taylor's theory. This extra argument place can be thought of as 
identifying those locations at which the given event takes place. Hinrichs' analysis of "build" is heterogeneous like Taylor's. 
for his theory incorporates a postulate that if build(max, house, l) is true for a location 1, then there is no location r contained in 
1 such that build(max, house, l') is true. 
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shown to carry over to the other two approaches. 
The following is an example of the imperfective paradox: (3) 
entails (4), but no entailment holds between (5) and (6). 
(3) Max was running 
(4) Max ran 
(5) Max was winning the race 
(6) Max won the race 
So in order to solve the imperfective paradox, Dowty must characterise a semantic distinction 
between the activity sentence (4) and the achievement sentence (6). 
A basic desideratum for the analyses of (4) and (6) is that they should fit with a representa- 
tion of temporal adverbials, for example the point adverbial "At 3pm" as it appears in sentences (7) 
and (8). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
I will argue in this chapter that the Heterogeneous Strategy for interpreting the aspectual classes 
cannot yield a satisfactory analysis of these sentences. 
The natural interpretation of (7) is an inchoative one; Max starts to run at 3pm. The natural 
interpretation of (8) is a terminal one; Max crosses the finish line in first place at 3pm. To capture 
these interpretations in the semantic characterisations of (7) and (8) would be a somewhat contr- 
oversial thing to do, since it would entail that (7) is false unless Max starts to run at 3pm, and (8) is 
false unless Max crosses the finish line at 3pm. I will nevertheless assume that this is what is 
required, since these interpretations of (7) and (8) are not cancellable7. How can we capture this 
data in Dowty's semantic theory? 
7 According to intuitions sentences (a) and (b) are strange, whatever the context. 
(a) ? Max ran at 3pm, and he started to run at 2pm 
(b) ? Max won the race at 3pm, and he crossed the finish line at 3: 30pm 
I choose to account for this by regarding these sentences as semantically unsatisfiable. 
16 
Dowty represents the point adverbial "At 3pm" as a sentential operator. Ignoring, tense for 
now, the logical forms of (7) and (8) are represented with the schema AT3pm(c), where 0 is the 
logical form of "Max runs" or "Max wins the race8. Since Dowty's framework is interval-based, 
the truth of (D is defined relative to intervals. So the truth conditions of AT3pm((D) might relate the 
time 3pm to the interval I where 0 is true. The question is: what relation captures the natural 
interpretations of (7) and (8)? 
Dowty represents the activity "Max runs" as true only on non-minimal intervals (i. e. intervals 
larger than a moment). The initial bound of the interval identifies the time Max starts to run. So 
to capture the natural interpretation of (7), its truth conditions must identify 3pm with the initial 
bound of the interval at which "Max runs" is true; i. e. it must have the following temporal structure, 





Given the logical form of (7), we obtain these desired truth conditions for (7) only if the truth of 
AT3pm((D) entails that 3pm is the initial bound of the interval I at which (D is true. 
Now consider the case of sentence (8). Dowty represents the achievement sentence "Max 
wins the race" as true only on non-minimal intervals. The final bound of the interval is interpreted 
as the time when the culmination occurs; in this case the culmination is that Max crosses the finish 
line in first place. So to capture the natural interpretation of (8), its truth conditions must identify 
3pm with the final bound of the interval at which "Max wins the race" is true; i. e. it must have the 
following temporal structure, where I is an interval at which "Max wins the race" is true. 
I 
Max wins the race 3pm 
Given the logical form of (8), we obtain these desired truth conditions for (8) only if the truth of 
AT3pm(d)) entails that 3pm is the final bound of the interval I at which c is true. 
8 (D represents present tensed sentences because Dowty assumes that the senseless sentences are the present tensed ones. This is discussed in more detail later. 
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So, under the assumption that (7) and (8) both have logical form AT3pm((D) (ignoring tense 
for now), a tension arises in their truth conditions, in that (7) requires AT3pm(-O) to entail the ini- 
tial bound relation between 3pm and the interval I at which 0 is true, and (8) requires the final 
bound relation9. 
Dowty's interprets activity and achievement sentences as true only on non-minimal intervals, 
and so "Max runs" or "Max wins the race" may be true at an interval I and false at an interval J 
which is contained in I, e. g. when J is a minimal interval. Hence Dowty's interpretation of activity 
and achievement sentences is heterogeneous. But Dowty's interpretation of these sentences gives 
rise to a tension between the logical representations of (7) and (8). The question now is: what 
implications does this tension have for heterogeneity? 
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I will demonstrate the tension between the 
representations of (7) and (8) in Dowty's and Taylor's theories, in order to examine the implications 
for heterogeneity. 
We do not examine the tension with respect to Cooper's theory, because the logical forms of 
sentences (7) and (8) are not fully worked out in the framework of situation semantics. Given that 
the argument we present here hinges on establishing the logical forms of sentences (7) and (8), we 
could not formulate it in Cooper's framework. However, since Taylor's and Cooper's general 
approaches for interpreting the aspectual classes are closely related, it will be clear that the argu- 
ment against heterogeneity that I formulate in Taylor's theory undermines Cooper's use of hetero- 
geneity, whatever logical form he might assign to sentences (7) and (8)10. But first, I start with 
Dowty's theory. 
9 One might feel uncomfortable with our desire to capture the inchoative interpretation of (7) in the semantics, despite 
the fact that this interpretation is not cancellable. However, if one accepts that the natural interpretation of (8) is a semantic 
one, which admittedly is open to debate, then even if the inchoative interpretation of (7) is demoted to pragmatics, there is 
still a tension in the truth conditions of AT3pm(4D) required by sentences (7) and (8). Sentence (8) requires AT3pm((D) to be 
true only if 3pm is the final bound of the interval I at which 0 is true. Under these truth conditions, we would interpret (7) 
as true only if Max finishes running at 3pm. Whatever (7) means, it certainly does not mean that Max stops running at 3pm. Therefore we still have a tension between the truth conditions of AT3pm(cI) required by (7) and the truth conditions of A13pm(t1) required by (8). In the rest of this chapter, however, for the sake of committing myself to a particular semantics for (7), I will maintain that the supposition that the semantic interpretation of (7) should be an inchoative one. 
to We will discuss Cooper's theory in detail in the next chapter, when we examine his strategy for defining the progres- 
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4 Dowty's Heterogeneous Interpretation of the Aspectual Classes 
Dowty characterises a semantic distinction between activity sentences, such as (9), and 
achievement and accomplishment sentences, such as (6) and (10), by formulating the metaphysical 
distinctions described by Vendler's (1967) classification of aspect in a heterogeneous interval-based 
semantics. 
(9) Max ran 
(6) Max won the race 
(10) Max built a house 
In order to construct an interval-based semantic representation, Dowty is obliged to introduce 
definitions for intervals and related notions. Intervals are described as connected sets over the reals. 
The definitions of the related notions such as "subinterval" and "initial bound" conform to their 
intuitive correlates. 
Dowty formulates Vendler's classification of verbs as follows: he postulates a single class of 
predicates, which are the stative predicates such as "is insane". His objective is to interpret verbs 
from all Vendler's aspectual classes as combinations of statives with explicitly interpreted operators. 
His strategy is to distinguish the logical forms of simple propositions, that are derived from verbs 
that belong to different aspectual classes. 
Sentence (11) is an example of a simple stative sentence, whose logical form is the atomic 
formula (12). 
(11) Max is insane 
(12) insane(Max) 
The predicate "insane'" and the singular term "Max'" are primitive elements of the system; they are 
the units of meaning. Dowty's analysis of statives is homogeneous, i. e. they satisfy the converse 
principle to heterogeneity: if (12) is true at an interval I, then (12) is true at all subintervals of I. 
Activities, accomplishments and achievements are all derived from statives by the application of 
certain operators and connectives, which yield heterogeneous interpretations of these classes. 
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4.1 The Semantic Interpretation of Achievements 
Dowty observes, in agreement with Kenny (1963). that an achievement always involves the 
coming about of a particular state of affairs. For example, sentence (13) involves the coming about 
of the state of affairs where Max is the winner of the race. 
(13) Max won the race 
In order to capture this observation, Dowty represents achievements with the aid of the operator 
BECOME. The logical form of tenseless achievements is given by (14), where 4) denotes the state 
of affairs once the achievement is completed. 
(14) [BECOME 0] 
For example, the tenseless achievement (15) will have the logical form (15a), where 
winner'(max', race') represents the state that Max is the winner of the race. 
(15) Max wins the race 
(15a) [BECOME (winnei'(max', race'))] 
The truth conditions for [BECOME 0], where c is a formula, are given below: 
The Truth Conditions for BECOME 
[BECOME b] is true at an interval I if and only if there is an interval J containing the in- itial bound of I such that -, (D is true at J and there is an interval K containing the final bound of I such that dD is true at K. 
The truth of the sentence [BECOME c] requires the following temporal structure: 
K 
-A) is true (D is true 
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The truth value of [BECOME 0] at the interval I depends on what goes on at the endpoints 
of I. The endpoints of an interval I may satisfy the truth conditions of [BECOME cb], even though 
the endpoints of an interval I' contained in I do not satisfy the conditions. Therefore it is possible 
for [BECOME cb] to be true at an interval I and false at an interval I' that is contained in I. So 
Dowty's analysis of achievement sentences is heterogeneous. 
Note that achievement sentences can only be true at non-minimal intervals. By this I mean 
that they are only true at intervals larger than a minimal interval, or, in other words, a moment, 
which in Dowty's theory is a singleton set like (t). For if [BECOME d)] is true at a moment (t), 
then both 0 and -, ) must be true at (t). Therefore [BECOME C] is false at all moments for all 
(D. Vendler claims that achievements are punctual, and yet Dowty's achievements are false at all 
moments. Therefore Dowty's heterogeneous analysis of achievement sentences does not conform 
exactly to Vendler's metaphysical description of themll. 
4.2 The Semantic Interpretation of Activities 
The logical form of activities includes the operator DO, that takes a singular term and a sta- 
tive as its arguments; the singular term is supposed to denote the agent of the activity. So the 
tenseless activity (16) has the logical form (16a), where "walldng-state'(Max) is a stative formula. 
(16) Max walks 
(16a) DO(Max', walking-state'(Max')) 
Dowty does not give explicit truth conditions for the operator DO, but he does claim that the 
following postulate applies to activities. 
(58) If A is an activity verb, then if A(x) is true at an interval I, there is some physically 
definable property P such that the individual denoted by x lacks P at the lower bound of I 
and has P at the upper bound of I. (Dowty 1979: 168) 
Postulate (58) is supposed to capture the intuition that activities, such as "Max ran", involve an 
indefinite change of state 12. Note that if an activity A(x) is true at the minimal interval (t), then 
11 Dowry himself observes some undesirable consequences of his definition for the operator "BECOME". but his criti- 
cisms are not relevant for our purposes here. 
12 Without a clear account of what sort of properties P can be, the activity postulate (58) is uninformative. No such ac- 
count is given by Dowty. 
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there must be a property P such that x lacks P at (t), and x has P at (t). Therefore it follows that 
activities are true only at non-minimal intervals. They are therefore heterogeneous, because an 
activity sentence may be true at an interval I and false at an interval J contained in I, e. g. when J is 
a minimal interval. 
Given that activities are true only at non-minimal intervals, we are left with a question: what 
structure do these non-minimal intervals have? Dowty (1979) is somewhat vague on this issue, but 
in (Dowty 1986), he argues that an activity is true at an interval only if it is true at all subintervals 
above a certain minimal size. Postulate (58) in the 1979 framework leaves open the issue of 
whether activities conform to this. 
5 Dowty's Analysis of Point Adverbials 
I have now discussed the semantics of activity and achievement sentences in Dowty's theory. 
The semantics of these sentences make essential use of the heterogeneous interval structure. A 
basic desideratum for this analysis is that it must fit with an interpretation of temporal adverbials, 
such as the point adverbial "At 3pm" as it appears in sentences (7) and (8). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
I will now investigate how one might define "At 3pm". This will be the crucial test for Dowty's 
formulation of the Heterogeneous Strategy. I will show that one cannot account for sentences (7) 
and (8) given Dowty's heterogeneous interpretations of activity and achievement sentences. 
5.1 The Logical Form 
One must assign the tenseless sentences that include point adverbials their logical forms. Let 
us start with sentence (17)13. 
(17) Max wins the race at 3pm 
The logical form of "Max wins the race" is sentence (15a). 
13 Dowty assumes that the tenseless sentences are the present-tensed ones. So (17) is a tenseless sentence. Dowty's full definition of tense appears in appendix 2 
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(15a) [BECOME (winnei'(ma)e, race')] 
Therefore given Dowty's structural representation of "At 3pm", there are two possible logical forms 
'4 for sentence (17); (17a) or (17b). 
(17) Max wins the race at 3pm 
(17a) [BECOME [AT(3pm, (winner'(max', race')))]] 
(17b) [AT(3pm, [BECOME (winner'(max', raceD)])] 
5.1.1 BECOME with Wide Scope over AT 
Suppose that the logical form of sentence (17) is sentence (17a). 
(17a) [BECOME [AT(3pm, winner'(max', race'))]] 
(17a) is true at the interval I if and only if there is an interval J containing the lower bound of I 
such that (18) is false at J, and there is an interval K containing the upper bound of I such that (18) 
is true at K. 
(18) [AT(3pm, winner'(max', race'))] 
According to Dowty's definition for "AT"15 
[AT(t, db)] is true at I if and only if 4) is true at (t), 
sentence (18) is an eternal sentence: it is either true at all intervals or false at all intervals. Sup- 
pose that (18) is true at all intervals. Then there is no interval J containing the lower bound of I 
such that (18) is false at J. So (17a) is false at I. On the other hand, suppose that (18) is false at 
all intervals. Then there is no interval K containing the upper bound of I such that (18) is true at 
K So (17a) is false at I. Hence given the eternal nature of AT, sentence (17a) must always be 
false, contrary to common sense. 
To rescue (17a) as the representation of (17), one might try to revise the analysis of AT so 
14 The logical form Dowty chooses is (17b), but I will entertain both possibilities for now. 
Is I have modified Dowry's definition of AT so that it is defined relative to intervals. His original definition of 
[AT(t, cD)] entails that it is true or false simpliciter, and this does not conform with the interval-based framework. 
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that [AT(t, (D)] is no longer an eternal sentence. We wish [AT(t, 4D)] to be true at some intervals and 
false at others. To achieve this, the truth conditions of [AT(t, O)] might have the following form, 
where R denotes some non-trivial relationship between t and I. 
[AT(t, (D)] is true at the interval I if and only if tRI, and cb is true at I. 
It must be stressed that in this definition of [AT(t, d))], we are using the expression "t" in two 
different ways. The expression "t" in the formula [AT(t, b)] is an expression in the object 
language, whereas the expression "t" that is related by R to I in the truth conditions is an expres- 
sion in the metalanguage, and is denoted by the expression "t" in the object language. 
What relationship is denoted by R? One must investigate further the interaction between 
BECOME and AT. 
The natural interpretation of sentence (17) is one in which Max is the winner of the race at 
3pm, but not before. But "Max is the winner of the race" is exactly the state of affairs that 
corresponds to the formula winner'(max', race'). So (17) must be true only if winner (max', race') is 
(a) true at (3pm) and (b) false at every non-minimal interval whose final bound is (3pm). Condi- 
tion (b) arises as a consequence of the homogeneity of states. If winner'(max', race) were true at 
some non-minimal interval, however small, whose final bound was 3pm, then winner'(max', race) 
would be true at some moment (t) before 3pm. This would not be a situation in which sentence 
(17) is regarded as true. 
Since the truth of winner'(max', race' at (3pm) must contribute to the truth of (18), the rela- 
tion R must be defined so that 3pmR(3pm) is satisfied. On the other hand, if winner'(max', race') is 
false at every interval whose final bound is 3pm, then [AT(3pm, winner'(max', raceD)] is also false 
at these intervals (by the above schema for the truth definition of [AT(t, cb)]). 
Now consider the truth conditions for (17a) with these constraints on AT. (17a) is true at the 
interval I if and only if there is an interval J containing the lower bound of I such that [AT(3pm, 
winner'(max', race))] is false at J, and there is an interval K containing the upper bound of I such 
that [AT(3pm, winner'(max', race))] is true at K. Suppose that winner'(max', race') is true at (3pm) 
and false at every interval whose final bound is (3pm). Then by the above constraints on AT, 
[AT(3pm, winner'(max', race'))] is true at (3pm) and false at every interval whose final bound is 
(3pm). But then according to the truth conditions for BECOME, (17a) is true at any interval I 
whose final bound is (3pm). This does not agree with the actual use of (17). So one cannot rescue 
(17a) as the representation of (17). So we have only one possible representation of (17) left, and 
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that is (17b). 
(17b) [AT(3pm, [BECOME winner'(max', raceD])] 
5.1.2 BECOME with Narrow Scope over AT 
How may (17b) yield a satisfactory analysis of (17)? 
(17) Max wins the race at 3pm 
(17b) [AT(3pm, [BECOME winnei'(max', race)])] 
Given Dowty's current definitions for BECOME and AT, the truth of (17b) requires that 
[BECOME (winner'(max', race'))] be true at (3pm). But any formula of the form [BECOME b] is 
false at all moments (i. e. all intervals that are singleton sets). Hence sentence (17b) is always false, 
contrary to the use of (17). 
In the case of (17b), we have encountered the same issue as we did for (17a): squaring the 
definitions of BECOME and AT. If (17b) is to be a satisfactory representation of (17) with 
Dowty's definition for BECOME, one must revise his definition of AT. Moreover, this definition 
must yield a satisfactory analysis of sentence (19). 
(19) Max runs at 3pm 
Since I am assuming that the logical form of sentence (17) is (17b), for the sake of uniformity the 
logical form of sentence (19) must be (19a). 
(19a) [AT(3pm, [DO(max'. running-state'(max'))])] 
How may one modify Dowty's definition of AT so that (17b) and (19a) represent (17) and (19)? 
5.2 The Eternal Nature of [AT(t, Z)] 
For the sake of perspective, I will now investigate how one might capture the meaning of sen- 
tence (19) in the truth conditions of (19a). As Dowty's definition of "AT" stands, sentence (19a) is 
true just in case [DO(max', running-state'(max'))] is true at the moment (3pm). But (by postulate 
(58)) all sentences of the form [DO(a, cb)] are false at all moments. Therefore sentence (19a) is 
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always false. If we are to preserve Dowty's interpretation of sentences denoting activities, we must 
modify the truth conditions for [AT(t, O)], so that the truth of [AT(t, (D)] arises from the truth of cb 
at some non-minimal interval I. 
The question now is: at which intervals I does the truth of (b contribute to the truth of 
[AT(t, c)]? To answer this question, one might specify a relation R between the time t and the 
interval I. [AT(t, cb)] is currently an eternal sentence: it is true at all intervals or at none. If we are 
to preserve the eternal nature of [AT(t, cb)], then its new truth definition might follow the schema 
given below, where R expresses some relation between t and I. 
[AT(t, (D)] is true at an interval J if and only if there exists an interval I such that tRI, and 
(D is true at I. 
How should R be specified? 
To answer this question, let us consider the representations of sentences (19) and (20). 
(20) Max does not run at 3pm 
I will now show that one cannot adequately represent both sentences (19) and (20) given the above 
schema for defining AT. 
There are no scope ambiguities in the negation featured in sentence (20). Sentence (20) 
entails that at 3pm, Max does not run. To capture this in Dowty's theory, -1[AT(3pm, cb)] must be 
truth-conditionally equivalent to [AT(3pm, )], where 0 represents the sentence "Max runs". 
Therefore we can assume that the logical form of sentence (20) is (20a). 
(20a) [AT(3pm, -i[DO(max', running-state'(max'))])] 
Let us now consider the truth conditions of sentence (20a). Since "? S4 runs" is an activity, 
the formula (21) is true at all moments (i. e. all intervals that are singleton sets). 
(21) -, [DO(max', running-state'(max))])l 
In particular, (21) is true at {3pm) in all models. 'But the relation R must be defined so that 3pm 
stands in the relation R to the interval (3pm) (the justification for this was discussed in section 
5.1.1). So since (21) is true at (3pm), then (20a) must be true at all intervals - because of the eter- 
nal nature of AT - in all models. 
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But suppose that the relationship R in the truth conditions of [AT(t, (D)] holds in a model M 
between 3pm and an interval I at which [DO(max', running-state'(max'))])] is true. (Notice that this 
assumption does not clash with the fact that -, [DO(max', running-state'(max'))] is true at (3pm) and 
the assumption that 3pmR{3pm)). Then (19a) is true in the model M at all intervals, due to the 
eternal nature of AT. But (19a) is the logical form of (19). 
(19) Max runs at 3pm 
(19a) [AT(3pm, [DO(max', running-state'(maxl)])] 
So in the model M, sentences (19) and (20) are both true at all intervals. 
Here we have a paradoxical situation on our hands. We have constructed a model M such 
that sentences (19) and (20) are both true at all intervals with respect to M. 
(19) Max runs at 3pm 
(20) Max does not run at 3pm 
This undesirable result arises from a clash between the assumption that activities take time (i. e. they 
are true only at non-minimal intervals), and the assumption that formulae of the form [AT(t, (D)] are 
eternal sentences. If we are to preserve Dowty's analysis of the aspectual classes, it is necessary to 
relax the condition that [AT(t, cb)] is an eternal sentence16. This can be achieved by defining the 
new truth conditions of [AT(t, O)] according to the following schema: 
[AT(t, cb)] is true at I just in case tRI and 0 is true at I 
The revised definition of [AT(t, ib)] involves expressing a relationship R between t and the interval I 
of evaluation. With this modification to [AT(t, O)], one guarantees that sentences (19) and (20) do 
not receive the same truth value at the same intervals in the same model. 
We have seen the general schema that the truth conditions of AT must follow. There is still 
the task, however, of describing the relationship R so that it captures the desired analyses of sen- 
17 tences (7) and (8), whose logical forms are (7a) and (8a) respectively. 
16 The above argument that [AT(t, D)] cannot be an eternal sentence with Dowty's interpretation of activities applies to 
achievements as well. To preserve Dowty's claim that achievement sentences are true only at non-minimal intervals, one 
must revise his truth definition for AT so that the formulae [AT(t, (D)] are not eternal sentences. 17 The representation of the past tense in (7a) and (8a) is Dowry's abbreviation for his analysis of tense to be found in 
appendix 2. 
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(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(7a) [PAST + [AT(3pm, [DO(max', running-state'(max'))])]] 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
(8a) [PAST + [AT(3pm, [BECOME winner'(max', race')])]] 
5.3 The Relation R in the Definition of [AT(t, (D)] 
How is one to express the relationship R between 3pm and I in the truth conditions for 
[AT(3pm, (D)] at I? Let us first examine the constraints required on R in order that the representation 
of (7) captures its natural, inchoative meaning. 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(7) is true only if Max starts to run at 3pm. For Dowty, the point of time at which Max starts to 
run must be equated with the initial bound of the interval at which "Max runs", i. e. 
[DO(max', running-state'(max )], is true. So to capture the inchoative reading of (7) in the truth con- 
ditions of (7a), one must have the following truth conditions for [AT(3pm, 4))] (so R is the initial 
bound relation): 
New Conditions for [AT(3pm, O)] 
[AT(3pm, (D)] is true at the interval I if and only if 3pm is the initial bound of I and 0 is 
true at I. 
One now has the problem of squaring this definition of [AT(3pm, (D)] with the representation 
of sentence (8). The representation of sentence (8) is (8a). 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
(8a) [PAST + [AT(3pm, [BECOME winner'(max', race')])]] 
Consider the following situation: suppose Max begins to win the race at 3pm, and crosses the finish 
line in first place at 5pm. Then according to Dowty's definition of BECOME, the formula (22) is 
true at the interval spanning 3pm to 5pm (which is denoted by the open interval (3pm, 5pm)). 
(22) [BECOME winner'(max', race')] 
So according to the new definition for [AT(3pm, T)], sentence (23) is true at the interval (3pm, 
5pm). 
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(23) [AT(3pm, [BECOME winnef(max', race')])] 
Therefore sentence (8a) is true at an interval later than (3pm, 5pm). 
This interpretation of (8) does not respect its actual use. The only natural interpretation of (8) 
is one in which Max is the winner of the race at 3pm. (8) should therefore be false with respect to 
the situation described, since Max is not the winner of the race until 5pm. If the definition of 
[AT(3pm, cb)] accounts for the natural interpretation of sentence (7), then it is in direct conflict with 
Dowty's definition for BECOME. Therefore if one is to represent the natural interpretation of (8), 
one is forced either to change the interpretation of achievement sentences, or change the definition 
of [AT(3pm, cb)]. 
Suppose now that one attempts to define [AT(3pm, (D)] so that (8a) captures the meaning of 
(8). 3pm must be identified as the time when Max crosses the finish line in first place, which 
occurs at the final bound of the interval I at which [BECOME winner'(max', race)] is true. So in 
order for (8a) to adequately represent (8), [AT(3pm, b)] receives the following definition (so R is 
the final bound relation): 
[AT(t, (D)] is true at the interval I if and only if t is the final bound of I and 0 is true at I. 
One now has the problem of squaring this definition of AT with the representation of (7). 
Consider the following situation: suppose that Max starts to run at 2pm and finishes running 
at 3pm. Then (19) is true at the interval (2pm, 3pm). 
(19a) [AT(3pm, [DO(max', running-state'(maxj)])] 
Hence sentence (7a), the representation of (7), is true with respect to this situation (provided the 
utterance time is after (2pm, 3pm)). 
(7a) [PAST + [AT(3pm, [DO(max', running-state'(max'))])]] 
This does not respect the natural, inchoative interpretation of (7), since Max finishes running at 
3pm, rather than starts to run. If the definition of [AT(3pm, cb)] captures the natural interpretation 
of (8), then it is in direct conflict with Dowty's interpretation of activities. 
A representation of "At 3pm" that captures the natural, inchoative interpretation of (7) is in 
direct conflict with Dowry's interpretation of achievement sentences. Furthermore, the 
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representation of "At 3pm" that captures the natural interpretation of (8) is in direct conflict with 
Dowty's interpretation of activity sentences. The problem can be seen as one of squaring the initial 
bound relation required of R to represent (7), in contrast with the final bound relation required of R 
to represent (8). 
At this point, there are three strategies one could adopt to resolve the situation. The first of 
these is to have two separate definitions for "At 3pm", one for activities, and the other for achieve- 
ments. The shortcomings of this strategy are obvious; one should have a uniform definition for "At 
3pm". 
The second strategy is to fix the definition of "At 3pm" so that (8a) captures the meaning of 
(8) (so R is the final bound relation), and revise the interpretation of activities so that this definition 
may also predict the inchoative interpretation with activities. The third strategy is to fix the 
definition of "At 3pm" so that (7a) captures the meaning of (7) (so R is the initial bound relation), 
and revise the interpretation of achievements so that this definition of "At 3pm" may also capture 
the natural interpretation with achievements. Whether we follow the second or third strategy, we 
are forced to change Dowty's interpretation of the aspectual classes. The question now is: what 
changes are necessary? 
5.4 A Change to Dowty's Interpretation of the Aspectual Classes 
5.4.1 A Change to Activities 
I will now examine the second strategy; i. e. I will investigate how one might revise the 
interpretation of activities so that the representation of "At 3pm" below, that captures the meaning 
of (8), also captures the (inchoative) meaning of (7): 
[AT(3pm, (D)] is true at the interval I if and only if 3pm is the final bound of I and Q is 
true at I. 
To capture the inchoative interpretation of (7) with the above definition for AT, activities 
must be true only at minimal intervals (i. e. moments). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
For suppose that there is a non-minimal interval I at which "Max runs" is true. Suppose that the 
initial bound of I is 3pm and the final bound is t (3pm 4 t). Then the above definition for AT 
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predicts that (7) is false at I. But 3pm is the time that Max starts to run, and so according to intui- 
tions (7) is true at I. Therefore, activity sentences cannot be true at non-minimal intervals: they 
must be true only at minimal intervals. 
Now suppose that activities are true only at minimal intervals, and suppose that we interpret 
activities so that if "Max runs" is true at (3pm), then Max starts to run at 3pm. 3pm is the final 
bound of (3pm), and so if "Max runs is true at (3pm), (7) is true. Hence (7) has an inchoative 
reading, as required, for the truth conditions of (7) identify 3pm with the time that Max starts to 
run. However, the assumption that activity sentences are false at all non-minimal intervals is 
clearly unviable, since our intuitions tell us that activities can happen over a period of time. Hence 
fixing the representation of "At 3pm" to capture the meaning of (8) and changing the interpretation 
of activity sentences, although a technically viable strategy, is materially inadequate. 
5.4.2 A Change to Achievements 
One is now left with only the third strategy to explain the natural meanings of (7) and (8), 
and that is to revise the interpretation of achievement sentences so that the representation of "At 
3pm" below, that captures the inchoative meaning of (7), also captures the natural meaning of (8). 
[AT(3pm, (D)] is true at I if and only if 3pm is the initial bound of I and d> is true at I. 
This definition of AT will capture the natural interpretation of (8) only if achievement sen- 
tences are false at all non-minimal intervals. 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
For suppose that there is a non-minimal interval I at which "Max wins the race" is true. Suppose 
the initial bound of I is t and the final bound is 3pm (so Max crosses the finish line in first place at 
3pm and t4 3pm). Then the above definition for AT predicts that (8) is false. But 3pm is the time 
Max crosses the finish line in first place, and so according to intuitions (8) is true. Therefore, 
achievement sentences such as "Max wins the race" cannot be true at non-minimal intervals; they 
must be true only at minimal intervals (i. e. moments). 
If achievement sentences are true only at minimal intervals and never true at non-minimal 
intervals, then the above definition of [AT(3pm, (D)] allows for a satisfactory representation of the 
meaning of (8). For (i) the interval (t) at which "Max wins the race" is true must be the time at 
which Max crosses the finish line, and (ii) since "Max wins the race" is true only at minimal 
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intervals (i. e. moments), (8) is true only if "Max wins the race" is true at (3pm). So the new 
interpretation of (8) identifies 3pm as the time when Max crosses the finish line in first place, as 
required. Therefore, in order to represent adequately (7) and (8), one must assume that achievement 
sentences are true only at moments. 
What are the consequences of the revised interpretation of achievement sentences? First, the 
operator BECOME can no longer feature in the logical form for achievements. But as we will see 
in the next chapter, Dowty's operator BECOME plays a key role in his solution to the imperfective 
paradox. 
Furthermore, we have undermined the very foundations of Dowty's Heterogeneous Strategy 
for distinguishing the semantics of linguistic expressions of different aspectual classes. The con- 
verse principle to heterogeneity is homogeneity: A sentence is homogeneous if its truth at an inter- 
val I entails its truth at all subintervals of I. The new interpretation of achievements undermines 
the Heterogeneous Strategy because the assumption that achievement sentences are true only at 
minimal intervals and the assumption that they are homogeneous are equivalent. This is shown as 
follows: if achievement sentences are true only at minimal intervals, then this does not allow for the 
possibility that an achievement sentence A is true at an interval I and false at an interval J which is 
contained in I (for I has no subintervals). So achievement sentences are homogeneous. On the 
other hand, a homogeneous interpretation of achievement sentences is satisfactory only if they are 
true only at minimal intervals. To see this, suppose that an achievement sentence A is true at a 
non-minimal interval I in a homogeneous environment. Then A must be true at every interval J 
contained in I. One is now committed to one of two undesirable consequences. The first alternative 
is that the structural representation of A is not related to the 'culmination' of the achievement. The 
second alternative is that A has a culmination associated with it, but homogeneity entails that this 
culmination occurs at every interval contained in I (since A is true at every interval contained in I). 
Hence a homogeneous interpretation of achievement sentences is satisfactory only if they are true 
only at minimal intervals. Hence the homogeneous analysis of achievement sentences is equivalent 
to the analysis where they are true only at minimal intervals18. 
So to conclude, we have explored all the possible ways in which Dowty might represent sen- 
tences (7) and (8). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
is By a similar argument, accomplishments are homogeneous if and only if they are true only at minimal intervals. 
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(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
First, there was a choice in logical form; (8) could have logical form (8a) or (8b). 
(8a) 
, 
[PAST + [AT(3pm, [BECOME winner'(max', race')])]] 
(8b) [PAST + [BECOME [AT(3pm, winnef(max', race'))]]] 
We argued that either way, Dowty's eternal nature of AT is not sustainable. Furthermore, even if 
one relaxes the condition that AT is an eternal sentence, one still cannot rescue (8b) as the 
representation of (8). Therefore we concluded that the logical form of (8) must be (8a). 
This logical form for (8) lead to a tension between the definition of AT required to capture 
the natural interpretation of (8), and the definition of AT required to capture the natural interpreta- 
tion of (7). We were forced by this tension to change Dowty's interpretation of the aspectual 
classes. We demonstrated that although changing Dowty's interpretation of activity sentences was a 
technically viable strategy, it was materially inadequate. We were therefore forced to change 
Dowty's interpretation of achievement sentences. We then showed that the only way one can 
represent sentences (7) and (8) in Dowty's framework is to assume that achievement sentences are 
true only at minimal intervals. This is equivalent to a homogeneous interpretation of achievements. 
Therefore, in order to represent (7) and (8), one must assume that achievement sentences are homo- 
geneous. 
We have seen that heterogeneity may not be sustainable, for achievements at least. The puz- 
zle now is: can homogeneity yield a satisfactory semantic distincton between activity sentences such 
as "Max ran" and achievement sentences such as "Max won the race"? This puzzle is answered in 
chapter 6. 
We have now examined Dowty's formulation of the Heterogeneous Strategy in an interval- 
based framework. It fails, because heterogeneity is not sustainable in Dowty's theory, for achieve- 
ments at least. But can Taylor's (1977,1985) formulation of the Heterogeneous Strategy do any 
better than Dowty's? Let us first examine the role of heterogeneity in Taylor's theory, and then see 
if his formulation is subject to the same puzzles as Dowty's. 
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6 Taylor's Semantic Interpretation of the Aspectual Classes 
Taylor aims to augment the Davidsonian analysis of adverb modification with a theory of 
events, and an essential part of this theory is his heterogeneous interpretation of the aspectual 
classes. 
Davidson's proposal is that putative n-place predicates capable of adverbial modification 
should be regarded as (n+l)-place predicates, with the extra argument place reserved for a singular 
term designating an event. Adverbs should be taken as expressing properties of the events thus 
invoked. A theory of events must explain how events relate to each other, whilst refusing to 
countenance such negative events as Brutus' not stabbing Caesar. Taylor's objective is to provide 
such a theory of events. 
It must be stressed that the aims of Taylor's theory are different to Dowty's. Taylor does not 
address the problem of the imperfective paradox. Unlike Dowty, he does not offer a definition of 
the progressive that solves the imperfective paradox. However, he fulfils the task connected with 
the imperfective paradox that is under examination in this chapter he provides a semantic distinc- 
tion between expressions of different aspectual classes. Taylor uses this to distinguish events from 
facts. 
The role heterogeneity plays in Taylor's theory is revealed in his semantic interpretation of 
Aristotle's classification of verbs. This classification is a trichotomy, the distinguishing classes 
being S("state")-verbs, E("energia")-verbs and K("ldnesis")-verbs. S-verbs correspond to Vendler's 
stative verbs, E-verbs correspond to Vendler's activities, and K-verbs to Vendler's accomplishments 
and achievements, grouped together in one class. Let us examine the backdrop of Taylor's theory, 
as a preliminary to reviewing his heterogeneous interpretation of Aristotle's trichotomy. 
6.1 Taylor's Analysis of Tense and Atomic Form 
Taylor's base formalism, which is called LE, contains variables that range over times, and 
also includes constants representing the natural language terms "now" and "then". Taylor distin- 
guishes two kinds of times; indivisible moments and longer temporal periods. The distinction 
between moments and periods is marked with the aid of predicates; Mom(t) ("t is a moment") and 
Per(t) ("t is a period"). The relations expressible between times are then represented as follows: 
"td'" means "t is earlier than t'". 
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"tct'" means "t falls properly within C". 
"taf" means "t falls within t'", i. e. t either is t', or else t falls properly within t'. 
Taylor also offers an axiomatic theory of time from which it follows that time is dense and continu- 
ous. The related notions such as "subinterval" and "initial bound" are defined so as to correspond 
to intuitions. 
Taylor analyses predicates in the base formalism as relativised to times. The reading of sen- 
tence (24) is "t is a time of Max's being taller than John". 
(24) Taller(max john, t) 
If (24) is true, then one can say that t is a time of application of the predicate "Taller". 
The representation of the simple present tensed sentence (25) is formula (25a). 
(25) Max is taller than John 
(25a) Taller(max, john, now) 
The representations of the simple past sentence (26) and the simple future sentence (27) are (26a) 
and (27a) respectively. 
(26) Max was taller than John 
(26a) ((t)(tnow & Taller(maxjohn, t)) 
(27) Max will be taller than John 
(27a) (3t)(now<t & Taller(maxjohn, t)) 
(26a) paraphrases as "there is a time t earlier than now such that t is a time of Max's being taller 
than John". (27a) paraphrases as "there is a time t later than now such that t is a time of Max's 
being taller than John". 
6.2 The Postulates 
We are now in a position to discuss Taylor's semantic characterisation Aristotle's 
classification of verbs. 
Taylor observes that a state, such as Rod's being hirsute, need not take an interval of time. 
In contrast, he claims that an E-expression, such as Rod's chuckling, or a K-expression, such as 
Rod's pulling a pint, necessarily take time. 
35 
To reflect these intuitions in the formalism LE, he defines a postulate for states, which stipu- 
lates that if t is a period of application of an S-verb, then every moment m in t is also a time of 
application of the S-verb. In contrast, if t is a time of application of an E-verb or K-verb, then t 
must be a period. 
Taylor defines the postulates with the following symbolism: S, K and E-verbs will be 
represented in the base language by use of a predicate constant in the corresponding category. 
(This will be defined as the theory is developed). Let Pý be the j-th n-place predicate constant of 
the base formalism, and let V" be the result of filling its first n-1 argument places by distinct vari- i 
ables (say, the first n-1 variables in some specified standard ordering). Where there is no confusion, 
I shall abbreviate P". and V`' to e and V° respectively. Postulates 1 and 2 are as follows: 
Postulate 1 (for S-verbs) 
P° should count as an S-predicate if it meets the following condition: 
Per(t) -. ý (V°(t) (Vt')((Mom(t) & t'ct) -. ý V°(t)) 
Postulate 2 (for E and K-verbs) 
If P° is an E or K-predicate, then it should meet the following condition: 
V°(t) ---> Per(t) 
For example, the verb phrase "is taller than" is stative, so by postulate 1 the predicate "Taller" 
satisfies condition (28) for all times t: in other words, if max is taller than john over t, then max is 
taller than john over every moment t' contained in t. 
(28) Per(t) -* (Taller(max john, t) <_> (Vt')((Mom(t') & tct) --> Taller(max john, t'))) 
The verb "run" is an E-verb, and so by postulate 2 the E-predicate "Run" satisfies condition (29) for 
all t: in other words, if max runs over time t, then t must be a period. 
(29) Run(max, t) -a Per(t) 
Postulate 2 expresses a feature common to both E and K-verbs. This postulate forms the 
foundation for postulate 3 on E-verbs, which stipulates that if t is a time of application of an E-verb 
then all periods contained in t are times of application of the E-verb: This reflects the idea that 
every part of a process is itself a process. Furthermore, postulate 3 adds a condition that the time t 
of application of the E-verb must be contained in an open interval that is also a time of application 
of the E-verb: this reflects the idea that processes don't have definite endpoints. Postulate 3 is 
given below ("OF(t')" means "t' is an open interval"): 
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Postulate 3 (for E-verbs) 
V'"t -' Per(t) & (3t')(OF(t') & tct' & V". t') i& (`dt")(t"ct & Pert") -- Vljt'ý 
Postulate 2 also forms the foundations for postulate 4 for K-verbs, which stipulates that if t is 
the time of application of a K-verb, then there is no time contained in t which is also the time of 
application of the K-verb; this reflects the idea that, in Vendler's terms, no part of an accomplish- 
ment is itself an accomplishment. 
Postulate 4 (for K-verbs) 
V ýt -4 Per(t) & (W)(t'ct --4 ,V fit) 
Taylor adds minor revisions to postulates 3 and 4 on the grounds of a spatial analogy. The revised 
descriptions of E and K-verbs, however, still rest on postulate 2. The revisions are irrelevant to the 
purposes of this chapter, for they do not affect the nature of heterogeneity in Taylor's theory. They 
are given in appendix 3. 
Postulates 2,3 and 4 entail that t may be a time of application of an E or K-predicate, even 
though t' is not a time of application of the E or K-predicate, where t' is contained in t (for E- 
predicates, this follows only if t' is a moment). Hence these postulates describe the semantics of E 
and K-verbs using a heterogeneous interval structure; so Taylor is adopting the Heterogeneous Stra- 
tegy for interpreting the aspectual classes. 
Dowty's and Taylor's theories are superficially very different, for they are stated in different 
frameworks. Taylors' theory is not interval-based, for the framework is Davidsonian and so the 
truth values of sentences are not given relative to intervals of time. A sentence in Taylor's theory 
is true or false simpliciter. Nevertheless, the role of heterogeneity resulting from postulates 2,3 
and 4 in Taylor's theory bears striking similarities to the role of heterogeneity in Dowry's theory. 
For Taylor, the only times of application of E-verbs (i. e. activities) and K-verbs (achievements) are 
non-minimal. Similarly for Dowty, activities and achievements are true only at non-minimal inter- 
vals. Moreover, postulate 4 entails that t may be a time of application of an achievement, even 
though the interval t' which is contained in t is not a time of application of the achievement. Simi- 
larly in Dowty's theory, an achievement may be true at an interval t and false at an period t' con- 
tained in t. 19 
19 One might think it possible to translate Taylor's theory into Dowty's interval-based framework. However. Taylor 
treats predicates from all aspectual classes as primitive and for Dowry, only the stative predicates are primitive. 
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7 Taylor's Representation of Point Adverbials 
Dowty's heterogeneous interpretation of the aspectual classes could not yield a satisfactory 
definition of the point adverbial "At 3pm", as it appears in sentences (7) and (8). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
Can Taylor's heterogeneous interpretation of the aspectual classes do any better? 
7.1 Events and Adverbs 
In order to clarify Taylor's representations of (7) and (8), one must understand his theory of 
events, and his Davidsonian interpretation of adverbial modification. (In what follows, no commit- 
ment , to Taylor's theory of events is intended). 
Taylor uses Aristotle's trichotomy to produce a theory of events. He argues that events 
should be viewed as a species öf states of affairs, and uses the analysis of Aristotle's classification 
of verbs to determine which states of affairs are events. He stipulates the following conditions on 
eventhood: 
(1) Events are one and all facts (i. e. obtaining states of affairs). 
(2) Events must be temporally continuous changes: Max's being noble is not an event, in 
contrast with his running or winning the race. Moreover, Reagan's eating breakfast and 
eating dinner each describe an event, but there is no one event of his eating both. 
(3) An Event must be continuously manifested in some one object. Jack's climbing 
Everest and Jill's climbing Ben Nevis are both events, but they do not constitute a single 
event. 
Taylor claims that according to his analysis of Aristotle's trichotomy, in particular the con- 
trast between postulates 1 and 2, the verbs that record `changes' are exactly the E and K-predicates, 
for it is these predicates that take time. Hence Aristotle's partition of verbs is one of the factors 
that separates events from facts. 
In order to respect Davidson's representation of adverb modification in the object language, 
Taylor forms an extension LE+ of the existing object language LE, where LE+ is augmented with 
an apparatus sufficient for it to discuss its own states of affairs and events. Taylor adds to LE the 
operator "ST" (read as "the state of affairs that"), so that: 
If A is a well formed formula of LEA then ST[A] is a term of LE+. 
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The term ST[A] should be glossed as "the state of affairs that A". The denotation of these terms in 
the metalanguage are states of affairs. LE+ also has variables "X", "Y", "Z",.. ranging over states of 
affairs. These are called state variables. State terms are the second level terms of LE+. The first 
level terms of LE+ are the terms of LE unaugmented. 
LE+ also has a range of second level predicates. These predicates come in various types 
<i1,. -, in>, where each =1 or 2. If i. = 1, then a first level term is required 
in its place, and if I= 
2, then a second level term is required in its place. For example, if the predicate "P" is of type 
<1,2>, then it is a two-place predicate, whose first argument ranges over first level terms, and whose 
second argument ranges over second level terms. 
LE+ contains a second level identity predicate "=" of type <2,2>, and a predicate "Ob" of 
type <2> (read as "obtains"), a predicate "Ev" of type <2> (read as "is an event", and is subject to 
the constraints on eventhood that we have stipulated), and a predicate "Cons" of type <2,2> (read 
"is a constituent or, and corresponding in the metalanguage to the containment of one state of 
affairs in a more complex one). 
Having introduced these second level predicates, Taylor defines when a state of affairs X is a 
stabbing, when X occurs over t, when the agent of X is the individual x, when the object of X is x, 
and so on. These definitions play an essential role in the final representation of natural language 
sentences. 
Intuitively, the state of affairs X is a stabbing only if for each of its constituent states of 
affairs Y. Y is ST[Stab(x, y, t)] for some individuals x and y and some time t. Taylor captures this 
intuition in the following definition: 
[DEF 1'] X is a STABBING <_> 
Ev(X) & (v'Y)(Cons(YX) --ý (3x)(3y)(3t)(Y = ST[Stab(x, y, t)])) 
Intuitively, the state of affairs X occurs over t if for every constituent state of affairs Y of X, 
Y is a state of affairs where t is a time of application of the predicate. Taylor captures these intui- 
tions by defining when the state of affairs X occupies t ("X occurs over t") as follows: 
[DEF 2'] X OCCUPIES t <_> 
Ev(X) & ((0n)(VY)(Cons(Y, X) -* (x )""(nxn-t)(Y 
= SýF[V (xl,.., xn_1, t)])) 
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Taylor views the agent of a state of affairs X as the individual x if one of the constituent 
states of affairs of X is ST[P(x, x2,.., xn, t)], for some predicate P, some individuals x2,.., xn, and some 
time t. Taylor formulates this in the definition below: 
[DEF 31 X is BY x <=> 
Ev(X) & (3Y)(Cons(YX) & 
(3e)(3xl).. (Bxn )(3t)( _ 
ST[(V(xl,. ". xn. l. 
) & xl = x)) 
Taylor's definition of the conditions under which an individual x is the object of a state of affairs X 
is similar to that for the agent. The state of affairs X is OF x (i. e. "the individual x is the object of 
X) if there is a constituent state of affairs of X that is ST[P(xl, x, x3. xn, t)], for some predicate P, 
some individuals xt, x3,.., x. and some time t. This is captured in the definition below: 
[DEF 41 X is OF x <=> 
Ev(X) & (3Y)(Cons(Y, X) & 
(30)(3x ).. (@x )( t)(Y _ 
ST[cb°(xtl.., x". l'tJ] 
& x2 = x)) 
LE+ has axioms which reflect the following ideas: 
(i) If X is an event then X obtains (i. e. X is a fact). 
(ii) X obtains if and only if every constituent member of X obtains 
(iii) The state of affairs ST[P"(xl,.. xn)] obtains if and only if P"(xl,.., xn) is true. 
These axioms are given below: 
[AX 1] Ev(X) -a Ob(X) 
[AX 2] (3Y)(Cons(Y, X) -* (Ob(X) <_> 
(VZ)(Cons(Z, X) -- Ob(Z))) 
[AX OB 1] Ob(ST[P"xl.. x]) <=> P"x1.. xn 
7.2 The Logical Form of Point Adverbials 
Now that the representation language is in place, I will discuss the representations of sen- 
tences (7) and (8). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
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The point adverbial "At 3pm" is represented in LE+ by the second level predicate "AT" of 
type <1,2>: the first argument is the moment 3pm, and the second argument is a state variable. The 
logical forms of (7) and (8) are (7a') and (8a) respectively. 
(7a) ((t)(3X)(t<now & Ev(X) &X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely &X OCCUPIES t 
& AT(3pm, X)) 
(8a') (3t)(3X)(t<now & Ev(X) &X is a WINNING &X is BY max uniquely &X is OF race 
uniquely &X OCCUPIES t& AT(3pm, X)) 
(7a') can be paraphrased as: there is a time t and state of affairs X such that t is earlier than the 
utterance time, X is an event, X is a running, the unique agent of X is Max, X occurs over t and X 
is AT 3pm. The paraphrase of (8a) is similar. 
In order to evaluate how (7a) and (8a) might represent the natural interpretations of (7) and 
(8), we must answer the following question: how do we translate the formula AT(3pm, X)? To 
answer this question, I will investigate what already logically follows from (7a'), given Taylor's 
definitions for "X is a RUNNING", "X OCCUPIES t" etc. 
According to [DEF 1'] and [DEF 3'], sentence (7b) is valid (the RHS of the equivalence is 
given simply by the definitions of "X is a RUNNING" and "X is BY max uniquely"). 
(7b) X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely <_> Ev(X) & 
(i) (VY)(Cons(Y, X) -ý (3x)(3t)(Y = ST[Run(x, t)])) & 
(ii) (3Y)(Cons(Y, X) & (3b°)(3x2).. (xn-t)(t)(Y = ST[D"(max,.., xn. 1, t)]) & (Vy)(X is BY y -* y= max) 
By expression (ii) in the above formula, the only substitution instance for "x" in expression (i) that 
can satisfy (7b) is "max". Moreover, because of expression (i) in (7b), the only substitution instance 
of the predicate "di°" in expression (ii) that will satisfy (7b) is the predicate "Run". Hence (7b) is 
true if and only if (7c) is true. 
(7c) X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely <_> Ev(X) & 
(i) (VY)(Cons(Y, X) -+ (3t)(Y = ST[Run(max, t)]) & 
(ii) (3Y)(Cons(Y, X) & (3t)(Y = ST[Run(max, t)]) 
Now (7c) is equivalent to (7d) (we have added to the LHS the formula "X OCCUPIES t" and to the 
RHS, we have added the technical definition of "X OCCUPIES t" given in [DEF 2']). 
(7d) X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely &X OCCUPIES t <_> Ev(X) & 
41 
(i) (`dY)(Cons(Y, X) -> (3t')(Y = ST[Run(max, t)]) & 
(ii) (3Y)(Cons(Y, X) & (3t')(Y = ST[Run(max, t')]) & 
(iii) (36 a)(VY)(Cons(Y, X) -* (3x1).. (3xn-1)(Y = ST[c°(xl,.., xn-l, t])) 
By expression (iii) in the above formula, the only possible substitution instance of "t'" in expres- 
sions (i) and (ii) is Y. Hence the truth of (7d) is equivalent to the truth of (7e). 
(7e) X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely &X OCCUPIES t <_> Ev(X) & 
(VY)(Cons(Y, X) --* Y= [ST(Run(max, t)]) & (3Y)(Cons(Y, X) &Y= ST[Run(max, t)]) 
(7e) is equivalent to (7f), since the only possible substitution instance for X is (ST[Run(max, t)]), 
which is coreferring with ST[Run(max, t)] (by Taylor's characterisation of states of affairs in the 
metalanguage (Taylor 1985: 86)). 
(71) X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely &X OCCUPIES t <_> X= ST[Run(max, t)] & 
Ev(ST[Run(max, t)]) 
By [AX 1], (7i) is equivalent to (7g). 
(7g) X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely &X OCCUPIES t <_> Ev(X) &X= 
ST[Run(max, t)] & Ob[ST(Run(max, t)] 
By [AX OB 1], (7g) is equivalent to (7h). 
(7h) X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely &X OCCUPIES t <_> Ev(X) &X= 
ST[Run(max, t)] & Run(max, t) 
Hence sentence (7a'), which is the representation of (7), is equivalent to (7i). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(7a) (3t)(3X)(t<now &X is a RUNNING &X is BY max uniquely &X OCCUPIES t& 
AT(3pm, X)) 
(7i) (3t)(t<now & Ev(ST[Run(max, t)]) & Run(max, t) & AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) 
Now the state of affairs ST[Run(max, t)] satisfies conditions (2) and (3) for eventhood that 
were described above: for (2) Taylor claims it denotes a continuous temporal change since "Run" is 
an E-verb, and (3) it manifests itself in one object, namely Max. So for the state of affairs 
ST[Run(max, t)] to be an event, there is only one remaining condition that must be satisfied, and 
that is that ST[Run(max, t)] must obtain. By [AX OB 1], ST[Run(max, t)] obtains if and only if 
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Run(max, t) is true. So the truth of Ev(ST[Run(max, t)]) is equivalent to the truth of Run(max, t). 
Therefore (7i) is equivalent to (7j), and so (7j) can be regarded as a canonical representation of (7). 
(7j) (3t)(ttnow & Run(max, t) & AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) 
How is one to translate the formula AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) so that it squares with the 
natural, inchoative interpretation of sentence (7)? (7j) is true only if AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) and 
Run(max, t) are both true for some time t. So the translation of AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) might 
specify a relationship R' between 3pm and t, such that Run(max, t) is true. i. e. the translation of 
AT(3pm, ST[Vn(t)]) follows the schema given below (where V° is the 1-place predicate that results 
from filling the first n-1 arguments of the n-place predicate P°). 
AT(3pm, ST[Vn(t)]) <_> 3pmR't & V°(t) 
By postulate 2, (30) is valid. 
(30) Run(max, t) --* Per(t) 
So the substitution instances for the variable "t" that satisfy formula (7j ) are all periods. Hence we 
are left with the question: What relationship R' between the moment 3pm and the period t in the 
translation of AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) captures the natural meaning of sentence (7)? 
The final semantic representations of (7) and (8) in Dowty's theory and in Taylor's appear 
very different. For Dowty, "At 3pm" is represented as a sentential operator and for Taylor, it is a 
predicate of events. But in spite of this difference, we have come up against a task in Taylor's 
theory that is analogous to the task we encountered in Dowty's. In Dowty's theory, we found that 
in order to represent (7), we had to specify a relation R between 3pm and the interval I at which 
"Max runs" is true. In Taylor's theory, we have to specify a relation R' between 3pm and the inter- 
val t such that Run(max, t) is true. The question now is: how should R' be specified? 
7.3 The Relation R' in the Translation of AT(3pm, ST[V(t)]) 
How is one to express the relationship R' between 3pm and t in the translation of 
AT(3pm, ST[V"(t)])? Let us first examine the constraints required on R' for (7a) to capture (7)'s 
natural, inchoative interpretation. 
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(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(7a) is true if and only if (7j) is true, if and only if (31) holds for some time t earlier than the utter- 
ance time. 
(31) AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) & Run(max, t) 
Max starts to run at the initial bound of the period t such that Run(max, t) is true. So to capture the 
natural interpretation of (7), (31) must be true only if 3pm is the initial bound of the interval t. 
Therefore, following the above schema for translating AT, R' must express the initial bound relation 
between 3pm and t, so that the translation for AT(3pm, ST[V°(t)]) is as follows: 
Translation for AT(3pm, ST[V"(t)J) 
If e is a first-level predicate of LE+, then 
AT(3pm, ST[V°(t)]) <_> Initial bound(3pm, t) & V°(t) 20 
One now has the problem of squaring this definition of "At 3pm" with the natural interpreta- 
tion of sentence (8). The representation of sentence (8) is (8a'), which in turn is truth conditionally 
equivalent to (8j)21. 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
(8a) (3t)((3X)(t<now &X is a WINNING &X is BY max uniquely &X is OF race uniquely & 
X OCCUPIES t& AT(3pm, X)) 
(8j) (3t)(tanow & Win(max, race, t) & AT(3pm, ST[Win(max, race, t)])) 
Consider the following situation: suppose Max begins to win the race at 3pm, and crosses the finish 
line in first place at 5pm. Then by Taylor's postulates on K-verbs, (32) is true, where t is the time 
period spanning 3pm to 5pm. 
(32) Win(max, race, t) 
According to the translation of AT(3pm, ST[V°(t)]), the formula (33) is true (since 3pm is the initial 
bound of t). 
20 The formula "Initial bound(3pm, t)" is to be understood as "3pm is the initial bound of t". The predicate 
"Initial bound" is defined as follows: 
Initial_bound(t, t) <=> Mom(t) & ((tct' & (tft")(t"ct' -a tan) V (-tLt' & va' & (Vt")((Mom(t") & va") -+ (t"fit' V 
t'R')))) 
21 The deduction from (8a) to (8j) is similar to that between (7a) and (7j). 
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(33) AT(3pm, ST[Win(max, race, t)]) 
Therefore (34) is true. 
(34) AT(3pm, ST[Win(max, race, t)]) & Win(max, race, t) 
Therefore, assuming that t is earlier than the utterance time, (8j), which is equivalent to the 
representation of (8), is true. 
This interpretation of (8) does not respect its actual use. The only natural interpretation of (8) 
is one in which Max crosses the finish line in first place at 3pm. So we intuitively interpret (8) to 
be false with respect to the situation described, since Max does not cross the finish line until 5pm. 
Hence if the translation of "At 3pm" captures the natural interpretation of (7), then it is in direct 
conflict with Taylor's postulates for K-verbs. 
Suppose now that one attempts to modify R' so that (8a') captures the meaning of (8). (8a) 
is true if and only if (34) holds for some time t earlier than the utterance time. By Taylor's postu- 
lates for K-verbs, Max crosses the finish line in first place at the final bound of t. So (8a) 
represents the natural interpretation of (8) if R' specifies the final bound relation between 3pm and t 
in the translation of AT(3pm, ST[Vn(t)]), i. e. AT(3pm, ST[Vn(t)]) is defined as follows: 
AT(3pm, ST[V"(t)]) <_> Final_bound(3pm, t) & V°(t) 22 
One now has the problem of squaring this definition with the natural interpretation of (7). 
Consider the following situation: suppose that Max starts to run at 2pm and finishes running 
at 3pm. Then Run(max, t) is true, where t is the period of time spanning 2pm to 3pm. Therefore, 
since 3pm is the final bound of t, by the new translation of "AT", (35) is true. 
(35) AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) 
Hence (31) is true. 
(31) AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) & Run(max, t) 
So, assuming that t is earlier than the utterance time, (7j), which is equivalent to the representation 
22 The predicate "Final_bound" is defined similarly to "Initial_bound" 
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of (7), is true. This does not respect the natural interpretation of (7), since Max finishes running at 
3pm in this situation, rather than starts to run. If the translation of "At 3pm" captures the natural 
interpretation of (8), then it is in direct conflict with Taylor's postulates for E-verbs. 
The representation of "At 3pm" that is required to interpret (7) is in direct conflict with 
Taylor's postulates for K-verbs. Furthermore, the representation of "At 3pm" that is required to 
interpret (8) is in direct conflict with Taylor's postulates for E-verbs. The problem can be seen as 
one of squaring the initial bound relation required of R' to represent (7), in contrast with the final 
bound relation required of R' to represent (8). 
At this point, as we encountered with Dowty, there are three strategies one could adopt to 
resolve the situation. The first of these is to have two separate translations for "At 3pm", one for 
E-verbs and the other for K-verbs. The shortcomings of this strategy are obvious; one should have 
a uniform translation for "At 3pm". 
The second strategy is to fix the definition of "At 3pm" so that (8a') captures the meaning of 
(8), (so R' is the final bound relation), and revise the interpretation of E-verbs so that this definition 
may also predict the natural, inchoative interpretation of (7). The third strategy is to fix the 
definition of "At 3pm" so that (7a') captures the inchoative interpretation of (7), (so R' is the initial 
bound relation), and revise the interpretation of K-verbs so that this definition also captures the 
natural interpretation of (8). Whether we follow the second or the third strategy, we are forced to 
change Taylor's interpretation of Aristotle's classification of verbs. The question now is: what 
changes are necessary? 
7.4 A Change to the Interpretation of Aristotle's Trichotomy 
7.4.1 A Change to E-verbs 
I will now examine the second strategy; I will investigate how one might revise Taylor's pos- 
tulates for E-verbs so that the translation of "At 3pm" repeated below, that captures the natural 
interpretation of (8), also captures the natural, inchoative interpretation of (7): 
AT(3pm, ST[V°(t)]) <=> Final_bound(3pm, t) & V°(t) 
To capture the inchoative interpretation of (7) with the above definition for "At 3pm", the 
only times of application of E-verbs must be moments. For suppose that Run(max, t) is true for 
some period t, and suppose that t is earlier than the utterance time. Suppose that the initial bound 
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of t is m and the final bound is 3pm (m ¢ 3pm). So Max starts to run at m, and finishes running at 
3pm. 3pm is the final bound of t, and so the conditions on AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) are satisfied. 
Therefore (assuming that t is before utterance time), (7j), which is the representation of (7), is true. 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(7j) ((t)(t<now & AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, t)]) & Run(max, t)) 
But 3pm identifies the time when Max terminates running, rather than starts to run. We have failed 
to capture the inchoative meaning of (7). Therefore, the assumption that Run(max, t) can be true for 
some period t is not sustainable. In other words, t must be a moment if Run(max, t) is true. 
If one revises Taylor's postulate for E-verbs so that the only times of application are 
moments, then the above representation of "At 3pm" captures the inchoative meaning of (7). This 
is shown as follows: Suppose we assume that whenever Run(max, 3pm) is true, then Max starts to 
run at 3pm. The moment 3pm is the final bound of itself, and so if Run(max, 3pm) is true, then so 
is AT(3pm, ST[Run(max, 3pm)]). Therefore (7) is true, where 3pm is the time that Max starts to 
run, as required. However, the assumption that the only times of application of E-verbs are 
moments is clearly unviable, since our intuitions tell us that processes can happen over a period of 
time. Hence fixing the representation of "At 3pm" to capture the meaning of (8) and changing the 
interpretation of E-verbs, although a technically viable strategy, is materially inadequate. 
7.4.2 A Change to K-verbs 
One is now left with only one strategy to represent (7) and (8), and that is to fix the represen- 
tation of "At 3pm" to capture the inchoative interpretation of (7), and change the interpretation of 
K-verbs so that this representation also captures the meaning of (8). The definition of "At 3pm" 
that captures the inchoative interpretation of (7) is repeated below: 
AT(3pm, ST[Vn(t)]) <=> Initial bound(3pm, t) & Vn(t) 
This representation of "At 3pm" clashes with the assumption that K-verbs have periods as the 
times of application rather than moments. For suppose that Win(maxrace, t) is true for some period 
t. Suppose that the initial bound of t is 3pm, and the final bound is m (3pm ¢ m). So Max starts 
to win the race at 3pm, and crosses the finish line at m. The formulae Initial_bound(3pm, t) and 
Win(max, race, t) are both true. Therefore, AT(3pm, ST[Win(max, race, t)]) is true. Suppose t is ear- 
lier than the utterance time. Then (8j), which is equivalent to the representation of (8), is true. 
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(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
(8j) (3t)(t<now & AT(3pm, ST[Win(max, race, t)]) & Win(max, race, t)) 
But 3pm identifies the time that Max starts winning the race, rather than the time he actually wins 
it. So we have failed to capture the natural meaning of (8). Therefore, the assumption that 
Win(max, race, t) can be true when t is a period is not sustainable. In other words, if 
Win(max, race, t) is true, then t must be a moment. 
Suppose that Win(max, race, t) is true only if t is a moment. Then the above definition of "At 
3pm" captures the natural meaning of (8). For (i) if Win(max, race, 3pm) is true then 3pm is the 
time at which Max crosses the finish line in first place, and (ii) the moment 3pm is the initial bound 
of itself, and so AT(3pm, ST[Win(max, race, 3pm)] is true if and only if Win(max, race, 3pm) is true. 
Therefore, (8j), the representation of (8), is true if and only if 3pm is earlier than the utterance time 
and 3pm is the time that Max crosses the finish line in first place, as required. Therefore, in order 
to give satisfactory representations of (7) and (8), one must assume that the only times of applica- 
tion of K-verbs are moments. 
What are the consequences of the revised interpretation of K-verbs? First, the revised 
interpretation is in direct conflict with postulate 2. One must revise postulate 2 to postulate 2*. 
Postulate 2* 
If p° is a K-predicate, then it must meet the following condition: 
V"(t) -a Mom(t) 
Postulate 2 forms the foundations for Taylor's analysis of the aspectual classes. So in abandoning 
postulate 2, one is forced to make fundamental changes to this analysis. 
Furthermore, we have undermined the role of heterogeneity in Taylor's theory. This is 
argued as follows: According to postulate 2*, if e is a K-predicate, then V°(t) entails that t is a 
moment (V" is the result of filling P"s first n-1 arguments). So we cannot have the situation where 
V°(t) is true and V°(t') is false, where t' is contained in t (for there are no t' contained in t). Hence 
postulate 2* does not give a heterogeneous analysis of K-verbs. The new analysis of K-verbs is 
homogeneous: the truth of V°(t) entails the truth of V°(t) for all t' contained in t. 
So to conclude, we have examined how Taylor might represent sentences (7) and (8). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
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Given Taylor's interpretation of the aspectual classes, a tension arose in the representation of these 
sentences, between the translation of "At 3pm" required to interpret (7) and the translation of "At 
3pm" required to interpret (8). We were therefore forced to modify Taylor's interpretation of the 
aspectual classes. We argued that the only way one may achieve an adequate representation of sen- 
tences (7) and (8) was to modify the interpretation of K-verbs, so that the only times of application 
of K-verbs are moments. This is equivalent to a homogeneous analysis. Therefore, in order to 
represent (7) and (8), one must assume that K-verbs are homogeneous. 
We have now examined both Dowty's and Taylor's formulations of the Heterogeneous Stra- 
tegy for distinguishing the semantics of expressions from different aspectual classes. Dowty's 
theory is stated in a (modal) interval-based framework, and Taylor's theory is stated in a (first 
order) event-based framework. So the two theories are very different on the surface. Nevertheless, 
in each case we come up with the same puzzle: the heterogeneous interpretation of K-verbs (or 
achievements in Dowty's terms) is not sustainable, if one is to supply satisfactory representations of 
sentences (7) and (8). The question now is: can homogeneity yield a satisfactory semantic interpre- 
tation of the aspectual classes? 
8 Conclusion 
Two tasks must be tackled in order to solve the imperfective paradox. The first is to charac- 
tense a semantic distinction between sentences like (4) 
and (6). 
(4) Max ran 
(6) Max won the race 
The second is to provide a definition of the progressive that meshes with this semantic distinction 
and so results in a solution to the imperfective paradox. This chapter addressed the first of these 
tasks. 
It was shown how some theories have attempted the task at hand by formalising Vendler's 
classification of aspect. These theories adopt what I have called the Heterogeneous Strategy: they 
invoke a heterogeneous interval structure in order to interpret sentences like "Max wins the race". 
The motivation for a heterogeneous interpretation of "Max wins the race" is that it reflects the 
intuition that not every part of an event where Max wins the race is itself an event where Max wins 
the race. 
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It was argued, however, that the Heterogeneous Strategy does not allow one to give a satis- 
factory representation of sentences (7) and (8). 
(7) Max ran at 3pm 
(8) Max won the race at 3pm 
The analysis of "Max wins the race" must be homogeneous rather than heterogeneous. This under- 
mines the Heterogeneous Strategy for interpreting the classification of aspect. Even though the 
Heterogeneous Strategy is intuitively motivated, it is not formally sustainable. The puzzle now is: 
can homogeneity provide a semantic distinction between expressions of different aspectual classes? 
This puzzle is answered in chapters 6 and 7. But before moving onto this, we will look in detail at 
the second task connected with the imperfective paradox, i. e. defining the semantics of the progres- 
sive. We explore this in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
An Account of the Progressive in Terms of 
Eventual Outcome 
1 Introduction 
A formal account of the semantics of the progressive must square with its actual use. So let 
us examine from an intuitive perspective what criteria are used to decide whether a progressive sen- 
tence is true. To start with, are there any criteria that one may apply directly to the current state of 
affairs, to discover whether that state of affairs makes a progressive sentence true? Consider sen- 
tence (1). 
(1) Max is winning the race 
It seems that such criteria would be difficult to describe. The states of affairs which make sentence 
(1) true could amount to almost anything. (1) may be true when Max is ahead, or when he is third 
but running faster than the athletes in first and second place. If Max has a good reputation as an 
athlete, then (1) may be true even if Max is last, but his strategy for winning the race is going 
according to plan. 
What property, if any, do all these states of affairs have, that can be regarded as the property 
making the progressive sentence true? The puzzle is: Given the wealth of states of affairs that can 
be regarded as an instance of (1), it seems that a search for a common property among them would 
prove fruitless. However, there is the following strong intuition: (1) is true just in case there is 
something going on now, whatever that is, such that if it were to continue uninterrupted, then the 
outcome would be that Max is the winner of the race. 
This intuition indicates that the common property of all the progressive states of affairs may 
not be found by looking at the state only at the current time; instead one must investigate the out- 
come of the state of affairs. This intuition may offer a strategy to yield the formal semantics of the 
progressive. The truth conditions placed by the semantic definition of the progressive on the 
current state of affairs should not be conditions that' concern what is going on now, but must be 
conditions on the eventual outcome of what is going on now. I call this strategy in defining the 





strategy can be formulated. 
How would the Eventual Outcome Strategy relate sentences (2) 
and (3)? 
(2) Max was winning the race 
(3) Max won the race 
Intuitively, (3) refers to a process which leads to a culmination. (2) refers to that process, but it 
does not assert that the culmination of the process occurred. 
The idea behind the Eventual Outcome Strategy is to define the semantics of (2) and (3) so 
that they do not place conditions directly on what the process leading to the culmination consists of. 
For example, the semantics of these sentences will not talk of whether Max had a good start to the 
race, whether he was ahead at the half way stage, and so on. Instead, the process is characterised 
in the semantics of the progressive in terms of the culmination: Whatever the process is, if it were 
to continue uninterrupted, then it would lead to the culmination. So the definition of the progres- 
sive under the Eventual Outcome Strategy essentially involves modality of the `counterfactual' kind. 
We have seen that the process (1) refers to is characterised in the Eventual Outcome seman- 
tics of the progressive in terms of the culmination, plus some appropriate sense of modality. Given 
this semantics, any formulation of the strategy must fulfil two tasks. First, it must offer a semantic 
account of the culmination that the process would lead to. Second, it must offer an account of the 
modality in the definition of the progressive; i. e. an explanation of the phrase "if the process were 
to continue uninterrupted". 
The object of this chapter is to test whether the Eventual Outcome Strategy can be formu- 
lated, and if so, establish how the formulation would deal with the two tasks at hand. The Eventual 
Outcome Strategy has been formalised in three theories, (Dowty 1979), (Cooper 1985) and (Hin- 
richs 1983). We will consider each of these theories in turn. 
2 The Consequences of the Eventual Outcome Strategy 
In order to have a perspective from which to test the theories that adopt the Eventual Out- 
come Strategy, I will now set up a question that concerns the consequences of the strategy. 
Consider the following situation: suppose that Max is running in a race of four laps. Suppose 
he is ahead at the start of the third lap. Then according to intuitions, sentence (1) is true at this 
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time. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
Now suppose that at the start of the fourth lap, Max has fallen behind in the race. He is now last, 
and it looks as though only a miracle could bring him victory. So according to intuitions, sentence 
(1) is now false. Suppose that, despite everything, Max surges forward half way through the fourth 
lap to gain first position again. Then according to intuitions (1) is true once again. Now suppose 
that Max crosses the finish line in first place to win the race. Then according to intuitions, this 
whole situation is one where sentence (1) is true, and then false, and then true, and then the target 
state to winning the race (Max is the winner) is true. Therefore, since the above situation is 
clearly possible, the following temporal structure must depict a possible state of affairs: 
i "Max is winning "Max Nis winning "Max is winning "Max is 
the race" is the race" is the race" is the winner true false true of the race" 
is true 
(a) 
The question now is: when is sentence (4) true in the above state of affairs? 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4) must be true at some time in the above situation, since Max does actually win the race. Sup- 
pose that (4) is true with respect to a period of time, to reflect the idea that (4) refers to a process 
that goes on over a period of time. Will the formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy allow 
this period to contain all the times depicted in (a), yielding temporal structure (i)? 
23 In chapter 2, we argued that (4) must be true only at moments and not over periods of time, if the semantics of (4) is 
to involve a notion of culmination. So in this case, we are considering (4) not as involving the notion of a culmination, but 
only involving the notion of a process. 
53 
- "Max wins the race" is true 
"Max is winning "Mac is winning 
the race" is the race" is 
true false 
(1) 
"Max is winning 'Max is 
the race" is the winner 
true of the race" 
is true 
Clearly, the state of affairs depicted in (a). which any satisfactory semantic theory must deem 
as possible, is related to the state of affairs depicted in (i), and just how they are related in the 
theory depends on the semantics of the progressive and the semantics of (4). Our puzzle is: will an 
Eventual Outcome theory allow for a semantic interpretation of the progressive and (4) that 
describes the state of affairs depicted in (i)? In the rest of this chapter, I will define the state of 
affairs depicted in (i) as consistent if there is a semantic interpretation of the progressive and (4) 
that describes that state of affairs, and inconsistent if there is no such semantic interpretation of the 
progressive and (4). So our puzzle can be stated in another way: will an Eventual Outcome theory 
establish the state of affairs depicted in (i) as consistent or as inconsistent? 
The Eventual Outcome Strategy has been formulated in three theories, (Dowty 1979), (Cooper 
1985) and (Hinrichs 1983). I will see whether (i) is consistent in each of these theories. We have 
seen that an Eventual Outcome semantics of the progressive defines the semantics of (1) purely in 
terms of the culmination, plus some appropriate notion of modality. I will argue that one can 
obtain an appropriate notion of modality only if one establishes that the state of affairs depicted in 
(i) is inconsistent. On the other hand, I will argue that if one is to characterise (1) purely in terms 
of the culmination, then one must allow (i) to be consistent. This exposes a tension in the two tasks 
that must be tackled in formulating the Eventual Outcome Strategy; defining the appropriate notion 
of modality and defining the semantics of (1) purely in terms of the culmination. I will conclude 
from this that the Eventual Outcome Strategy is ultimately untenable. 
It is important to realise that our argument against the Eventual Outcome Strategy is indepen- 
dent of the intuitions one might have concerning whether (i) should be consistent or inconsistent. 
There seems to be something highly counterintuitive in allowing for a semantic interpretation of (4) 
and (1) that describes the state of affairs depicted in (i). One feels that sentences (4) and (1) should 
refer to the same process, and so the period of time over which (4)'s process goes on should not 
contain times at which (1) is false. And yet in (i), (1) is false in that period. So according to intui- 
tions, (i) should be inconsistent. However, it must be stressed that our argument against the 
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Eventual Outcome Strategy is not based on this intuition that (i) should be inconsistent. The argu- 
ment is based on something slightly stronger. Any formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy 
must account for (i) as consistent or as inconsistent. I will argue that either way, the formulation 
fails. In each case, the reasons it fails are independent of the intuition that (i) should be incon- 
sistent. 
I will consider each of the three Eventual outcome theories in turn. I start with Dowty's 
theory. 
3 Dowty's Formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy 
Before describing Dowty's Eventual Outcome definition of the progressive, one must under- 
stand his semantic interpretation of non-progressive sentences. Dowty's strategy for analysing these 
sentences is to formalise Vendler's (1967) classification of aspect. A detailed discussion of 
Vendler's classification of aspect and Dowty's formulation of it took place in the previous chapter. 
I am concerned here only with his interpretation of sentences like (4). 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4) denotes an achievement, and therefore I shall consider here how Dowty interprets achievement 
sentences. 
3.1 Dowty's Semantic Interpretation of Achievements 
The logical form of a tenseless achievement sentence is [BECOME (D), where T denotes the 
state of affairs once the achievement is completed. For example, the logical form of sentence (4) is 
(4a), where the stative formula winner'(max', race) corresponds to the state that Max is the winner 
of the race. 
(4a) [BECOME winner'(max', race')] 
I repeat here the truth definition of the operator BECOME that was discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
The Truth Conditions for BECOME 
[BECOME b] is true at an interval I if and only if there is an interval J containing the in- 
itial bound of I such that - 4' is true at J and there is an interval K containing the final bound of I such that CD is true at K. 
The truth of the sentence [BECOME b] requires the following temporal structure: 
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--(I) is true (I) is true 
The truth value of [BECOME D] at the interval I is determined solely by what goes on at the 
endpoints of I. No conditions are placed on what goes on during the interval I. Thus Dowty 
avoids defining directly in the semantics of (4) what constitutes the process that leads to Max being 
the winner of the race. This is an essential part of the Eventual Outcome Strategy. There is an 
abundance of states of affairs that may correspond to the coming about of the target 4), and Dowty 
avoids describing these. BECOME does not even define when the process leading to the target goes 
on. Indeed, BECOME does not induce a concept of this sort of process at all. Therefore, an 
achievement is not interpreted as a structured event, constituting a process leading to a goal. 
Clearly, it is not just any state of affairs that deserves to be regarded as the process that leads 
to the goal. The innovation in the Eventual Outcome Strategy is that the definition of the progres- 
sive in modal terms will reveal when the process goes on. 
3.2 Dowty's Analysis of the Progressive 
Dowry interprets the progressive as a mixed modal-temporal operator. Its definition is the fol- 
lowing: 
[PROG c] is true at an index <I, w> if and only if there is an interval I' such that I is con- 
tained in I' and I is not a final subinterval of I', and for all the worlds w'e Inr(<I, w>), 0 is 
true at <I', w'>. 
The primitive function Inr is defined as part of the model. It is a two-placed function, taking an 
interval and a world as its arguments. The evaluation of Inr(<I, w>) gives the inertia worlds at 
<I, w>, and these characterise the `natural course of events' at <I, w>. Intuitively, Inr(<I, w>) denotes 
the worlds w' that (a) are like the world w up to and including the interval I, and (b) include the 
natural course of events with respect to the situation in w at I. In other words, an inertia world can 
be thought of as a world in which nothing unexpected happens. 
The logical form of (1) is (la). 
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(1) Max is winning the race 
(1a) [PROG [BECOME winner (max', raceD]] 
In fact, the progressive forms of all achievement sentences are represented by a formula of the form 
[PROG [BECOME D]), which receives the following truth conditions. (PROD (BECOME (DJ( is 
true in a model M at <i, w> just in case there is an interval I' containing I such that I is not a final 
subinterval of I', and for all w'elnr(<I, w>), [BECOME c] is true at <I', w>. [BECOME 0] is true 
at <I', w'> if and only if there is an interval J containing the initial bound of I' such that -4 is true 
at <J, w>, and there is an interval K containing the final bound of I' such that d) is true at <K, w>. 
So the truth of [PROG [BECOME (b]] requires the following temporal structure: 
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w and w' arc alike up to here 
w 
[PROG [BECOME (I)]] 
is true 
These truth conditions capture the following intuition: if [PROG [BECOME 4]] is true then what- 
ever the current state of affairs is, that state of affairs must lead to the target d) in the 'natural 
course of events'. 
According to Dowty, the actual world w is not necessarily a member of the set Inr(<I, w>). 
Therefore the truth of [PROG [BECOME (D]] at <I, w> does not guarantee the truth of [BECOME 
c] in w. Hence there is no entailment from sentence (2) to (3), which is just as required. 
(2) Max was winning the race 
(3) Max won the race 
Suppose that [BECOME (D] is true at an interval Y. Then even though no conditions are 
placed in the truth conditions of [BECOME dD] on what goes on during the interval I', it is possible 
to evaluate the truth value of [PROG [BECOME CD]] in terms of [BECOME CD] at all times during 
I'. In this way, the definition of the progressive in terms of inertia worlds reveals the structure of 
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the interval I' at which [BECOME 4] is true; i. e. one reveals at what times in I' the process that 
leads to the target (D goes on. 
Dowty invokes inertia worlds in the analysis of the progressive to specify when the current 
state of affairs leads to the target. It is the target happening incrtially that is crucial to the analysis 
of the progressive of achievements. It doesn't matter in evaluating (1) whether Max is ahead or in 
second place at the time in question. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
Even though there are endless possible actions corresponding to (1), they all have one thing in com- 
mon, and that is that they inertially lead to the target state. 
Dowty's approach seems fruitful, but one cannot adopt it until one fully understands the 
notion of modality invoked in the definition of the progressive. In Dowty's theory, this amounts to 
solving the following problem. Choose a model M and a world time index d, w>. Then what is 
the set of inertia worlds, Inr(d, w>) in M? Is the function Inr uniquely defined with respect to the 
model M? It is inertia specification that gives the analysis of the progressive its "eventual out- 
come" properties. The question remains as to whether inertia specification is sufficient for describ- 
ing what is going on at the time of (1) in a way that squares with our intuitions. 
4 Inr and Why (i) is Inconsistent 
In order to see how inertia should be specified, we will now ask, relative to Dowty's theory, 
the question that was posed in section 2. In section 2, I argued that according to intuitions, it is 
possible for sentence (1) to be true, and then false, and then true, and then Max may go on to win 
the race. i. e. the situation depicted in (a) is a possible state of affairs: 
I 
"Max is winning "Max is winning "1,1ax is winning "Max is 
the race" is the race" is the race" is the winner 
true false true of the race" 
is true 
(a) 
The question we ask is: when is sentence (4) true. in the above? 
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(4) Max wins the race 
Can the period with respect to which (4) is true contain the time at which (1) is false? That is. can 
we have a semantic interpretation of the progressive and (4) that describes the state of affairs dep- 
icted in (i) (i. e. in our terminology is (i) consistent)? 
- "Max wins the race" is true 
"Max is winning "Max is winning 
the race" is the race" is 
true false 
(i) 
"Max is winning "Max is 
the race" is the winner 
true of the race" 
is true 
This question amounts to the following in Dowty's theory: can [PROG [BECOME C]] (where CD is 
the formula winner'(max', race')) be true at an index <I, w>, and then false at <J, w> and then true at 
<K, w>, where I, J and K are contained in an interval I' and [BECOME C] is true at <I', w>? In 
other words, is Dowty's version of structure (i) consistent? 
[PROG [BECOME (I'll 
-'[PROG [BECOME 4)1] 





Given that Dowty places no restrictions on what goes on during the interval I' in the truth 
definition of [BECOME 01 at 1', this seems like a legitimate question to ask. Whether or not (i) is 
consistent will depend on the semantics of PROG, and in particular on how the function Inr is 
defined. The object of this section is to demonstrate that in order for the function Inr to be well- 
defined, we must ensure that (i) depicts a state of affairs that is inconsistent. 
To show this, I will assume the hypothesis that (i) is consistent, and show that Inr cannot be 
well-defined under this hypothesis.. Suppose that a model M describes the state of affairs depicted 
in (i): i. e. [PROG [BECOME (D]J is true in M at <I, w>, false in M at <J, w> and true in M at 
<K, w>, and [BECOME dD] is true in M at <I', w>, where I<J<K, and I. J and K are all contained in 
I'. Then is wa member of the inertia worlds at <I, w> with respect to M? In exploring this 
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question, we will reveal whether or not the function Inr which is part of the model M can be 
uniquely defined. We first examine the consequences of the assumption that w is a member of 
Inr(<I, w>) in the model M. 
4.1 Why the Assumption that w is Inertial is Inadequate 
Suppose we assume that w is a member of Inr(<I, w>) in the model M that describes the state 
of affairs corresponding to (i). Then the resulting interpretation of inertia worlds does not square 
with the intuitions concerning the progressive. It will be shown that this follows from the fact that 
for any model M' where, like the model M, [PROG [BECOME 1]] is true at <I, w> and false at 
<J, w> where IJ, it is not possible to maintain the supposition that w is inertial at <Lw> in M. 
I now argue for this conclusion by considering such a model M'; it will be shown that w can- 
not be a member of Inr(d, w>) in W. Consider the following model M': suppose that Max is run- 
ning in a race at <I', w>, and suppose that he falls over at <J, w>, where J is contained in I'. Since 
Max is lying flat on his face on the track at <J, w>, according to intuitions, (5), whose logical form 
is (5a), is true at <J, w> with respect to M'. 
(5) It is not the case that Max is winning the race 
(5a) -, [PROG [BECOME winner'(max', race)]] 
Suppose in the model M' that before Max fell over at <J, w>, he was winning the race. i. e. (1a) is 
true with respect to M' at d, w>, where 14 and I is contained in I. 
(1a) [PROG [BECOME winner'(max', race')]] 
Then given these assumptions on M', is w inertial at <I, w> in NO 
According to intuitions, after the progressive action has been interrupted, anything can hap- 
pen. But the progressive action is interrupted in the model M' at <J, w> because Max falls over at 
<J, w>, and so anything that happens after J in w is consistent with the truth of (la) at ä, w> where 
I<J. In particular, the truth of (la) in the model M' at d, w> is consistent with "Max wins the race" 
being false in w. However, if w is inertial at <I, w> in M', then by the definition of PROG, the 
truth of (la) at <I, w> requires that Max wins the race in w. This is contrary to intuitions, and 
therefore one cannot assume that w is inertial at d, w> in the model M', if the definition of the pro- 
gressive is to agree with its actual use. 
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This model M' describes a state of affairs that is like the state' of affairs depicted in (i), in 
that the formula [PROG [BECOME d)]] is true at d, w> and then false at <J, w>, where J>I. There- 
fore, the argument presented here that w must not be inertial at d, w> in M' supports the claim that 
w must not be inertial at d, w> in the model M with respect to which the state of affairs in (i) is 
true. What are the consequences of this? 
4.2 Circularity 
Given that w cannot be inertial at d, w> in the model M with respect to which the state of 
affairs in (i) is true, I will now show that the two-place function Inr is not well-defined. Further- 
more, if one were to try to modify the function to make it well-defined, then the analysis of the pro- 
gressive would be reduced to circularity. 
In order to show that Inr is not well-defined, we must establish in more depth how to interpret 
the phrase "an inertia world is one where the state of affairs continues uninterrupted". In the 
semantic evaluation of a progressive sentence, say (1), 
(1) Max is winning the race 
do we assume (a) that a world w' is inertial at <I, w> with respect to a model M if and only if all 
the states of affairs at <I, w> 'continue uninterrupted' in w', or (b) that a world w' is inertial at 
<I, w> with respect to M if and only if the 'winning' event 'continues uninterrupted' in w' (so other 
events may be interrupted in w')? The difference between assumptions (a) and (b) is clear. 
Assumption (a) entails that absolutely nothing can be interrupted in an inertial world, and (b) entails 
that in the semantic evaluation of (1), only the winning event is uninterrupted. Furthermore, (a) and 
(b) are the only two possible assumptions, since there are no other plausible ways of picking the 
inertia worlds if they are to capture a notion of events continuing uninterrupted. 
We will now show that assumption (a) is not sustainable, and so inertia worlds must be 
chosen according to assumption (b). We will demonstrate that assumption (a) is inadequate by 
means of the following example: suppose that sentences (1) and (6) are both true at <I, w> with 
respect to a model M'. 
(6) John is sabotaging the race (by planting a bomb on the race track that is due to blow up 
Max before the race is completed). 
Let us consider what will happen if the two corresponding events 'continue uninterrupted'. If John 
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succeeds in sabotaging the race, i. e. the bomb goes off and the race is never completed, then Max 
will not win the race, i. e. Max's winning will be interrupted. On the other hand, if Max's winning 
the race continues uninterrupted so that he becomes the winner of the race, then John did not 
succeed in sabotaging the race. So there is no world where both the state of affairs corresponding 
to (1) and the state of affairs corresponding to (6) continue uninterrupted to the target. Therefore, if 
assumption (a) is correct, then the set of inertia worlds at <I, w> with respect to this model M' will 
be empty. But this is clearly undesirable, since it follows from this by the definition of PROG that 
any progressive sentence is true at <i, w> with respect to M'. Hence assumption (a) is not satisfac- 
tory and assumption (b) must hold. 
We will now show that since assumption (b) holds, Inr is not well-defined. Suppose that the 
model M is as described above. That is, M corresponds to the state of affairs in (i). Suppose furth- 
ermore that in M. [BECOME `Pj is true at <I', w> for some state ̀ P (where IF is not related to 0), 
and [PROG [BECOME `P]] is true in w at every interval contained in I' before the time L at which 
`P is true. So the model M corresponds to temporal structure (ii) as well as (i) in w. 





The state of affairs in (ii) 'continues uninterrupted', since the progressive action continues from the 
interval I to the time when the target `P is true. According to assumption (b), therefore, w must be 
a member of the inertia worlds at <I, w> with respect to the model M in order to obtain the right 
truth conditions of [PROG [BECOME `j]. But we concluded in the previous section that w cannot 
be inertial at <I, w> if we are to gain the right truth conditions for [PROG [BECOME (]]. There- 
fore we have a situation where w is in Inr(<I, w>) with respect to M and w is not in Inr(<I, w>) with 
respect to M. Hence the two-place function Inr that takes an interval and a world as its arguments 
is not well-defined. 
How may one modify the function Inr, in order to make it well-defined? If Inr is to be well- 
defined, then it must be defined relative to formulae, as well as intervals and worlds, so that inertia 
specification in the model M can distinguish the inertial status of w in the semantic evaluations of 
[PROG [BECOME b]] and [PROG [BECOME `Y]]. But which formulae are appropriate as input 
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for Inr? 
[PROG [BECOME `Y]] requires w to be inertial at <I, w> in the model M because we have 
assumed that [PROG [BECOME 'i']] is true at <J', w> in the model M for every interval J' con- 
tained in I. [PROG [BECOME cb]] requires w not to be inertial at <I, w> in the model M because 
we have assumed that [PROG [BECOME CD]] is false in the model M at some <J, w> where Ica and 
J is contained in I' (cf. section 5.1). Therefore, in order for Inr to predict that w is inertial at <I, w> 
in the M in the semantic evaluation of [PROG [BECOME 119] but not in the semantic evaluation of 
[PROG [BECOME CD]], Inr must be defined relative to the truth value of the progressive sentence at 
the intervals contained in I. i. e. Inr must be a function whose arguments for the semantic evalua- 
tion of [PROG [BECOME CD]] are I, w, and the truth values of [PROG [BECOME d)]] at times 
contained in I2a. ' 
This leaves us with the following problem in specifying Inr. In order to obtain a satisfactory 
specification of the function Inr, it must include as arguments the truth values of [PROG [BECOME 
0]]. But one cannot know the truth values of [PROG [BECOME b]] until one has successfully 
completed specifying Mr. Specifying inertia is thus reduced to circularity. 
We have shown that in the model M that describes the state of affairs depicted in (i), the 
two-place function Inr that takes an interval and a world as its arguments is not well-defined. 
Furthermore, if one were to try and make it well-defined, then the analysis of the progressive would 
be reduced to circularity. Therefore, the function Inr cannot be defined with respect to the model 
M. In other words, if (i) is consistent, then one cannot successfully specify Inr. 
One cannot specify Inr under the assumption that (i) is consistent. But specifying Inr is cru- 
cial to defining the progressive in terms of eventual outcome in Dowty's theory. Therefore, to 
preserve the Eventual Outcome Strategy, one must place conditions on the semantics of the progres- 
sive and the semantics of BECOME to ensure that (i) is inconsistent. In other words, the semantics 
of the progressive and of BECOME must ensure that if [BECOME db] is true at an interval I, then 
[PROG [BECOME CD]] is true at all intervals contained in I: i. e. the state of affairs must be that 
depicted in (iii) below. 
u Notice that it is the progressive sentence that must be the argument to Inr, because the 'bare' formulae 0 and Y' may 
agree in semantic value in w. 
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i 
[PROG [BECOME (I)]] 
K [BECOME (1)] 
(iii) 
5 How to Define (i) as Inconsistent 
How may one guarantee that if [BECOME (D] is true at an interval I, then [PROG [BECOME 
(D]] is true at all subintervals of I? I will argue that this temporal structure cannot be derived from 
Dowty's current semantics for BECOME. Furthermore, it cannot be derived by revising the seman- 
tics of BECOME without undermining the Eventual Outcome Strategy. 
5.1 The Current Semantics for BECOME 
Suppose one fixes Dowty's semantics for BECOME, and suppose that the function Inr is 
defined so that if [BECOME C] is true at the interval I, then [PROG [BECOME 4>]] is true at 
every interval contained in I. Then although placing conditions on inertia specification to guarantee 
this temporal structure may be technically viable, it is materially inadequate, given the current truth 
conditions for BECOME. To show this, I will construct a model M" where the truth of (1) in M" 
does not agree with it actual use. 
Consider the model M" where Max is born at <N, w>, and (4a), which is the representation of 
(4) is true at <I', w>, where I' spans twenty years and contains N. 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4a) [BECOME winner'(max', race')] 
Such a model is admissible with the current truth conditions for BECOME 25 . If inertia is specified 
25 Dowty offers alternative truth conditions for BECOME (call the new operator BECOME where [BECOME 4)] is 1 supposed to identify the smallest interval over which the change of state from -, 0 to 4) takes ptace. The definition of BE- COME, requires Dowty to assume that there are truth value gaps; i. e. D must be neither true nor false at all intervals properly 
contained in the interval I at which [BECOME 1 
0] is true. But Dowty does not define when a sentence like "Max is the 
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so that (la), which is the representation of (1), is true at all times during the interval I', then (la) is 
true in M" at <N, w>, the time when Max is born. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
(1a) [PROG [BECOME winner'(max', race')]] 
This does not accord with the actual use of the progressive. The discrepancy between the truth 
value of the progressive and its actual use is a direct result of the fact that BECOME does not yield 
an interpretation of (4) as a process that leads to culmination. 
The required relationship between [BECOME cb] and [PROG [BECOME (]] cannot be 
obtained with the current semantics of BECOME. The question now is: how should the semantics 
of BECOME be modified? 
5.2 A Change to BECOME 
How should Dowty's definition of BECOME be revised to ensure that (i) is inconsistent? In 
other words, how should BECOME be modified so that [PROG [BECOME 0]] is true throughout 
any interval I at which [BECOME cp] is true, in such a way that the truth values assigned by the 
theory to [PROG [BECOME c]] square with the actual use of the progressive? To obtain such a 
semantics for BECOME the following must hold: if (4a), which represents (4), is true at an interval 
I, then the semantic definition of BECOME must ensure that the state of affairs during I is one 
where we would naturally assert (1) as true, e. g. Max is ahead in the race, or he is third but running 
faster than the athletes in first and second place, etc. In other words, the semantics of BECOME 
must ensure that all the intervals contained in I are ones where the process that leads to the target is 
going on, and to achieve this, the semantics of BECOME must characterise the process that leads 
to the target. 
The Eventual Outcome Strategy is an attempt to characterise the process that leads to the tar- 
get in terms of eventual outcome. Can one define the process in terms of eventual outcome within 
the semantics of BECOME? The Eventual Outcome characterisation that Dowty offers of the pro- 
cess that leads to the target cb is given in the semantics of [PROG [BECOME 4>]], which invokes 
the semantics of BECOME. So one cannot use this definition to define BECOME, or the analysis is 
reduced to circularity. Instead, the definition of BECOME must characterise the process that leads 
winner of the race" (whose formal representation is winner'(max', race')) is neither true nor false. So there is still nothing in 
the truth conditions of BECOME, that bars the model M" from being admissible. 
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to the target by placing conditions directly on what the process consists of, i. e. it must assert in the 
case of (4) that the process goes on only if Max is ahead, or third but running faster than the ath- 
letes in first and second place, etc. 
This goes against the grain of the Eventual Outcome strategy. The aim is to characterise the 
process purely in terms of eventual outcome. There must be no conditions placed directly on what 
the process consists of. Therefore, one undermines the Eventual Outcome Strategy, if the semantics 
for (4) characterises the process by placing conditions directly on what the process consists of. But 
we have argued that having such a semantics for (4) is the only way to explain that the state of 
affairs depicted in (i) is inconsistent. Hence one cannot modify Dowty's definition of BECOME in 
order to ensure that (i) is inconsistent without undermining the Eventual Outcome Strategy. 
I have argued that one cannot explain that (i) is inconsistent in Dowty's theory with his 
current semantics for BECOME. But I have shown here that if one attempts to revise the semantics 
of BECOME to explain the inconsistency of (i), then one undermines the Eventual Outcome Stra- 
tegy. Therefore, (i) must be consistent. 
But this is in conflict with the argument given in section 5, that in order to give a satisfactory 
specification of Inr, (i) must be an inconsistent state of affairs. The semantics of BECOME and the 
specification of Inr are both essential ingredients to Dowty's formulation of the Eventual Outcome 
Strategy. But the semantics of BECOME requires (i) to be consistent and the specification of Inr 
requires (i) to be inconsistent. Therefore, Dowty's formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy 
fails. 
Cooper offers an alternative formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy, this time within 
the framework of situation semantics. Can Cooper succeed where Dowty failed? To answer this 
question, we will investigate his semantic analysis of sentences (1) and (4). 
(1) Max is winning the race 
(4) Max wins the race 
6 Cooper's Formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy 
Before describing Cooper's Eventual Outcome definition of the progressive, we will review 
his interpretation of sentence (4). Cooper represents the semantics of (4) by formulating Vendler's 
classification of verbs in situation semantics. Let us review the general framework in which 
66 
Cooper's theory is set. 
6.1 The Tools 
Individuals, n-place relations and locations constitute the primitive objects in the semantic 
framework. Locations are spatio-temporal entities, e. g. the time spanning from 2pm to 3pm on 30th 
April 1988 at the Centre for Cognitive Science is a location. There are also indeterminates over 
locations and individuals; these play the role of variables. 
The basic constructs out of these objects are fact-types, i. e. structures of the form 
d, r, xl,..., xn, i> 
where 1 is a location (or location indeterminate) r is an n-place relation, xt,.. xn are individuals (or 
individual indeterminates), and i is either 0 or 1 (0 corresponds to "false" and 1 corresponds to 
"true"). For example, the fact-type d, win, max, race, l> is paraphrased as "the fact-type that Max 
wins the race at location 1 is true". Facts are those fact-types that do not contain any indeter- 
minates. So, for example, d, win, max, race, l> is a fact as well as a fact-type. Cooper names fact- 
types with determinate locations located or tensed fact-types, and fact-types with location indeter- 
minates are unlocated or untensed fact-types. 
A set of fact-types is a situation-type. For example, the situation-type s defined below 
s {d, win, max, race, l>, <1, draw, john, circle, l>) 
is paraphrased as the situation-type where Max wins the race at location 1 is true, and John draws a 
circle at location 1 is true. A situation-type that constitutes a set of tensed fact-types is a history 
(hence s is a history). A situation-type that constitutes a set of untensed fact-types is an unlocated 
or untensed situation-type. A history where all the fact-types share the same location is referred to 
as a state of affairs (hence s is a state of affairs). 
Cooper interprets tensed sentences deictically. He introduces a connection function c defined 
on tensed verbs so that c(loved) provides a location in space-time where the relation "love" is to be 
considered. The sentence "John loved Mary" is interpreted in the following way, where Id is the 
discourse location (identified by the discourse state of affairs d): 
John loved Mary 
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describes a history h with respect to connection c and discourse state of affairs d if and 
only if h contains the fact 
<c(loved), love John, Mary, 1> 
where c(loved) < ld. 
The interpretation of a sentence in Cooper's framework is concerned with whether sentences 
describe histories rather than with truth values per se. Finding out whether the sentence is true or 
not involves an additional step of evaluation, seeing whether the histories described match the world 
or not. A sentence is true (with respect to some structure of situations) if it describes a history 
which is realised or actual (in that structure of situations). A sentence is false if its negation 
describes histories that are all realised or actual. 
It must be stressed that as yet, situation semantics has no notion of logical consequence. So 
strictly speaking, there is no way of dealing with the imperfective paradox, since this is a problem 
of entailment. In defining the semantics of the progressive, Cooper is answering the following 
question: If a notion of logical consequence were to emerge, then what would the definition of the 
progressive have to look like in order to solve the imperfective paradox with that theory of logical 
consequence? Cooper uses the Eventual Outcome Strategy to define the progressive. We will 
argue that no matter what theory of logical consequence situation semantics might end up with, this 
definition of the progressive won't work. 
6.2 The Structural Constraints on the Aspectual Classes 
Having reviewed some basic groundwork, let us examine Cooper's interpretation of sentence 
(4). 
(4) Max wins the race 
The semantics of (4) rests on his formulation of Vendler's classification of aspect26. 
According to Vendler, (4) denotes an achievement. However, in Cooper's account it must be 
possible to classify it as an accomplishment sentence. This is because Cooper's semantic interpreta- 
tion of achievement sentences predicts that the progressive form of an achievement sentence is 
26 This formulation trades on an idea first introduced by Quine and developed by Carlson; the distinction between indi- 
viduals and stages of individuals (Carbon 1977, Quine 1960). Cooper uses this distinction to explain why progressives of 
statives. such as "? Max is loving Mary", are anomalous. The semantics of progressives of statives do not concern me in this 
chapter however. So I will simplify Cooper's account by dropping the distinction between individuals and stages of individu- 
als. 
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always false, and clearly, (1) can be true. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
Therefore I will assume that (4) is subject to Cooper's semantic interpretation of accomplishments 
rather than achievements. 
Cooper offers a series of what he calls structural constraints to distinguish the semantics of 
expressions of different aspectual classes. These constraints describe the different kinds of locations 
at which relations from the different aspectual classes can hold. The structural constraint on real- 
ised histories containing accomplishment relations is given below: 
Temporal Groundedness 
If r is an accomplishment relation then any realised history which contains the fact 
d, r, x ,.., x , 1> does not also contain the fact 
d', r, x ,.., x , 1> where 1' is pro, erl}1'temporally included in 1, 
For example, the fact (4a), which represents (4) (for the location 1 determined by the connection 
function c), is subject to the constraint described in Temporal Groundedness. 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4a) <l, win, max, race, l> 
In words, Temporal Groundedness asserts that if Max wins the race at location 1, then there is no 
location 1' temporally included in that location at which Max wins the race: this is meant to reflect 
the intuition that any part of an event where Max wins the race is not itself an event where Max 
wins the race. Cooper later revises this constraint to a more sophisticated version. The revisions 
have no bearing on the Eventual Outcome Strategy, however, and so I shall preserve the above con- 
straint. 
Temporal Groundedness does not place any conditions on the times during the location 1 at 
which the accomplishment relation holds, save that the target should not have already been reached. 
Thus Cooper avoids defining directly in the semantics of (4) what constitutes the process that leads 
to Max being the winner of the race. This is an essential part of the Eventual Outcome Strategy. 
There is an abundance of states of affairs that may correspond to the coming about of the target, 
and Cooper wants to avoid describing these. Temporal Groundedness does not even define when 
the process leading to the target goes on. Indeed, Temporal Groundedness does not induce a con- 
cept of this sort of process at all. Therefore, an accomplishment is not interpreted as a "structured" 
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event, constituting a process leading to a goal. 
We have now seen how Cooper defines the semantics of (4) without defining directly what 
the process leading to the target consists of. Cooper's theory is different from Dowty's, for they are 
stated in different frameworks. Nevertheless, there are striking similarities in their semantics for 
(4). Dowty places no restrictions on the state of affairs during the intervals at which (4) is true. In 
Cooper's theory, Temporal Groundedness places no restrictions on the state of affairs during the 
locations at which the accomplishment relation "win" holds. 
Clearly, it is not just any state of affairs that deserves to be regarded as the process that leads 
to the goal. The innovation in the Eventual Outcome Strategy is that the definition of the progres- 
sive in modal terms will reveal when the process goes on. 
6.3 Cooper's Analysis of the Progressive 
Cooper provides a semantic definition of the progressive auxiliary "be". He represents it as a 
relation between an individual and the property represented by a verb phrase. Verb phrases 
represent pairs consisting of an indeterminate (which are represented by symbols in bold type) and 
a situation-type; e. g. the verb-phrase "win the race" is represented as <a, {<l, win, a, race, 1>)>. One 
might refer to the property informally as "the property of being an a such that a wins the race" (this 
is analogous to X-abstraction). The interpretation of "Max is winning the race" is as follows: 
Max is winning the race 
describes a history h with respect to connection c and discourse state of affairs d if and 
only if h contains the fact 
<c(is), be, max, P, l> 
where c(is) = ld 
and P is the property represented by the VP "wins the race" with respect to d and c, 
i. e. <a, (d, win, a, race, l>)>. 
The above describes the logical structure of progressive sentences. The semantic interpreta- 
Lion of the relation "be" takes the form of further structural constraints. 
Control Constraint on "be" 
If any realised history h contains the fact 
<l, be, x, P, i> 
(where i is either 0 or 1) 
then h also contains the fact 
<l, be+, P[a/x], i> 
(where a is the subject indeterminate in P). 
P(a/x] means "P with x substituted for the indeterminate a" (this corresponds to X-reduction). For 
example, the above constraint on "be" entails that if a realised history h contains the fact 
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<l, be, max, <a, {d, win, a, race, l>)>, 1> (this corresponds to "Max is winning the race"), then h also 
contains the fact d, be+, (d, win, max, race, l>?, 1>. 
In addition to the above constraint on "be", Cooper describes a structural constraint on "be+" 
which relates all the progressive sentences to the corresponding non-progressive ones. This con- 
straint invokes the consistent extension of a state of affairs (where consistency here is not to be con- 
fused with logical consistency). An extension of a state of affairs is simply a history which is a 
superset of that state of affairs, and a consistent extension of a state of affairs is a certain kind of 
extension, the role of which is to define when the state of affairs `continues uninterrupted'. The 
structural constraint on be+ is defined below, where f[l] represents a fact-type containing the loca- 
tion indeterminate 1, and the consistent extension of h at 1 is the consistent extension of the state of 
affairs that contains all and only the fact-types in h with location 127. 
Structural Constraint on "be+" 
If any realised history h contains the fact 
d, be+, {f [11],.., f [1 ]), 1> 
then the consistent exten&n of h at 1 contains this fact and also the facts 
f [l n "., f [1 /1 l where 1t,. 1, ln inl, clude In n 
This constraint on be+ is supposed to capture the following intuition: if (1) is true, then what- 
ever the current state of affairs is, that state of affairs must lead to Max being the winner of the 
race if it continues uninterrupted. To see exactly how the analysis does this, let us examine the 
relationship between sentences (1) and (4) that arises from the above constraint. Sentence (1) is 
represented by the fact-type (la), for the appropriate location 1 determined by connection c. 
(la) d, be, max, <a, (d', win, a, race, 1>), 1> 
By the control constraint on "be", a realised history h contains (la) only if it contains the fact (lb). 
27 This is Cooper's revised structural constraint on "be+". The original account invoked existential quantification over 
consistent extensions. This proved problematic for sentences (i) and (ii). 
(i) The coin is coming up heads 
(ü) The coin is coming up tails 
So Cooper suggests that any history h at location 1 invokes only one consistent extension Cooper has suggested in conversa- 
tion that the term "consistency" used here should be equated with logical consistency. This cannot be sustained, however, 
since there is more than one logically consistent extension of a history h at location 1. and the consistent extension of h at 1 re- 
ferred to in the structural constraint on be+ is unique. So Cooper's use of consistency in be+ should not be confused with 
logical consistency. 
71 
Ob) d, be+, {d', win, max, race, l>), 1> 
By the structural constraint on "be+", h contains (lb) only if the consistent extension of h at 1 that 
contains the fact (lb) also contains (4a) for some location 1' that includes 1. 
(4a) d', win, max, race, l> 
(4a) is the representation of (4). 
(4) Max wins the race 
Thus if (1) describes the state of affairs defined by the history h at location 1, i. e. the state of affairs 
that contains all and only the fact-types in h with location 1, then (4) describes the consistent exten- 
sion of that state of affairs. Thus the role of consistent extensions is to tell us when the state of 
affairs ̀ continues uninterrupted'. But even if h is realised, it is not necessarily the case that the con- 
sistent extension of the state of affairs defined by h at I is realised. Hence there is no entailment 
from sentence (1) to (4). 
Cooper's analysis of the progressive bears a striking resemblance to that of Dowty (Dowty 
1979). Dowty defines the progressive with the use of a primitive accessibility relation termed iner- 
tia, the role of which is to define when the current state of affairs 'continues uninterrupted'. Cooper 
defines the progressive with the use of a primitive extensibility relation termed consistency, the role 
of which is also to define when the current state of affairs 'continues uninterrupted'. 
Even though Cooper's Eventual Outcome Strategy seems fruitful, one cannot adopt it until 
one fully understands the notion of modality involved. In Cooper's theory, this amounts to solving 
the following problem: given the history h and location 1, what is the consistent extension of the 
state of affairs defined by h at I? Cooper claims that the consistent extension of the discourse his- 
tory at the discourse location Id is unique. Therefore it must be possible to define a (possibly par- 
tial) function "Ext" on the cross product of histories and locations, which for each pair (h, l) picks 
out the unique history h' that is the consistent extension of the state of affairs defined by h at 1. 
The structural constraint on "be+" may refer to this function Ext as follows: 
If any realised history h contains the fact 
<1, be+, {f [1 ],.., f [I ]), 1> 
then Ext(h, 1) contAins thi$ fact and also the facts 
f[1/1],.., f[I/1] 
where 11 ,.., 1n includ 
fn 
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The question remains as to whether the specification of the function Ext is sufficient for 
describing what is going on at the time of (1) in a way that squares with intuitions. This question 
is analogous to the question that Dowty faced: can one specify the function Inr? We concluded that 
one could not specify Inr; it was not a well-defined function. Can Cooper do any better? Is the 
function Ext well-defined? 
7 Ext and Why (i) is Inconsistent 
In order to see how Ext should be defined, we will now ask relative to Cooper's theory the 
same question that we asked relative to Dowty's theory, i. e. the question that was posed in section 
2. In section 2, I argued that according to intuitions, it is possible for (1) to be true, and then false, 
and then true, and then Max may go on to win the race. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
That is, the state of affairs depicted in (a) is possible. 
IIII 
"Max is winning "Max is winning "Max is winning "Max is 
the race" is the race" is the race" is the winner 
true false true of the race" 
is true 
(a) 
The question is: when is (4) true relative to this situation? 
(4) Max wins the race 
Can the period at which (4) is true contain the time at which (1) is false? i. e. Is the situation dep- 
icted in (i) consistent? 
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- "A1ax wins VIC race" is true 
"Max is winning "Max is winning 
the race" is the race" is 
true false 
(I) 
"! lax is winning "Max is 
the race" is the winner 
true of the race" 
is true 
This question amounts to the following in Cooper's theory: Let the history h contain the facts (la) 
(representing (1)), (5a) (representing (5)), (lb) (representing (1) again) and (4a) (representing (4)), 
where P represents "wins the race", 1,, 11 and lk are contained in 1, and 1, temporally precedes 5, 
which temporally precedes 1k. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
(1a) d, be, max, P, 1> 
(5) It is not the case that Max is winning the race 
(5a) <1i be, max, P, O> 
(lb) dk, be, max, P, l> 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4a) d, win, max, race, l> 
So h depicts location structure (i) below: 
space 
, ýl <l, win, max, racc, l> 
<1bcanax, P, O> 
<1 bc, cnax, P, l> <1,,, 
bc, max, P, 1> 
1 li 1}; 
(i) 
Then can the history h be realised? 
timt 
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Given that Cooper places no restrictions on what goes on during the location I at which the 
relation "win" holds, this seems like a legitimate question to ask. Whether or not h can be realised 
depends on the semantics of the progressive, and in particular on how the function Ext is defined. 
The object of this section is to demonstrate that in order for the function Ext to be well-defined, the 
history h that describes (i) must not ever be realised, i. e. h must be 'inconsistent'. 
To show this, I will assume the hypothesis that h can be realised and show that Ext cannot by 
defined under this hypothesis. Suppose that the history h that describes (i) is realised. Then is this 
history h that describes (i) the consistent extension of h at 1.7 In exploring this question, we will 
reveal whether the function Ext is well-defined. We first examine the consequences if h is Ext(h, ll). 
7.1 Why the Assumption that h is Ext(h, 1, ) is Inadequate 
Suppose we assume that the history h that describes (i) is the consistent extension of h at lt . 
Then the resulting interpretation of "consistent extension" does not result in a definition of the pro- 
gressive that squares with intuitions. It will be shown that this follows from the fact that for any 
history h' that, like h, contains facts (la) and (5a) for 1<5, it is not possible to maintain the supposi- 
tion that h' is the consistent extension of h at 1.. 
I now argue for this conclusion by considering such a history h'; it will be shown that h' can- 
not be the consistent extension of h at 1.. Suppose that If contains the fact that Max is running in a 
race at location 1, and suppose that he falls over at ý. Then since Max is lying flat on his face on 
the track, according to intuitions, (5a), which represents (5), is contained in h'. Suppose that before 
he fell over, he was winning the race. i. e. (la) is contained in h'. Then h' at I is exactly like the 
history h at 1i, So h' is an extension of the state of affairs defined by h at 1, (since it is a superset 
of this state of affairs). But is h' the consistent extension of h at li? 
According to intuitions, anything that happens after 1.1 in the history h' is consistent with Max 
winning the race at 1t where 1id , because the progressive action is interrupted at 1 since Max falls 
over at Ii. In particular, Max need not win the race in h'. However, if h' is the consistent extension 
of h at 11, then by the semantics of the progressive auxiliary "be", the truth of (1) requires Max to 
win the race in h'. This is contrary to intuitions, and therefore one cannot assume that h' is the 
consistent extension of h at 1.. 
The history h' described here is like the history h that is depicted in (i) above, in that both h' 
and h contain the facts (la) and (5a) where 1d.. So the argument that h' cannot be the consistent 
extension of h at 1, equally well applies to h. So h cannot be the consistent extension of h at 1I . 
7S 
What are the consequences of this? 
7.2 Circularity 
Given that the realised history h that is depicted in (i) cannot be Ext(h, li), I will now show 
that the function Ext is not well-defined. Furthermore, if one were to try to modify the function Ext 
in order to make it well-defined, then one would reduce the analysis of the progressive to circular- 
ity. 
Suppose that the realised history h is as described above (and so is depicted by (i)). Let the 
fact (7a) represent (7) (so Q represents the verb phrase "draw a circle"). 
(7) John is drawing a circle 
(7a) di, beJohn, Q, l> 
In addition to facts (la), (5a), (lb) and (4a) being contained in h, suppose that (7b) is contained in h 
for every location lm contained in 1 (i. e. John is drawing a circle at every location lm contained in 
1), and the fact (8a), which represents (8), is contained in h (so John draws a circle at location 1). 
(Note that since (7b) is contained in h for every location lm contained in 1, (7a) is contained in h 
because 1, is contained in 1). 
(7b) dm, beJohn, Q, l> 
(8) John draws a circle 
(8a) d, draw, John, circle, l> 
So h describes location structures (i) and (ii) below. 
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space 
% <l, win, max, racc, l> 
<I., bc, max, P, O> 







<1, draw, john, circlc, l> 
time 
For every Inß contained in 1 





The history h is one where John's drawing a circle continues uninterrupted from the location II to 
the location where the target is reached. This is just the course of events that Ext(h, li) is supposed 
to characterise in the semantics of (7). Therefore to gain the right semantics for (7), this history h 
must be Ext(h, 1, ) in the semantic interpretation of (7a). 
One can now see a problem in defining the function Ext. By our argument in the previous 
section, the history h depicted by (i) and (ii) above is not the consistent extension of h at 1 in the 
semantic interpretation of (la), and yet this history h is the consistent extension of h at 11 in the 
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semantic interpretation of (7a). Therefore we have a situation here where h is Ext(h, l, ) and h is not 
Ext(h, 1. ). Hence the two-place function Ext that takes a history and a location as its arguments is 
not well-defined. 
How may one modify the function Ext, in order to make it well-defined? If Ext is to be 
well-defined, then it must be defined relative to facts, as well as the history h and location 1i, so that 
Ext can distinguish that h (that describes (i) and (ii) above) is the consistent extension of h at li in 
the semantic evaluation of (7), but not of (1). But which facts are appropriate as input to Ext? 
(7) requires h to be the consistent extension of h at 1, because we have assumed that h con- 
tains the fact (7b) ("John is drawing a circle") for every location 1m contained in 1. (1) requires h 
not to be the consistent extension of h at 1. because we have assumed that h contains the fact (5a) 
("It is not the case that Max is winning the race") at a location contained in 1 (cf. section 7.1). 
Therefore, in order for Ext to predict that h is the consistent extension of h at 1I in the semantic 
evaluation of (7) but h is not the consistent extension of h at 1. in the semantic evaluation of (1), 
Ext must be defined relative to the progressive facts at locations contained in 1. That is, Ext must 
be a function whose arguments in the semantic evaluation of (la) are It, h and <1, be, max, P, O>n. 
One now has the following problem in specifying Ext. In order to obtain a satisfactory 
specification of the function Ext, it must include as arguments the progressive facts. But the pro- 
gressive is defined in terms of Ext, and so to introduce progressive facts as an argument to Ext 
would reduce the analysis to circularity. This is exactly analogous to the snag encountered in 
Dowty's theory. Under the assumption that (i) defines a possible state of affairs, the function Inr is 
not well-defined, and if one were to modify it to make it well-defined, then the analysis of the pro- 
gressive would be reduced to circularity. 
The function Ext is crucial to defining the progressive in terms of eventual outcome in 
Cooper's theory. But under the assumption that the history h that depicts (i) can be realised, the 
function Ext cannot be specified. Therefore, to preserve the Eventual Outcome Strategy, one must 
place conditions on the semantics of (4) or the semantics of the progressive to ensure that h cannot 
be realised. 
(4) Max wins the race 
28 Notice that it is the progressive facts that must be input to Ext, because the non-progressive facts agree in semantic 
value with respect to h. 
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In other words, the semantics of (4) and the semantics of the progressive must ensure that any real- 
ised history h that contains the fact (4a) (representing (4)) must also contain the facts (lb) 
(representing (1)) for every location Im contained in 1. 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4a) <1, win, max, race, l> 
(1) Max is winning the race 
(lb) <1 m, 
bc, max, P, 1> 
This history is depicted in (iii) below. 
space <I, win, max, racc, l> 
For cvcry lm containcd in 1 





8 How to Ensure that (i) is Inconsistent 
time 
How may one guarantee that if a realised history h contains the fact (4a), then it also contains 
the facts (lb) for every location 1m contained in 1? I will argue that this temporal structure cannot 
be derived from Cooper's current semantic interpretation of (4a). Furthermore, it cannot be derived 
by revising Cooper's semantic interpretation of (4a) without undermining the Eventual Outcome 
Strategy. 
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8.1 The Current Interpretation of Temporal Groundedness 
Suppose one fixes Cooper's semantics for the sentence (4) (i. e. one preserves Temporal 
Groundedness), and suppose that the function Ext is defined so that if the realised history h contains 
the fact (4a) then it contains the facts (lb) for every location 1M contained in 1. Then although plac- 
ing conditions on Ext to guarantee this structure is technically viable, it is materially inadequate, 
given the current semantics for (4). To show this, I will construct a realised history h" where the 
truth of (1) is contrary to its actual use. 
Consider the history h" where Max is born at location 1, (i. e. h contains the fact 
d1, born, max, 1>), and Max wins the race at location I (i. e. h" contains the fact (4a)), where 1 spans 
twenty years and contains 1,. According to Temporal Groundedness this history can be realised, for 
we have not assumed that the history contains a fact (4b), where lm is contained in 1. 
(4b) dm, win, maxrace, l> 
Indeed, Cooper offers nothing in the semantics of (4) to bar Max from being born at a location con- 
tained in one where he wins the race. Thus if one specifies consistency so that h" contains (lb) for 
all locations 1m contained in 1, then (1) is true at 1., the location where Max is born. This is con- 
trary to its actual use. The discrepancy between the truth value of the progressive and its actual use 
arises from the fact that Temporal Groundedness does not yield an interpretation of (4) as a process 
that leads to a goal. Hence the required relationship between (1) and (4), i. e. that (i) is inconsistent, 
cannot be obtained with Temporal Groundedness. 
This corresponds to the problem that we found with Dowty. Dowry cannot account for (i) as 
inconsistent given his current truth conditions for BECOME, because BECOME does not yield an 
interpretation of (4) as a process that leads to a goal. 
One cannot explain in Cooper's theory that the history h describing (i) cannot be realised, 
given his current analysis of (4). The question now is: how can the semantics of (4) be modified? 
8.2 A Change to Temporal Groundedness 
How may one modify Cooper's structural constraints on (4) to ensure that if (4a) (represent- 
ing (4)) is contained in a realised history h, then (lb) (representing (1)) is contained in h for every 
location 1m contained in 1, in such way that the analysis of the progressive agrees with its actual 
use? 
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(1) Max is winning the race 
(lb) dm, winmaz, race, 1> 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4a) d, win, max, race, l> 
If the analysis of (1) is to agree with intuitions, then the structural constraints on (4a) must 
ensure that the states of affairs at locations contained in 1 are ones where we would naturally assert 
(1) as true, e. g. Max is ahead in the race, or he is third but running faster than the athletes in first 
and second place, etc. In other words, the semantics of (4a) must assert that all the locations con- 
tained in 1 are ones where the process that leads to the target is going on. In order to achieve this 
analysis, the semantics of (4a) must characterise the process that leads to the target. 
The Eventual Outcome Strategy is an attempt to characterise the process that leads to the tar- 
get in terms of eventual outcome. Can one characterise the process in terms of eventual outcome 
within the semantic analysis of (4a)? The definition of the process in terms of eventual outcome 
that Cooper offers is given in the semantics of the progressive auxiliary "be" with the use of con- 
sistent extensions, and this semantic definition is given in terms of (4a). So one cannot use this to 
define (4a), or the analysis would be reduced to circularity. Instead, the semantics of (4a) must 
characterise the process that leads to the target by placing conditions directly on what the process 
consists of; i. e. it must assert that the process goes on only if Max is ahead, or he is third but run- 
ning faster than the athletes in first and second place, etc. 
This goes against the grain of the Eventual Outcome Strategy. The aim is to characterise the 
process purely in terms of eventual outcome. There must be no conditions placed directly on what 
the process consists of. Therefore, one undermines the Eventual Outcome Strategy if the semantics 
of (4) characterises the process by placing conditions directly on what the process consists of. But 
we have argued that having such a semantics for (4) is the only way we can explain that the history 
h that describes (i) cannot be realised. Hence one cannot modify Cooper's semantics for (4) to 
ensure that h that describes (i) cannot be realised without undermining the Eventual Outcome Stra- 
tegy. 
Just as with Dowty's, Cooper's semantic analysis of (4) cannot ensure that the situation dep- 
icted in (i) is inconsistent. Furthermore, one cannot revise his analysis of (4) to make (i) incon- 
sistent without undermining the Eventual Outcome Strategy. Therefore, the history h that depicts 
(i) must be consistent. 
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But this is in conflict with the argument given in section 7, that in order to give a satisfactory 
specification of the function Ext, the history h that depicts (i) must not ever be realised. The 
semantics of (4) and the specification of Ext are both essential ingredients to Cooper's formulation 
of the Eventual Outcome Strategy. But the semantics of (4) requires (i) to be consistent and the 
specification of Ext requires (i) to be inconsistent. Therefore, just like Dowty's, Cooper's formula- 
tion of the Eventual Outcome Strategy fails. 
9 Hinrichs' Formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy 
Hinrichs' formulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy is in the framework of situation 
semantics, but a different version to that of Cooper's. I will now review the terminology that he 
makes use of. 
9.1 The Backdrop 
Hinrichs' framework is the version of situation semantics in (Barwise and Perry 1983). The 
basic construct is a situation-type, which in this version is a partial function from n-ary relations 
and n individuals to truth values. For example, the situation-type in which Molly barks and Jackie 
doesn't is s. 
s: = barks, Molly; yes 
barks, Jackie; no 
This is slightly different from Cooper's interpretation of a situation-type. as a set of fact-types. 
From situation-types, one can construct courses of events. A course of events is a partial 
function from locations to situation-types. For example, the course of events in which Molly barks, 
and then Mr. Levine shouts at Molly, and then Molly stops barking is denoted by a below: 
CF: = at 1: barksMolly; yes 
at 1': shouts-at-, Mr. Levine, Molly; yes 
at 1": barks, Molly; no 
where 1,1' and 1" are locations and 1d'd" 
A course of events that is defined on one location alone is a state of affairs. Among all possible 
courses of events, there is a designated course of events a* which is actual. 
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One can also construct event-types in this framework. An event-type is exactly like a course 
of events, save that one or more of the indeterminates may appear in place of genuine individuals, 
relations or locations. Event-types are used to express complex properties. For example, the com- 
plex property of being a tired hungry philosopher is described in the event-type E below: 
E: = at 1: philosopher, a; yes 
tired, a; yes 
hungry, a; yes 
One can introduce anchors for event-types. An anchor for an event-type E is a function f 
assigning individuals, relations and locations to some of the indeterminates in E. Given an anchor f 
of E, one can construct a new event-type E[f] by replacing each indeterminate x in the domain of f 
by its value f(x). A total anchor is a function f whose domain includes all the indeterminates in E. 
Given the anchors on event-types, one can relate events to corresponding event-types. A 
course of events e is of type E if E[Q is part of e for some anchor f (f is necessarily total). I 
presume that a partial function E[f] is part of a partial function e if the domain of E[l. written 
dom(E[f]) (this is a set of locations), is contained in dom(e) (also a set of locations) and for all I in 
dom(E[fl), E[fl(1) = e(1). 
9.2 Hinrichs' Analysis of the Progressive 
Hinrichs' definition of the progressive is an attempt to improve on Dowty's analysis by 
replacing the primitive construct inertia worlds with an independently motivated construct in situa- 
tion semantics; structural constraints. But what are structural constraints in Hinrichs' version of 
situation semantics? 
9.2.1 Structural Constraints 
Structural constraints provide one with information on how the world is made up. The actual 
course of events must comply with structural constraints. There are three types; necessary con- 
straints, nomic constraints, and conventional constraints. Necessary constraints are ones that arise 
from necessary relations, for example the constraint that every woman is human. Nomic constraints 
are inviolable patterns in nature, for example the constraint that a ball once thrown must eventually 
come down. 
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Conventional constraints are ones that arise from conventions that hold within a community 
of living beings, for example the relation between the ringing of the bell and the end of class. In 
contrast with the other two types of constraints these are violable, that is, the actual course of 
events need not necessarily comply with conventional constraints. To know English one must know 
the meaning of basic lexical items. This is all knowledge about various conventional constraints. 
Barwise and Perry (1983) represent structural constraints by invoking the primitive relation 
involves that holds between event-types. Unconditional structural constraints, (the only type we 
consider here), are all of the form given below, where lu denotes the universal location: 
C: = at 1ti involves, E, E'; yes 
As an example of a constraint, Barwise and Perry sight CO below, which is supposed to 
assert that kissing involves touching. 
CO: = at 1u: involves, E, E'; yes 
E := at 1: kisses, a, b; yes 
E': = at 1: touches, a, b; yes 
Given the constraint C, 
C: = at 1u: involves, E, E'; yes 
Barwise and Perry introduce the following terminology that we will subsequently make use of. 
(i) A course of events e is meaningful with respect to C if e is of type E. For example, the 
course of events e given below is meaningful with respect to the constraint CO above, 
since e is of type E. 
e: = at 1: ldss, max, mary; yes 
(ii) If e is meaningful with respect to C, then e' is a meaningful option from e with respect to 
C if for every total anchor f for exactly the indeterminates in E, if e is of type E[f], then e' 
is of type E'[f]. For example, e', defined below, is a meaningful option from e with respect 
to CO, where e and CO are as defined above. 
e': = at 1: touch, max, mary; yes 
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Hinrichs uses structural constraints to define the progressive. However, it is not very clear 
what a constraint is, since Barwise and Perry are not very clear on which event-types E stand in the 
primitive relation involves to which event-types E. Because of this, when we review Hinrichs' 
definition of the progressive, we will have to ask ourselves what the relation involves would have to 
look like in order that Hinrichs' definition of the progressive agrees with its actual use. 
9.2.2 How Hinrichs Uses Structural Constraints 
To motivate how structural constraints contribute to the semantics of the progressive, consider 
sentence (9). 
(9) Max is making a bid 
Hinrichs claims that (9) will count as true in a course of events characterised in (10) because there 
is a conventional constraint to the effect that raising one's hand at an auction constitutes making a 
bid. 
(10) a: = at 1: auction, a; yes 
raising-his-hand, max; yes 
be-at, max, a; yes 
intend, max, (bid, max); yes 
Hinrichs' definition for the progressive with respect o a course of events v at location 1, writ- 
ten as al, is (11). 
(11) a1(PROG(Rn), al'", an) =1 if and only if 
there is a course of events a' contained in or equal to a* such that: 
(i) -, (31')(1'E dom(a) & l'>l) & le dom(a) 
(ii) there is a structural constraint 
Cn: at IU involves, E, E'; yes 
such that a' is meaningful with respect to Cn and a" is a meaningful option from 
a' with respect to Cn, and d'1"(n'a1""an) =1 for 1 contained in 1". 
Before we discuss the ideas behind this definition, we should note that it features a glaring peculiar- 
ity; there are no conditions placed on the course of events a with respect to which the progressive 
sentence is evaluated. So sentence (1) (whose representation is (1a)) is either true with respect to 
every course of events (whether or not they are actual) or it is false with respect to every course of 
events; i. e. (1) is an eternal sentence. 
85 
(1) Max is winning the race 
(1a) (PROG(win), max, race) 
To overcome this, one may revise (11) to (l la): 
(Ila) a I(PROG(RR), at,..., ad= 1 if and only 
if 
a is contained in a* and 
(i) dom(a) & 1'>l) & le dom(a) 
(ii) There is a structural constraint 
Cn: = at 1: involves, E, E'; yes 
such that a is meaningful with respect to Cn and a" is a meaningful option from 
a with respect to Cn, and 
a' 1(RA, at,.., d=1 for 1 contained in 1" 
(11a) is exactly the same as (11) save that the truth conditions that were placed on the course of 
events a' in definition (11) are now placed on the course of events a of evaluation. This guarantees 
that (1) will be true with respect to some courses of events a (and these courses of events must be 
actual) and false with respect to others; i. e. (1) is no longer an eternal sentence. Since (Ila) 
improves on the analysis of the progressive in this respect. I will adopt definition (1la) from now 
on". 
Let us discuss the semantic role played by clauses (i) and (ii) in the definition (lla). Clause 
(i) allows a to contain any facts up to the point of speech and therefore ranges in effect over the 
entire context of an utterance. Clause (ii) in (11a) gives Hinrichs' definition of the progressive its 
"eventual outcome" properties. For example, the conventional completion as described by (conven- 
tional) structural constraints of the state of affairs a at location 1 that makes (1) true is the state of 
affairs a' at location 1' that makes sentence (4), whose representation is (4a), true where 1' contains 
1. 
(4) Max wins the race 
(4a) (win, max, race) 
So conventional completion in Hinrichs' theory corresponds to the course of events 'continuing 
uninterrupted'. 
Hinrichs claims that he explains how (1) can be true even if (4) is never true by the violable 
nature of structural constraints. An actual course of events a makes (1) true if it is meaningful with 
29 The criticisms that I will eventually give of (1 Ia), however, will equally well apply to (11). 
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respect to a structural constraint, where the RHS of the constraint is a course of events that, if it 
were actual, would make (4) true. But if the constraint is violated, then the course of events 
corresponding to the RHS is not actual and so (4) will not be true. 
Hinrichs is using structural constraints where Dowty used inertia worlds and Cooper used 
consistent extensions: these tell us when the current state of affairs `continues 
uninterrupted'. Hinrichs claims that structural constraints are motivated independently of the seman- 
tics of the progressive, whereas inertia worlds and consistent extensions are not. However, it is not 
clear that this is the case. Indeed, until we have some idea of which event-types E stand in the 
primitive relation involves to which event-types E', we do not even know what the constraints are. 
Therefore, given the particular event-types E and E', we have the task of stating whether E involves 
E'. This task must be carried out with the definition of the progressive in mind. The structural 
constraints we have as a result of our specification of involves must ensure that the definition of the 
progressive in terms of structural constraints that is given in (1la) squares with its actual use. 
10 The Data in Hinrichs' Theory 
We have the task of stating which event-types E stand in the primitive relation involves to 
which event-types E. In order to see what requirements must be placed on the relation involves so 
that Hinrichs' definition of the progressive agrees with intuitions, I will investigate the truth condi- 
tions of a particular example, namely sentence (1). 
(1) Max is winning the race 
Suppose that Max is running in a race of four laps, and suppose that at the start of the third 
lap he is ahead in the race and running the fastest. Then according to intuitions, sentence (1) is 
true. Let 13 be the location that refers to the time when Max starts the third lap. Then the course of 
events where Max is ahead and running the fastest at the start of the third lap corresponds to the 
course of events a below: 
a: = at 13: ahead, max, race; yes 
fastest, max, race; yes 
So to capture the intuitions concerning (1) in Hinrichs' definition of the progressive, (1) must be 
true with respect to a at location 13' i. e. a must satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in (1la). What does 
this tell us about the relation involves? 
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First by condition (ii), there must be some constraint C such that a is meaningful with respect 
to C. and a' defined below (corresponding to "Max wins the race") must be a meaningful option 
from Q with respect to C, such that 13 is contained in 1. 
a': = at 1: win, max, race; yes 
What should the constraint C be? 
Let C be as defined below: 
C: = at ly involves, E, E'; yes 
What are the event-types E and E'? For a to be meaningful with respect to C, a must be of type E. 
So there must be some anchor f such that E[f] is part of a; i. e. the domain of E[f] must be con- 
tained in the domain of a and E[f] must equal a on that domain. The domain of a is (13), and so 
the domain of E[f] must be the empty set or (13). Since it makes no sense for the domain of E[f] 
to be the empty set, the domain of E[fj must be (13). Now the value of E[f] at 13 must be the same 
as that of a. The value of a is s given below: 
s: = ahead, max, race; yes 
fastest, max, race; yes 
So suppose f(a) = max. Then if E is as defined below, then the value of E[f] at 13 is s, as required. 
E: = at 13: ahead, a, race; yes 
fastest, a, race; yes 
So the event-type E in constraint C must be as we have it defined here. 
According to condition (ii) in (1la), the course of events d must be a meaningful option from 
a with respect to C. Therefore, a' must be of type E'[f] (i. e. E'[f] must be part of d), where f(a) 
= max. So E' must be as defined below: 
E': = at 1: win, a, race; yes 
We have seen which event-types C must relate with the relation involves, but there still 
remains something to be said about the relation between the location 13 (featured in E) and 1 
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(featured in E'). For (1) to be true with respect to a at location 13, by condition (ii) in (11a)1 must 
contain 13, which is the time corresponding to when Max starts the third lap. Furthermore, since 1 
corresponds to the location where Max wins the race, it must contain the time when the target, i. e. 
Max crosses the finish line in first place, is reached. Since the race is four laps long, this means 
that 1 must contain the time when Max finishes the fourth lap. Assuming that I is connected, l must 
contain the time spanning from when Max starts the third lap to when he finishes the fourth lap. 
Given the requirements on the event-types E and E' and the locations 13 and I that we have 
discussed, the constraint C must be as defined below. 
C: = at 1: u 
involves, E, E'; yes 
E: = at 13: ahead, a, race; yes 
fastest, a, race; yes 
E': = at 1: win, a, race; yes 
where 13 is contained in 1. 
(13 corresponds to the time when a starts the third lap and 1 corresponds to the time span- 
ning from when a starts the third lap to when he finishes the fourth and final lap). 
So, in order for (1la) to agree with the intuition that (1) is true with respect to the course of events 
a at location 13, the structural constraint C above must exist; the event-types E and E' defined above 
must be related by the relation involves. 
We now have the following problem on our hands. Suppose that at the start of the third lap 
Max is ahead in the race and running the fastest. Furthermore, suppose that at the start of the 
fourth lap, Max has fallen back and he is now last and the slowest. This corresponds to the course 
of events d' below, where 14 corresponds to the time when Max starts the fourth lap. 
d': = at 13: ahead, max, race; yes 
fastest, max, race; yes 
at 14: last, max, race; yes 
slowest, max, race; yes 
13<14 
Then one can show that according to (1la), sentence (1) is true with respect to the course of events 
d' at location 14, where Max is last in the race and running the slowest, contrary to intuitions. 
Let us evaluate the truth value of (1) with respect to the course of events a" at location 14. 
First, a" satisfies condition (i) of (1la) because the domain of d' contains no locations later than 14. 
To satisfy condition (ii), a" must be meaningful with respect to some constraint C, and a' defined 
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below must be a meaningful option from d' with respect to C', and 14 must be contained in 1. 
d: = at 1: win, max, race; yes 
One can show that this condition is satisfied when the constraint is C as defined above. 
First, to show that d' is meaningful with respect to C: the domain of E (defined in C above) 
is (13) and this is contained in the domain of d' which is (13,14}. Furthermore the value of E[f], 
where f(a) = max, at the location 13 is the same as that for o" at 13. Therefore E[fJ is part of d', 
and so d' is of type E. Hence d' is meaningful with respect to the constraint C. Furthermore, a' 
is a meaningful option from d' with respect to constraint C because a' is of type E[f] where f(a) = 
max. Moreover, the location 14 is contained in 1, for 1 contains the time when Max starts the fourth 
lap, which is just 14. Hence the course of events a" satisfies condition (ii) of the definition (1la). 
Hence according to (1la), (1) is true with respect to the course of events o" at location 14. But this 
corresponds to Max being last in the race and running the slowest, and so according to intuitions, 
(1) is false with respect to this situation. Hence the current definition of the progressive given in 
(I la) does not agree with its actual use. 
How can one improve on the problematic analysis of (1)? As we have discussed, Hinrichs is 
using constraints in the definition of the progressive to define when the process 'continues 
uninterrupted'. So using the constraint C in defining (1) is supposed to capture the idea that the pro- 
cess 'continues uninterrupted'. The problem with the current analysis of (1) is that the constraint C 
does not assert anything about what happens between the start of the third lap and the finish line. It 
therefore cannot capture in the way that we desire the notion that the process going on at the start 
of the third lap (that Max is ahead and running the fastest) `continues uninterrupted'. To improve 
on Hinrichs' problematic analysis of (1), we must overcome this flaw. We must replace the con- 
straint C with some other constraint that better captures our intuitions about when the process 'con- 
tinues uninterrupted'. How is this to be done? 
In order to capture in structural constraints the notion of a process `continuing 
uninterrupted' in the way we desire, we might replace the constraint C with a constraint Ct defined 
as below, which asserts that the individual remains ahead in the race and runs the fastest from the 
start of the third lap right up to the time he crosses the finish line. 
Cl: = at 1u: involves, E1, E't; yes 
E1: = at 1: ahead, a, race; yes 
fastest, a, race; yes 
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E'1: = at 1: win, a, race; Yes 
where 1 spans the time from the beginning of the third lap to when Max crosses the finish 
line. 
Unlike C. the constraint Cl captures the idea that the process continues uninterrupted, because Cl 
requires Max to remain ahead in the race and remain the fastest. By getting rid of the constraint C 
and replacing it with the constraint Ct, we guarantee that (1) is false with respect to the course of 
events a" at 14, as desired, for d' is not meaningful with respect to Cl and so a" does not satisfy 
condition (ii) of definition (1la). Hence we seem to have improved the analysis of (1). 
However, there are two problems in getting rid of the constraint C and replacing it with the 
constraint C1. First of all, the course of events a where Max is ahead and running the fastest at the 
beginning of the third lap is not of type El, for the domain of El is (1) and the domain of a is (13) 
and so the domain of El is not contained in the domain of a. 
a: = at 13: ahead, maxrace; yes 
fastest, max, race; yes 
Therefore, a is not meaningful with respect to Cl, and so a does not satisfy condition (ii) in 
definition (11a) (since we have got rid of C and replaced it with Ct and so there is now no con- 
straint with respect to which a is meaningful and (; ' is a meaningful option). Therefore (1) is 
predicted to be false with respect to the course of events a, contrary to intuitions. 
The second problem in replacing the constraint C with the constraint CI is that defining the 
constraint Cl amounts to defining directly what the process that leads to the goal consists of (CI 
says the process consists of Max being ahead and running the fastest). The Eventual Outcome Stra- 
tegy is an attempt to define the process in terms of eventual outcome instead of defining it directly: 
Therefore, in replacing the constraint C with the constraint Ct, we have undermined Hinrichs' for- 
mulation of the Eventual Outcome Strategy. 
Hinrichs attempts to define when the state of affairs continues uninterrupted in terms of con- 
straints. We have argued that in doing this, he fails to capture the natural language data. Further- 
more, we found that the constraints must define directly what the process that leads to the goal con- 
sists of. But the Eventual Outcome Strategy attempts to define the process purely in terms of even- 
tual outcome instead of directly, and so, like Dowty and Cooper, Hinrichs' formulation of the Even- 
tual Outcome Strategy fails. 
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11 Conclusion 
In characterising the semantics of (1), one might adopt what I have called the Eventual Out- 
come Strategy for defining the progressive. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
The intuition behind the strategy is the following: (1) is true if whatever the current state of affairs 
is, if that state of affairs were to continue uninterrupted, then the eventual outcome would be that 
Max is the winner of the race. The idea is that the conditions defined by the semantics of the pro- 
gressive should not concern what is going on now, but must concern only the eventual outcome of 
what is going on now. To achieve this the process that (1) refers to is characterised purely in terms 
of the culmination, plus some appropriate notion of modality, where the modality explains the 
phrase "if the process were to continue uninterrupted". The Eventual Outcome Strategy thus avoids 
placing conditions directly on what the process consists of. For example in the semantics of (1), 
one avoids talk about Max's position in the race, how fast he is running, etc. 
In this chapter, I have investigated whether the Eventual Outcome Strategy could be formu- 
lated. There have been three attempts to formulate the strategy, (Dowty 1979), (Cooper 1985) and 
(Hinrichs 1983). Hinrichs' formulation of the strategy proved problematic. In order to explain the 
phrase "if the process were to continue uninterrupted", it was necessary in Hinrichs' theory to define 
directly what the process consists of. But if one does this, then one is no longer adopting the Even- 
tual Outcome Strategy, where the aim is to define the process in terms of eventual outcome rather 
than directly. 
With respect to Dowry's and Cooper's theories, I asked the following question: Given that (4) 
is true at a period K, 
(4) Max wins the race 
is it consistent hat (1) is true and then false and then true at times contained in K? i. e. is (i) a con- 
sistent state of affairs? 
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- "max wins the race" is true 
"Max is winning "Mai is winning 
the race" is the race" is 
true false 
(i) 
'Nlax is winning "Max is 
the racc" is the winncr 
truc of the racc" 
is truc 
We have seen that an Eventual Outcome semantics of the progressive defines (1) purely in terms of 
the culmination, plus some appropriate notion of modality. I argued that in order to define the 
appropriate notion of modality in Dowty's and Cooper's theories, one must insist that (i) is incon- 
sistent. On the other hand, I argued that in order to define (1) purely in terms of the culmination, 
one must allow (i) to be consistent. This exposed a tension between the two tasks that must be 
tackled in formulating the Eventual Outcome Strategy; defining the appropriate notion of modality 
and defining (1) purely in terms of the culmination. Hence the Eventual Outcome Strategy is 
undermined. 
One is now left with a puzzle. There is a wealth of states of affairs that make sentence (1) 
true. (1) may be true when Max is ahead, in second place or last at the current time. 
(1) Max is winning the race 
In this chapter, I have investigated whether one may canvass in the formal semantic analysis of the 
progressive the intuition that the common property among these states of affairs is one of eventual 
outcome, the eventual outcome being the one described by "Max wins the race". This intuition is 
not sufficient to yield a satisfactory logical analysis of the progressive however. The puzzle is: how 
else may the progressive be defined so as to lead to a solution to the imperfective paradox? In the 




The Progressive in an Event Ontology 
1 Introduction 
To see an alternative perspective on the characterisation of the progressive, let us see what 
relation we intuitively feel holds between sentences (1) and (2). 
(1) Max was winning the race 
(2) Max won the race 
Intuitively, sentence (2) refers to an event that can be divided into phases; it is a process which 
leads to a culmination. (1) refers to that process, but it does not assert that the culmination 
occurred. 
This is the intuition underlying what I call the Event-Based Strategy in defining the progres- 
sive. The object of this chapter is to test this strategy. Event-based theories of tense and aspect 
construct event ontologies to take into account the internal structure of events (Bach 1986, Moens 
1987, Parsons 1984, ter Meulen 1982,1984). According to event ontologists, sentences like (2) 
refer to events that are divided in the event ontology into constituent parts: a process and a culmi- 
nation point. The eventual outcome of the process, provided it continues uninterrupted,, is the cul- 
mination point. This structure arises from the way the ontology for events is set up. 
Unlike the Eventual Outcome Strategy, the concept of a prior process (that is, the process that 
leads to a culmination) is not brought out purely by a modal semantics for the progressive. Instead, 
there are more ontological commitments: culmination points are assigned definite prior processes in 
the ontology. Hence constructing an event ontology provides a natural alternative to the Eventual 
Outcome approach. The concept of eventual outcome that is defined explicitly in the semantic 
definition of the progressive under the Eventual Outcome Strategy now appears as part of the event 
ontology; i. e. it is now one of the idiosyncratic things that is given as part of the model, rather than 
being defined in terms of rules. The event ontology thus provides the potential means to achieve 
one of the tasks connected with the imperfective paradox: defining the progressive. The event- 
based semantics of (1) will refer to the process that is assigned in the event ontology to (2)'s culmi- 
nation. 
Moreover, the Event-based Strategy provides a way of accomplishing the other task connected 
with the imperfective paradox: distinguishing the semantics of sentences like (2) and (3). 
(3) Max ran 
The distinct semantics of (2) and (3) can be explained by assigning the underlying events different 
structures in the ontology. 
So, following the Event-based Strategy may prove fruitful for solving the imperfective para- 
dox, since it provides a way of fulfilling both of the tasks connected with the problem: distinguish- 
ing the semantics of (3) and (2) and providing a semantic definition of the progressive. The object 
of this chapter is to evaluate how the Event-based approach tackles these two tasks in solving the 
imperfective paradox. I start by discussing briefly Bach's (1986) theory, and then I will study Par- 
sons' (1984) theory in detail, in order to assess the viability of the Event-based Strategy. 
2 Bach's Lattice-Theoretic Approach 
Bach (1986) applies Link's (1983) lattice theory to the domain of event descriptions. Bach's 
aim is to allow events to be decomposed in the ontology into the stuff in D from which they are 
made, and to allow for the composition of events into more complex ones. 
Bach's event ontology constitutes a domain E of events, a domain A contained in E of atomic 
events, and a domain D contained in A of stuff from which events are made. Atomic events are 
events such as "Max builds a house" and "Max wins a race". By means of a join operation UE, the 
domain A is extended into E, so that E contains plural events, such as "Max builds a house and 
Max wins a race". The domain E is closed under the join operation UE, and there is a partial ord- 
ering on E satisfying condition (4). 
(4) for all e1, e2e E, e15fie2 if and only if e1vEe2 = e2 
D is also closed under its join operation uD. 
Processes are considered to be the stuff that constitutes events. There is a homomorphism h 
from the domain E to D which relates events in E to the stuff from which they are made. The 
homomorphism h satisfies the following conditions: 
h: E --> D is a homomorphism such that (i) For all de D, h(d) =d 
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(ii) For all e1, e2EE, h(eIuEe2) = h(e )u h(e ) 
(iii) For all e1, e2EE, if e1S e2, then hkel)ýDQe2) 
Bach argues that the progressive form of a sentence denoting an event is derived from the stuff 
from which that event is made. Hence the progressive is a function of the homomorphism h. For 
example, sentence (5) is true if certain processes occur which form part of the event described by 
sentence (6). 
(5) Max is building a house 
(6) Max builds a house 
Bach claims that the imperfective paradox is solved since processes that form part of an event 
may occur without the event itself occurring. However, Bach does not say how a definition of the 
homomorphism h might contribute to such a solution. It is difficult to assess the viability of Bach's 
approach, because he does not show how the homomorphism h blocks the entailment between (5) 
and (6). Indeed, he does not even state the logical forms of these sentences, and so one cannot see 
how they are related at all. Bach's lattice-theoretic approach may lead to a solution to the imper- 
fective paradox, but so far, one has not been developed. We therefore just note it in passing. 
Parsons (1984) event-based theory offers a formal solution to the imperfective paradox, and 
so we will study Parsons' theory in detail, in order to assess the Event-based Approach. 
3 Parsons' Ontology 
Parsons' (1984) account of the semantics of a fragment of English presupposes that in addi- 
tion to individuals and times in the ontology, there are events, corresponding to Vendler's accom- 
plishments and achievements, processes, corresponding to Vendler's activities, and states, 
corresponding to Vendler's states (Vendler 1967). For example, (7) reports a state, (3) a process 
and (8) an event. 
(7) Max is a doctor 
(3) Max ran 
(8) Max made a sandwich 
Events, processes and states are grouped together in the theory under eventualities. Eventualities 
usually have agents and may also have objects. For example, if Max builds a house, then there is a 
building event of which Max is the agent and the house is the object. 
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The three classes of eventualities are ontologically interpreted in different ways. In the case 
of events, one can typically identify subparts; a development portion and a culmination. For exam- 
ple, if Max builds a house, then there is a period of time during which the building is going on - 
the development portion - and then (if he finishes) a time at which the house finally gets built, the 
time of culmination. I will show, however, that Parsons doesn't use the distinction between the 
development portion of an event and its culmination in the logical formalism. Nevertheless, the 
distinction remains a useful one to draw, in order to understand the intuitions underlying the ontol- 
ogy of eventualities. So it will remain useful to bear in mind the distinction between development 
portions and culminations. 
The ontological interpretation of events is in sharp contrast to that of processes and states. 
Events may culminate, but processes and states cannot ever culminate. Processes merely go on at a 
30 time t, and states hold . 
4 The Formalism 
Parsons attempts to reflect some of the ontological intuitions concerning eventualities in the 
semantic component of the theory. The symbolism is as follows: e and e are used as variables that 
range over eventualities. The predicate Cul(e, t) is used to mean that e is an event which culminates 
at time t. The predicate Hold(et) means that the eventuality e holds at t. This can be interpreted 
in one of three ways: either (i) e is a state and e's agent is in state e at time t, or (ii) e is a process 
that is going on at t, or (iii) e is an event which is in development at t. 
Parsons gives the syntax and logical forms of a small fragment of English in a format that is 
similar in style to Montague grammar. The syntactic categories that are used are NAME ("Proper 
Noun"), VERB ("Verb"), VP ("Verb phrase or "Predicate"), CL ("Sentential clause"), and S ("Sen- 
tence"). The logical symbolism is essentially a three-sorted version of the ordinary predicate cal- 
culus with predicate abstraction. Corresponding to each of the three 'sorts' is a style of variable. 
X. y, z... are variables that range over individuals; t, t',.. range over moments of time; and e, e',.. range 
over eventualities. One can make lambda abstracts in the usual way. 
The rules for a small fragment of English are given below (an expression "A*" denotes the 
semantic translation of A). 
30 Parsons later revises the interpretation of processes, so that the distinction between processes and events is dropped. 
The reasons for this are discussed in detail in section 5. 
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Ri: An intransitive VERB all by itself constitutes a VP. Its translation as a VP is the 
same as its translation as a VERB. 
R2: If A is a transitive VERB and B is a NAME, then AB is a VP, and the transla- 
tion of AB is (AB)*, where 
(AB)* = Xe[A*(e) & Object(B*, e)] 
R3: If B is a NAME and A is a VP, then BA is an untensed CL, and: 
If A is a Process or Stative VP, then 
(BA)* = Xe), t[A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Hold(e, t)] 
otherwise, if A is an Event VP, then 
(BA)* = ae%t[A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Cul(e, t)] 
Let us consider how these rules construct tenseless clauses of English. "Run" is an intransi- 
tive verb, and so by Rl it also constitutes a VP, whose translation is the same as that of "run", 
namely "Running*(e)", which should be read as "e is a running". "Win" is a transitive verb, which 
31 by rule R2 combines with the NAME "a race" to give a VP "win a race", whose translation is (9). 
(9) Xe[Winning*(e) & Object(race*, e)] 
(9) expresses the property of being a winning eventuality whose object is a race. 
The VP "run" is classified as a process VP and the VP "win the race" 
is classified as an event 
VP. So by rule R3, (10) and (11) are tenseless CLs, which translate as (10a) and (Ila) respectively. 
(10) Max run 
(10a) XeXt[Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Hold(e, t)] 
(11) Max win a race 
(1la) XeXt[Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*, e) & Cul(e, t)] 
The rule R3 treats process VPs and event VPs differently. Because "run" is a process VP. the 
predicate Hold appears in the representation of (10), whereas, because "win the race" is an event 
VP, the predicate Cul appears in the representation of (11). (10a) relates any eventuality e and time 
t just in case e is a running whose agent is Max, and which holds at t. (Ila) relates any eventuality 
e and time t just in case e is a winning whose agent is Max and object is a race, and which cul- 
minates at t. 
31 The word "race" is traditionally represented as a predicate, but Parsons represents it as a term in order to simplify 
the analysis for his purposes. 
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It is important to stress that the development portion of an event has no status in the semantic 
translation of event CLs. According to rule R3, the logical form of the tenseless event clause (11) 
is (Ila). (Ila) features just the formula Cul(e, t), standing for "e culminates at t", and it does not 
feature the formula Hold(e, t), which would stand for "e is in development at t". Thus the semantics 
of (11) is characterised purely in terms of the culmination, and it is not characterised in any way in 
terms of the development portion. Hence the development portion plays no role in discriminating 
events; one can distinguish between events solely on the basis of their culminations. 
Since the semantics of an event CL is fully specified in terms of the culmination, it looks as 
though Parsons' formalism is not making any use at all of the notion that an event has a develop- 
ment portion. But the situation is not quite that simple, thanks to the definition of the progressive. 
The progressive tenseless CL (12) is analysed so that it reports a state holding, which, ontologically 
speaking, is understood to be the development portion of winning the race being in progress. 
(12) Max be winning the race 
So although the development portion of an event plays no logical role in Parsons' theory, it plays a 
metaphysical role, and that is to help us understand in metaphysical terms what it means for a state 
of winning the race to hold. 
The rule Parsons gives for introducing the progressive form of a verb is the following: 
R7: If A is a non-stative VP, then be A-ing is a stative VP, whose translation is the 
same as A. 
Changing a VP to the progressive simply reclassifies it as stative. The semantic translation of a 
progressive VP is the same as that for the corresponding non-progressive VP. For example, the VPs 
"be winning the race" and "win the race" are both translated as (9). 
(9) Xe[Winning*(e) & Object(race*, e)] 
But because the progressive VP is stative and the nonprogressive one is an event, when one adds a 
NAME to the VPs to make tenseless CLs, rule R3 will assign the progressive CL and the non- 
progressive CL different semantic translations. The translation by rule R3 of (12) is (12a) and (11) 
translates as (Ila). 
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(12a) XCXt[Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*, e) & Hold(et)1 
(1 la) AeXt[Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*, e) & Cul(e, t)] 
The formulae (12a) and (Ila) are the same, save that the formula Hold(et) appears in (12a) and the 
formula Cul(e, t) appears in (Ila). 
Parsons' analysis of the progressive acts as a "signal" that the clause should change to another 
form. It is a signal in the case of event clauses that the formula Cul(e, t) should be replaced by the 
formula Hold(e, t). Nothing appears in the final representation of a progressive VP that corresponds 
to the progressive itself. Thus by trading on the event ontology, Parsons assigns no scope proper- 
ties to the progressive32. 
Indeed, because the formulae Cul(e, t) and Hold(et) are not logically related, the progressive 
CL (12) is not logically related to the corresponding non-progressive clause (11), even though it is 
definable directly. However, they are metaphysically related. The formula Hold(e, t) in (12a) 
corresponds to the state of winning the race holding at t, and this is understood metaphysically to 
mean that the development portion of the event of Max winning the race is in progress at t. The 
formula Cul(e, t) in (Ila) is interpreted as the same event culminating at t. 
Rules R4 and R5 are used to construct tensed sentences from the tenseless CLs: 
R4: If A is a tenseless CL, then the past, present and future forms of A are tensed 
CLs, where 
Past(A)* = AcXt(3t')[t'<t & A*(e, t')] 
Pres(A)* = A* 
Fut(A)* = XeXt(Jt')[t'>t & A*(e, t')] 
R5: If A is a tensed CL, then #A# is an S, where 
(#A#)* = kt(3e)A*(e, t) 
In rule R5 above the expression "#A#" is just the same string of words as A. Parsons has two ways 
of referring to the same string of words, because this string can be categorised as both a tensed CL 
and an S, and these denote different semantic objects. 
32 This is in sharp contrast to the traditional view on the progressive. where it is regarded as a sentential modifier, cf. 
(Bennett and Partee 1972, Dowty 1979, Scott 1968, Vlach 1981). 
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For example (2) is a tensed CL and an S. Its translation as a tensed CL is (2a). and its trans- 
lation as an S is (2b). 
(2) Max won the race 
(2a) XeXt(3t')[t'<t & Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*, e) & Cul(e, t)] 
(2b) Xt(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*, e) & Cul(e, t')] 
(2a) describes a relation between times and eventualities, and (2b) describes a property of times. 
(2a) relates any eventuality e and time t just in case there is a time t' earlier than t such that e is a 
winning that holds at t', with agent max and the race as the object. (2b) describes a property of 
times, and is true of a time t just in case there is an eventuality e and a time t' such that t' is earlier 
than t and e is a winning that holds at t' with agent max and the race as the object. 
Translating the members of the syntactic category S into predicates of times rather than for- 
mulas in the semantics may seem a little mysterious. However, the intended application is the fol- 
lowing: if A is an S then any given utterance of A is true (or false) of the time of utterance. Thus 
an utterance of sentence (2) is true if and only if (2b) is true of the time of utterance. 
Now that we have discussed Parsons' rules for the progressive and tense, we are in a position 
to see how Parsons solves the imperfective paradox. Let us review how the formalism relates sen- 
tences (1) and (2), and (13) and (3). 
(1) Max was winning the race 
(2) Max won the race 
(13) Max was running 
(3) Max ran 
The representation of (1) is (1a), and the representation of (2) is (2a). 
(la) Xt(3e)(3t')(t<t & Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*, e) & Hold(e, t')) 
(2a) Xt(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*. e) & Cul(e, t')) 
(la) and (2a) are the same, save that (la) features the formula Hold(e, t) and (2a) features the for- 
mula Cul(e, t"). This difference is a result of the fact that rule R3 treats stative VPs, such as pro- 
gressive VPs, and event VPs differently. The formulae Hold(e, t) and Cul(e, t) are unrelated logi- 
cally speaking, and so (la) does not entail (2a), as required. 
One intuitively feels, however, that there is an entailment from (2) to (1), and since the for- 
mulae Hold(e, t) and Cul(e, t) are logically unrelated, Parsons' formalism does not capture this 
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entailment within the realm of semantics. One could, however, explain the entailment, even though 
it would not be explained logically, by trading on the intuition that if an event culminates at the 
time t', then it must have been in the development portion before, t'. This intuition would be 
reflected in the formalism by assuming that whenever an event e satisfies the formula Cul(e, t'), then 
it satisfies Hold(e, t") for some time t" earlier than t'. So although (2) doesn't logically entail (1), it 
does entail (1) modulo this assumption, and so one might feel generous to Parsons on this point. 
The progressive form of a process sentence, on the other hand, is semantically equivalent to 
the corresponding non-progressive. This is a result of the fact that rule R3 treats stative VPs, such 
as progressive VPs, and process VPs in exactly the same way. The formalism assigns both sen- 
tences (13) and (3) the same translation, namely (13a). 
(13a) Xt(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Hold(e, t')) 
Hence Parsons' analysis of the progressive explains an entailment from (13) to (3) and vice versa, 
as required. In this way, Parsons' theory solves the imperfective paradox. It achieves both the 
necessary tasks for solving the imperfective paradox, for it provides a semantic distinction between 
sentences (3) and (2) (sentence (3) features the predicate "Hold" and (2) features the predicate 
"Cul"), and the definition of the progressive is sensitive to this distinction between (3) and (2) (sen- 
tences (13) and (3) have the same logical form, but (1) and (2) do not). 
S The Analysis of Adverbials 
We have seen how Parsons uses the Event-based Strategy to solve the imperfective paradox. 
But a solution to the imperfective paradox in isolation from an explanation of other temporal 
phenomena is not what one would want. His account of aspect, if it is to be satisfactory at all, 
must fit into a general theory of temporal reference. In particular, rules R3, R7, R5 etc. must fit 
with an account of adverbial modification. We must have a semantic representation of sentences 
like "Max ran slowly", "Max ran across the street" and "Max ran at 3pm". We will show that Par- 
sons' formalism as it stands cannot adequately represent "Max ran across the street" and "Max ran 
at 3pm". Moreover, if one tries to modify his formalism in order to improve the representation of 
these sentences, then one loses the potential for solving the imperfective paradox. Thus, we will 
argue, Parsons' solution to the imperfective paradox is unworkable, since it cannot be stated in a 
formalism that at the same time gives semantic representations of "Max ran across the street" and 
"Max ran at 3pm". 
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To see how Parsons would account for "Max ran across the street", let us establish how he 
treats adverbial modification, and assess how this treatment interacts with rules R3, R7 etc. Par- 
sons' framework assumes a Davidsonian treatment of adverb modification. Indeed, it is one of the 
aims of his theory to illustrate the virtues of such a treatment. Adverbials are regarded in the 
theory as predicates whose arguments range over eventualities. The following rule assigns semantic 
structures to sentences that include adverbials: 
R8: If A is an adverbial and B is a VP. then BA is also a VP and 
(BA)* = Xe[B*(e) & A*(e)] 
For example, the VP "sing softly" receives the semantic translation (14). 
(14) ? e[Singing*(e) & Softly*(e)] 
So the representations of (15) and (16) are (15a) and (16a) respectively. 
(15) Max sang softly 
(15a) ? t(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Singing*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Softly*(e) & Hold(e, t)] 
(16) Max sang 
(16a) A, t(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Singing*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Hold(e, t)] 
With these translations, one can explain the entailment from sentence (15) to (16) by the ordinary 
predicate calculus. 
5.1 A Problem with Entailment 
Although the rule for adverbial modification handles sentence (15) in the way we would 
desire, Parsons notes problems in the analysis of sentence (17). 
(17) Max ran across the street 
To see what the problem is, let us investigate how Parsons represents (17) in the semantic formal- 
ism. 
Sentence (17) features a prepositional phrase. Parsons' rule for prepositional phrases, given 
below, takes a preposition and an object to form an adverbial. 
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R9: If P is a preposition and N is a NAME, then PN is an adverbial, and 
(PN)* = Xe[P*(r1*, e)] 
We intuitively feel that the VP "run across the street" must be an event VP, since there is no entail- 
ment from (18) to (17). 
(18) Max was running across the street 
So in the translation of (17), the event VP case of rule R3 must be used; i. e. the predicate featured 
in the translation of (17) must be Cul instead of Hold. So, using the rules Parsons has given so far. 
the representation of (17) is (17a). 
(17a) %t(Be)(at')[t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Across*(the street*, e) & Cul(e, t')] 
In words, (17a) is a property of times which holds of a time t just in case there is a time t' such 
that t' is earlier than t and there is an eventuality e such that e is a running, the agent of e is Max, 
the 'spatial location' of e is across the street, and e culminates at t'. 
Parsons observes that problems arise in the above analysis of (17) because of the classification 
of the VP "run" as a process VP. He argues that since "run" is a process VP, its semantic transla- 
tion, i. e. ? eRunning*(e), must be a property of processes. Therefore, if Running* is a property of e 
(that is, Running*(e) is true), then e is a process. So according to Parsons' ontology, e cannot cul- 
minate. Therefore the formula (19) is false for every eventuality e and every time t'. 
(19) Running*(e) & Cul(e, tD 
But by the ordinary predicate calculus, if (17a) is true of a time t, then (19) is true of an event e 
and time t'. Hence, since (19) is always false, (17a) must be false for every time t. But sentence 
(17) can be true. 
Parsons suggests that if we are to preserve the translation of (17) as (17a), then we must 
change our interpretation of the VP "run" so that (19) can be true. (19) can be true only if the VP 
"run" is classified as an event, so that the eventuality e that is a running can culminate. Hence the 
only way to rescue (17a) as the representation of (17), is to classify the VP "run" as an event and 
not a process. 
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Because "run" must be classified as an event and not a process, Parsons drops the distinction 
between processes and events, so that all processes are a species of events. He suggests that what 
we have been calling processes are in fact events, and what we have been calling process VPs are 
in fact events VPs, which have the property that when they are true of an event e they are often 
true of many 'subevents' of e which have the same agents and objects. For example, a running is 
now an event which typically consists of 'shorter' events which are also runnings. Parsons claims 
that typically, a running starts to develop when the agent starts running, and it culminates when the 
agent stops running. He proposes, however, that a running, like a street crossing, may terminate 
before its culmination if something interferes. Parsons suggests that "unculminated runnings do not 
occupy one's attention, since they typically have 'subrunnings' which do culminate". 
What are the consequences of this re-classification of process VPs to event VPs? Since the 
process category has been abolished, rule R3 need not mention this option. So rule R3 is replaced 
by rule R3' below. 
R3': If B is a NAME and A is a VP, then BA is an untensed CL, and: 
If A is a stative VP, then 
(BA)* = X. e)x[A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Hold(e, t)] 
otherwise, if A is an event VP, then 
(BA)* = XeL[A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Cul(e, t)] 
Rule R3' treats CLs such as "Max run" differently to R3; it will use the predicate Cul in their 
translation instead of Hold. For example, the semantic representation of (3) is now (3b), and so 
now one can explain an entailment from (17) to (3) by the ordinary predicate calculus. 
(3) Max ran 
(3b) ). t(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Cul(e, t')) 
But what effect does this have on Parsons' solution to the imperfective paradox? 
As a result of the new rule R3', there is no longer a logical explanation of the entailment 
from (13) to (3). 
(13) Max was running 
(13) still receives the translation (13a). 
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(13a) 7lt(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Running*(e) & Agengmax*, e) & Hold(e, t')) 
So the representation of (3) features the predicate Cul whereas (13) features the predicate Hold. 
These predicates are logically unrelated, and so there is now no logical entailment from (13) to (3). 
Hence Parsons' solution to the imperfective paradox is undermined. 
Parsons notices this problem, and suggests a way out. He suggests that although his formal- 
ism cannot explain a logical entailment from (13) to (3), one could explain a weaker entailment by 
incorporating into the formalism the principle that if an event e is a running, then e has 
`subevents' that are runnings which culminate. So if (13) is true of a time t, then the event e that is 
a running has 'subevents' that are runnings that culminate, making (3) true. 
One might feel generous to Parsons on this point, and accept this new explanation of the rela- 
tionship between (13) and (3) that he has been forced into. But even if we do give Parsons the 
benefit of the doubt on the issue of sentences (13) and (3), there are still irresolvable problems with 
the new rule R3' that concern the question of temporal adverbial modification. Because we have 
been forced to drop the distinction between events and process, the representation of sentence (20) 
proves problematic, as I will now show. 
(20) Max ran at 3pm 
5.2 Temporal Adverbials 
What is the representation of sentence (20)? Parsons does not offer an account of the tem- 
poral adverbial "At 3pm" in (Parsons 1984), the paper in which he offers an analysis of aspect. 
However, he does give an account in (Parsons 1980). The analysis of "At 3pm" in (Parsons 1980) 
is as follows: the point adverbial "At 3pm" is a basic expression whose translation is (21). 
(21) 7PPXe)lt(P(e, t) & AT3pm(e, t)) 
R10 is the rule for temporal adverbials. 
RIO: If A is a temporal adverbial and B is an tenseless CL, then the appropriate combination of 
A with B is a tenseless CL, and the combination of A with B translates as A*(B*). 
106 
According to rules RiO and R3', the semantic translation of sentence (20) is (20a) (since 
"run" is an event VP). 
(20) Max ran at 3pm 
(20a) Xt(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & AT3pm(e, t) & Cul(e, tD] 
So when is (20a) true of a time t? 
1-1 According to Parsons, the formula AT3pm(e, t) when e is an event is true if and only if e cul- 
minates at time t'. and t' is 3pm (Parsons 1980: p47). The time of culmination of a running is the 
time of termination of the running33. So (20a) is true of a time t only if 3pm is the time of termi- 
nation of the running. How does this square with our natural interpretation of (20)? 
The natural interpretation of sentence (20) is an inchoative one; (20) is true if and only if 
Max starts to run at 3pm. But (20a) fails to explain this, for (20a) identifies 3pm as the time of 
termination of the running. If one is to achieve an adequate semantic interpretation of (20) in the 
theory, then the representation of (20) must identify 3pm with the time Max starts to run; i. e. 3pm 
must be the time when the running event e starts to develop. This places certain requirements on 
the interpretation of the formula AT3pm(e, t'): AT3pm(e, t) must be true for an event e if and only 
if e starts to develop at time t' and t' is 3pm. According to Parsons' ontology, if an event e is 
developing at a time t', then it cannot be culminating at t' (e develops over an open interval of 
time, and culminates at the final bound of that open interval). So if an event e starts to develop at 
t', then Cul(e, t) must be false. Hence under the new interpretation of AT3pm(e, t) that the interpre- 
tation of (20) requires, the formulae AT3pm(e, t) and Cul(e, t) cannot both be true. So (20a) is 
false of any time t, and so it cannot be the representation of (20). Hence we have failed to give a 
satisfactory representation of sentence (20) under rule R3'. 
However, had we kept the original classification of the VP "run", and so kept the original rule 
R3, then we would not have had a problematic analysis of (20). Under the original analysis, "run" 
is a process VP, and so under rule R3, (20) translates as (20b). 
(20b) Xt(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & AT3pm(e, t) & Hold(e, t')) 
(20b) differs from (20a) in that (20b) features the formula Hold(e, t) instead of Cul(e, tD. So sup- 
pose we interpret AT3pm(e, t) so that if e is a process then t' is the time that e starts to hold and t' 
33 This is the only interpretation that squares with the culmination of events in general. 
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is 3pm. Then (20b) will identify 3pm as the time when the running starts to hold, which is just as 
required. 
w Under Parsons' original rule R3, we showed the representation (17a) of (17) is always false. 
(17) Max ran across the street 
(17a) X1(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Across*(the street*, e) & Cul(e, t')) 
We argued that there was only one thing we could do in order to preserve (17a) as the translation 
of (17), and that was to re-classify processes as events. This entailed changing rule R3 to R3', 
since the option for process VPs was no longer needed. But this change proved problematic for 
sentence (20). 
(20) Max ran at 3pm 
We could account for (20) under rule R3, but not under the new rule R3'. So re-classifying 
processes as events was not satisfactory. But this was the only way we could preserve (17a) as the 
representation of (17). We are, therefore, now forced to change the representation of (17) from 
(17a) to something else, in order to account for the fact that (17) can be true. But what could that 
something else be? 
6A Revised Representation 
As the theory stands, (17a) is the representation of (17). 
(17) Max ran across the street 
(17a) 7lt(2e)(3t')[t<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Across*(street*, e) & Cul(e, t')] 
What changes are necessary to this representation, in order to account for the fact that (17) can be 
true? Suppose one revises the analysis of adverbials to a Montagovian treatment, as modifiers on 
predicates. The logical form of (17) is then (17b), where "Across-the-street*" is a modifier on 
predicates. 
(17b) a, t(2e)(3t')[t'<t & Across-the-street*(Running*)(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Cul(e, t)] 
One can ensure that (17b) can be true only by assuming that there is no entailment from the 




For suppose (22) does entail (23). Then (17b) entails there is an eventuality e and time t' such that 
the formulae Running*(e) and Cul(e, t) are both true. Since the VP "run" is now back to being a 
process, there is no such eventuality e, and so (17b) is always false. Hence (17b) is a satisfactory 
representation of (17) only if (22) does not entail (23). So, since (22) does not entail (23), (17b) 
cannot entail (3a), which is the representation of (3). 
(3) Max ran 
(3a) M(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Hold(e, t')) 
Revising Parsons' analysis of adverbials to the Montagovian treatment undermines his whole 
strategy. The aim of his theory is to show that quantification over eventualities is required in order 
to explain elegantly the entailment from sentence (17) to (3). 
(17) Max ran across the street 
(3) Max ran 
But if (17b) is the logical form of (17), and if (22) does not entail (23), then one can't explain the 
entailment from (17) to (3). So (17b) is not a satisfactory representation of (17). 
We have seen that changing Parsons' analysis of "across the street" in order to solve the prob- 
lematic analysis of sentence (17) is not workable. The only other relevant thing that is available to 
change in the representation of (17) is the predicate "Cul". Parsons' 1980 formalism thus offers the 
only plausible alternative strategy that may solve the problematic analysis of sentence (17): The 
strategy is to replace both the predicates "Cul" and "Hold" with the single predicate "Occ" 
("occurs") that appears in (Parsons 1980). Occ(e, t) can mean one of three things: either (i) e is an 
event which culminates at t (e. g. the event e of Max winning the race satisfies Occ(e, t) if Max 
crosses the finish line in first place at t), or (ii) e is a process which is going on at t (e. g. a running 
process e satisfies Occ(e, t) if the running is going on at t), or (iii) e is a state and e's agent is in 
state e at t. Since Occ reports the culmination for an event, which was given by "Cul" in the origi- 
nal formalism, and Occ reports the holding of a process or state, which was given by "Hold", one 
can think of the predicate Occ as an amalgamation of the two predicates Cul and Hold. 
Replacing the predicates Cul and Hold with Occ entails that rule R3 is replaced by rule 
R3occ which is defined below. 
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R3occ: If B is a NAME and A is a VP, then BA is an untensed CL and 
(BA)* = XtXle[A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Occ(e, t)] 
Under rule R3occ, the representations of (17) and (3) are (17c) and (3c) respectively. 
(17) Max ran across the street 
(17c) Xt(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*. e) & Across*(the street*, e) & Occ(e, t')] 
(3) Max ran 
(3c) At(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) && Occ(e, t')] 
(17c) can be true, because under the new formalism an eventuality e can satisfy both Running*(e) 
and Occ(e, t). Furthermore, (17c) entails (3c) by ordinary predicate logic, and so one has an expla- 
nation for the entailment from sentence (17) to (3). Therefore, this revised representation solves the 
problematic analysis of (17). 
R3occ also provides a satisfactory representation of (20). 
(20) Max ran at 3pm 
The representation of (20) is now (20c), 
(20c) ýt(3e)(3t')(tct & Running*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & AT3pm(e, t) & Occ(e, t')) 
and under the assumption that for a process e the formula AT3pm(e, t) is true only if e starts to 
occur at t' (so Occ(e, t) is true) and t' is 3pm, (20c) captures the natural interpretation of (20) where 
Max starts to run at 3pm. But what are the ramifications of revising R3 to R3occ for Parsons' solu- 
tion to the imperfective paradox? 
6.1 The Progressive Revisited 
Although changing R3 to R3occ solves the problems concerning the analyses of sentences 
(17) and (20), there are serious implications for the existing analysis of the progressive. One is no 
longer able to block the entailment from (1) to (2), because one no longer has the two logically 
unrelated predicates Cul and Hold in the formalism. 
(1) Max was winning the race 
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(2) Max won the race 
By replacing the predicates Cul and Hold with Occ in rule R3occ, the logical forms of sentences (1) 
and (2) are both (2c). 
(1) Max was winning the race 
(2) Max won the race 
(2c) 71t(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Winning*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(race*, e) & Occ(e, t')] 
Hence the theory predicts an equivalence between sentences (1) and (2), and so the theory falls foul 
of the imperfective paradox. 
Parsons was able to solve the imperfective paradox under the original rule R3. However, as 
he observed, this rule proved problematic in the analysis of sentence (17). 
(17) Max ran across the street 
The only way to preserve the logical form of (17) was to re-classify process VPs as event VPs, and 
in so doing, change rule R3 to R3'. However, rule R3' proved problematic in the analysis of (20) 
(20) Max ran at 3pm 
Therefore, we were left with no choice; we had to change the logical form of (17). The change 
that was found necessary was to replace both predicates Cut and Hold with one predicate, Occ. 
Thus the logical distinction between the predicates Cut and Hold was not sustainable, indicating that 
the predicates Cut and Hold must have been logically related after all. Rule R3 was revised to rule 
R3occ, and this solved the problematic interpretations of (17) and (20). But the progressive rule R7 
and rule R3occ fall foul of the imperfective paradox: sentence (1) entails (2). Hence there seems to 
be no way in Parsons' theory of solving the imperfective paradox and at the same time accounting 
for sentences (17) and (20). Hence Parsons' formulation of the Event-based Strategy for solving the 
imperfective paradox fails, for it cannot fit together with an account of adverbial modification. In 
chapters 6 and 7. I will present a solution to the imperfective paradox that can square with an 
account of adverbial modification in a way that Parsons' theory can't. 
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Chapter 5 
The Progressive and Universal Quantification 
1 Introduction 
The object of this chapter is to investigate how the progressive behaves in a sentence contain- 
ing universally quantified noun phrases. Consider sentence (1). 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
Sentence (1) can have a distributive interpretation: (1) may be true when Max is kissing one girl at 
a time. Moreover under this distributive reading, (1) does not require that for every girl there is a 
time at which Max was kissing her, that is, sentence (1) does not entail (2). 
(2) Max was kissing Susan 
To see that there is no inference from (1) to (2), consider the following state of affairs. Suppose 
that there is a queue of girls, Susan is last in the queue, and suppose that Max is in the process of 
kissing each girl in turn (so (1) is true). Suppose while he is doing this, something happens which 
stops him from ever being engaged in kissing Susan. Then (2) is false. Hence in the case of (1), 
universal instantiation fails 34. 
The interpretation of (1) is in sharp contrast to its corresponding non-progressive form. Sen- 
tence (3) entails sentence (4). 
(3) Max kissed every girl 
(4) Max kissed Susan 
This indicates that the lack of inference from (1) to (2) must arise from the interaction of the pro- 
gressive with the quantifier. 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate how one might formulate the failure of 
34 It must be stressed that we are talking here about the 'simple past' sense of (2) rather than the futurate sense of (2) (which is synonymous with "Max was going to be kissing Susan"), and in line with the traditional view (cf. Dowty 1979), we 
assume that these two senses ate semantically distinct. So universal instantiation fags because the 'simple past' sense of (1) does not entail the 'simple past' sense of (2). 
universal instantiation in the case of (1). I will explore how one might represent sentence (1) in Par- 
sons' (1980,1984) analysis of a fragment of English, and then I will investigate the analysis of (1) 
given by Dowty (Dowty 1979). Parsons is adopting the Event-based Strategy in defining the pro- 
gressive, which was discussed at length in the previous chapter, whereas Dowty adopts the Eventual 
Outcome Strategy, which was discussed in chapter 3. We established in these chapters that Parsons' 
and Dowty's theories were inadequate in certain respects, but in seeing which strategy best accounts 
for (1), we will nevertheless reveal some of the essential characteristics that should be embodied in 
an adequate alternative theory of the progressive. I start with Parsons' theory. 
2 Parsons' Formalism 
The details of Parsons' (1984) representation of a fragment of English were discussed at 
length in the previous chapter. I will just remind the reader of the parts of Parsons' theory that are 
relevant to our purposes here. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Parsons introduces an eventuality ontology. This ontol- 
ogy consists of three classes of eventualities: events, corresponding to Vendler's (1967) accomplish- 
ments and achievements (cf. "Max kissed every girl", "Max built a house"), processes, correspond- 
ing to Vendler's activities (cf. "Max ran"), and states, corresponding to Vendler's states (cf. "Max 
knew the answer"). 
These three types of eventualities have different ontological structures. An event may be 
divided into two parts, a development portion and a culmination. If Max builds a house, then there 
is a period of time during which the building is going on - the development portion - and then (if 
he finishes) a time at which the house finally gets built, the time of culmination. In contrast, 
processes and states cannot culminate. A process merely goes on and a state holds. 
These ideas are reflected in the formalism with the aid of the predicates "Cul" and "Hold". 
The formula Cul(e, t) means that the event e culminates at time t. The formula Hold(e, t) can mean 
one of three things: either (a) e is an event which is in development at t, or (b) e is a process that 
goes on at time t, or (c) e is a state and e's agent is in state e at time t. Parsons uses these formu- 
lae in interpreting a fragment of English. 
For the sake of convenience, I repeat the relevant rules of Parsons' interpretation of a frag- 
ment of English below: 
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RI: An intransitive VERB all by itself constitutes a VP. Its translation as a VP is the, 
same as its translation as a VERB. 
R2: If A is a transitive VERB and B is a NAME, then AB is a VP, and 
(BA)* = 7le[A*(e) & Object(B*, e)] 
R3: If B is a NAME and A is a VP, then BA is an untensed CL, and 
If A is a process or state VP, then 
(BA)* = XeXt[A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Hold(e, t)] 
If A is an event VP, then 
(BA)* = Xe), t[A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Cul(e, t)] 
R4: If A is a tenseless CL, then the past, present and future forms of A are tensed 
CLs, where 
Past(A)* = AeXt(3t')[t'<t & A*(e, t')] 
Pres(A)* = A* 
Fut(A)* = XcXt(3t')[t'>t & A*(e, t')] 
R5: If A is a tensed CL, then #A# is an S, where 
(#A#)* = a, t(3e)A*(e, t) 
R7: If A is a non-stative VP, then be A-ing is a stative VP, whose translation is the 
same as A. 
To remind ourselves of how these rules supply the semantics of natural language expressions, 
let us, for the sake of example, recap on the representations assigned to sentences (5) and (6). 
(5) Max built a house 
(6) Max was building a house 
The above rules assign sentences (5) and (6) representations (5a) and (6a) respectively. 
(5a) ý1(3e)(3t')(t'<t & building*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(house*, e) & Cul(e, t')) 
(6a) 711(3e)(3t')(t'<t & building*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(house*, e) & Hold(e, tD) 
(5a) and (6a) both express a property of times. (5a) is true of a time t just in case there is a time t' 
earlier than t and an event e such that e is a building and the agent of e is Max and the object is 
the house and e culminates at t'. (6a) expresses the same property save that e must hold at t' 
instead of culminating. This analysis captures the intuition that (5) tallos about the culmination of 
the event of Max building a house, whereas (6) talks about the development portion of the event of 
Max building a house. 
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The question for us is: What aspects of Parsons' analysis, if any, contribute to the explanation 
of the absence of inference from sentence (1) to (2)? 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
(2) Max was kissing Susan 
To answer this question, one must understand Parsons' analysis of quantification. 
2.1 Parsons' Analysis of Quantifiers 
Parsons does not give a treatment of quantifiers in (Parsons 1984), the paper in which he 
investigates the semantics of the progressive. However, he does offer an analysis of quantification 
in (Parsons 1980). The essential difference between the 1980 and 1984 formalisms is that in (Par- 
sons 1980), an eventuality can merely occur, written Occ(e, t), while in (Parsons 1984), an eventual- 
ity can culminate (Cul(e, t)) or hold (Hold(e, t)). 
According to the Parsons' (1980) formalism, the formula Occ(e, t) can mean one of three 
things: either (i) e is an event which culminates at t (e. g. a winning event e satisfies Occ(e, t) if the 
winning culminates at t), or (ii) e is a process which is going on at t (e. g. a running process e 
satisfies Occ(e, t) if the running is going on at t), or (iii) e is a state and e's agent is in state e at t. 
Since in the 1980 theory Occ reports the culmination of an event, which is given by "Cul" in the 
1984 formalism, and Occ reports the holding of a process or state, which is given by "Hold" in the 
1984 formalism, one can think of the predicate Occ as an amalgamation of the predicates Cul and 
Hold. 
In order to see how Parsons' treatment of quantifiers and the progressive interact, I shall 
incorporate Parsons' 1980 treatment of quantifiers into the 1984 formalism, in a way that still cap- 
tures Parsons' intuitions concerning quantification. This essentially involves replacing the formula 
Occ(e, t) with the formula Hold(e, t) or Cul(e, t), whichever is appropriate. 
The intuitions that Parsons intends to capture in his analysis of quantification is that sentence 
(7) is about an event that is in some sense composed of each individual leaving event. 
(7) Every girl left 
So the problem Parsons faces is to construct in the formalism the event that is the composite of 
each leaving event, such that the theory assigns an interpretation to (7) that agrees with intuitions. 
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According to intuitions, (7) can have a distributive reading, where it is true of a time t if the 
last girl leaves at t and every other girl left before t. Parsons aims to capture the distributive read- 
ing in the theory by assuming that the `composite' leaving event that (7) refers to, whatever that is, 
should culminate when the last individual leaving event culminates. 
On the other hand, Parsons suggests that sentence (8) is about a process that is in some sense 
composed of each individual humming process. 
(8) Every girl hummed 
According to intuitions, (8) can have a 'collective' reading, and under this reading it is true of a 
time t if every girl hums at t. Parsons intends to capture the collective reading of (8) by assuming 
that the composite process it refers to, whatever that is, is going on at a time t just in case each 
individual humming process is going on at t. It is not clear why Parsons chooses to capture the dis- 
tributive reading of (7) but the collective reading of (8) in the same analysis of quantification. But 
we will gloss over this puzzle for now. 
How is one to reflect these ideas in the formalism? How is a set of eventualities such as 
leavings and hummings to be composed into one leaving eventuality or humming eventuality in a 
way that agrees with the intuitions that we have just mentioned concerning sentences (7) and (8)? 
Let S be a non-empty set of eventualities, and let nS be the composite eventuality constructed from 
the members of S. So, for example, if S is the set of leavings done by each girl, then the event nS 
is the composite leaving event, i. e. the event of every girl's leaving, that Parsons wishes (7) to refer 
to. Then the question is: how is one to interpret when the eventuality nS occurs? In other words, 
(with respect to the 1980 formalism for now), for what times t is Occ(nS, t) true? 
By using the process sentence (8) (under the collective reading) as an example, Parsons 
argues from an intuitive point of view that if S is a set of processes, then nS is a process that is 
going on at a time t (i. e. Occ(nS, t) is true) if for each process e contained in S, e is going on at t 
(i. e. Occ(e, t) is true). Using the event sentence (7) (under the distributive reading) as an example, 
Parsons argues from an intuitive point of view that if S is a set of events, then nS is an event and 
nS culminates at t if one of the members of S culminates at t and every other member culminates 
before t; i. e. Occ(nS, t) is true if there is a member e of S such that Occ(e, t) is true and for every 
other member e' of S, Occ(e', t) is true from some t' earlier than t. 
The intuition Parsons wishes to capture concerning sentence (9) is that it is about the develop- 
ment portion of the event of every girl's leaving. 
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(9) Every girl was leaving 
Sentence (9) can have a distributive reading, and to capture this the event of everyone's leaving 
must be in development whenever one of the individual leavings is in development. This intuition 
can be generalised to the following: if S is a set of events, then the composite event nS must be in 
development whenever one of the members of S is in development. Parsons' final analysis of 
quantification is an attempt to capture these ideas. 
One more piece of notation is useful to Parsons' definition of quantifiers. Suppose that the 
set X is a class of sets of eventualities. Then Parsons offers the following definition: 
n*X=df nX', where X' is the union of the members of X, provided that each member of X is non- 
empty; otherwise OX is to be some eventuality that never occurs. 
n*X is defined in terms of n, unless X contains the empty set. The condition that every member 
of X should be non-empty will play the role in the analysis of (7) of ensuring that it is true only if 
every girl leaves at some time or other, i. e. for every girl there is a leaving that has that girl as the 
agent which occurs at some time or other. To see how n* plays this role, consider how we should 
interpret (7). Suppose it is true. This means that every girl leaves at some time or other, and so 
for every girl, the set of leaving events that has that girl as the agent that occurs at some time is 
non-empty. Let X be the set of these sets of leavings. Then every member of X is non-empty. So 
n*X is nX', where X' is the union of the members of X. But nX' is just the composite event of 
every girl's leavings, which is just the event that we want (7) to be about. Hence (7) must be about 
n*X. 
On the other hand, suppose that (7) is false. To show this in the theory, (7) must be about an 
eventuality which never occurs. Since (7) is false, there is a girl that never leaves; i. e. the set of all 
leaving events that has that girl as the agent that occurs at some time is empty. But this set is a 
member of X. where X is the set that contains for each girl, the set of all of her leavings that occur 
at some time. Hence by the definition of n*, n*X is an eventuality that never occurs. So, since 
(7) must be about an eventuality that never occurs, (7) again is about n*X. Hence whether (7) is 
true or false, (7) must be about n*X where X is the set that contains for each girl, the set of all of 
her leavings that occur at some time. 
It is now clear what role the definition of n* will play in the analysis of (7). When we 
review Parsons' rule for interpreting quantified noun phrases, we will see that it yields an analysis 
of (7) where it is indeed about n*X, where X is the set that contains for each girl, the set of all of 
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her leavings that occur at some time. The condition that n*X is an eventuality that occurs only if 
every member of X is non-empty guarantees that (7) is true only if for each girl there is some leav- 
ing event that has that girl as the agent that occurs at some time, which is just as required. 
But before we can understand Parsons' final rule for interpreting "every girl", we must review 
his treatment of comnwn nouns such as "girl". Common nouns stand for kinds of states. For exam- 
ple, "girl" translates into a relation between individuals and times, which holds between x and t just 
in case x is the agent of the state of being a girl which occurs at t. The rule Parsons offers in (Par- 
sons 1980) is as follows: 
R8: If A is a common noun, then A is a CN, and A translates as 
Xx)1(3e)(G(e) & Occ(e, t) & Agent(x, e)) 
where G is the symbol associated with A; for example, if A is "girl" then G will 
be "girl*", where girl*(e) is paraphrased as "e is the state of being a girl". (Note 
that G is not the translation of A). 
The interpretation of the formula Occ(e, t) for a state e in the 1980 formalism is equivalent to 
the interpretation of the formula Hold(e, t) in the 1984 formalism. Therefore, rule R8 is modified to 
R8' for the 1984 theory. 
R8': If A is a common noun, then A is a CN. If G is the symbol associated with A 
then A translates as 
Xx%t(3e)(G(e) & Hold(e, t) & Agent(x, e)) 
For example, the common noun "girl" is translated as (10), where Girl*(e) is to be read as "e is the 
state of being a girl". 
(10) XxXt(3e)(girl*(e) & Hold(e, t) & Agent(x, e)) 
(10) relates an individual x and time t, just in case there is a eventuality e such that e is the state of 
being a girl, x is the agent of e, and e holds at time L 
Consider again sentence (7). 
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C7) Every girl left 
The event that (7) will be about in Parsons' analysis is n*S, where S is the set containing for each 
girl, the set of all of her leavings that occur at some time (so S is (s: for some girl, s is the set of 
all of her leavings that occur at some time)). The rule for quantification captures this, and also 
takes into account the analysis of common nouns given above. More specifically the rule Parsons 
offers for quantification in (Parsons 1980) is given below: 
R9n: If A is a CN and if B is an untensed CL containing "itn", then Bn is an untensed 
CL of the same type as B, where BA is obtained from B by replacing the first 
"itn" with "every A" and all later occurrences of itn (if any) by a pronoun of the 
same gender as A. 
13 
II 
A translates as: 
aeat(Occ(e, t) &e= n*(s: (3xp)(A*(xp, t) &s= (e': (3t')B*(e', t')D)) 
Before incorporating rule R9n into Parsons' 1984 formalism, let us see how it represents the 
tenseless CL (11), so that we can understand the semantic roles of the formulae A*(xn, t) and s= 
{e': (3t')B*(e', t')) in the above translation rule. 
(11) Every girl leave 
By rule R9n and rule R8 (we are translating according to the 1980 formalism for now), the tense- 
less CL (11) is translated as (lla). 
(h a) XeXt(Occ(e, t) &e= n* (s: (3x )((3e')(girl*(e) & Agent(x , e') & Occ(e', t)) &s= (e": (3t')(leaving*(e") & Agent(xo, e"i & Occ(e", t)))l)) 
The translation of (1la) can be paraphrased as follows: (1la) expresses a relation between an even- 
tuality e and time t where e occurs at t and e is n*S, where S is the set (s: for an individual x that 
is the agent of the state e' of being a girl that occurs at t, s is the set of leaving events e" that has x 
as the agent, and e" occurs at some time t'}. So the semantic role of the formula A*(xn, t) in rule 
R9n is to assert that x is a girl, and the role of the set s= (e': (3t')B*(e', t')} is to identify the set of n 
leaving events that has xn as the agent that occurs at some time t': this gives us just the definition 
of S that we want, i. e. S is the set that contains for each girl the set of all of her leavings that occur 
at some time. 
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This analysis of (11) captures just the intuitions Parsons desires. If one of the girls never 
leaves, then one of the members of the set S is empty, and so by the definition of n* the eventual- 
ity e in (Ila) never occurs. So (1la) is false for every eventuality e and time t, as required. On 
the other hand if every girl leaves at some time or other, then all the members of the set S are 
non-empty, and so by the definition of n*, (1la) is about an eventuality e that is nS' where S' is 
the union of the members of S, and as we discussed before, we interpret this composite event nS' 
as culminating at the time t if there is a member e' of S' that culminates at t, and every other 
member of S' culminates before t. So (Ila) is true of the event e and time t if t is the time when 
the last girl leaves and every other girl left before t. We know that such a time exists, since every 
girl leaves at some time. Hence (1la) is true for e and some time t, which is as required. 
In order to see how Parsons would represent sentence (1), we must incorporate in the 1984 
theory the rule R9n for quantification, which is given in the 1980 formalism. 
(1) Max is kissing every girl 
This is because the analysis of the progressive is stated in the 1984 formalism and not the 1980 
one. How may Parsons' 1980 treatment of quantification be incorporated into the 1984 theory? 
Clearly, one must replace the formula Occ(e, t) by the formula Cul(e, t) or Hold(e, t), whichever is 
appropriate. That is, if the composite eventuality e in the rule for quantification is an event, then 
"Occ" must be replaced by "Cul" (so that we still assert that the event e that (7) refers to cul- 
minates), and if the eventuality e is a process or state, then "Occ" must be replaced by the predicate 
"Hold". We replace "Occ" with "Cul" and "Hold" in the way desired by replacing rule R9n with 
R9n' defined below: 
R9n': If A is a CN and if B is an untensed CL containing "it n", 
then Bn is an untensed 
CL of the same type as B, where BA is obtained from B by replacing the first it 
by "every A", and all later occurrences of itn (if any) by a pronoun of the same 
gender as A. 
If B is a process or state CL, then 
(B n)* = XeXt(Ho1d(e, t) &e= n* (s: (3xn)A*(xn, t) 
&s= [e: (3t')B*(e', t'))))) 
Otherwise, if B is an event CL, then 
(B ä)* _ Xea, t(Cul(e, t) &e= n*(s: (3x)A*(x, t) 
&s= {e': (3t')B*(e', t')})}) 
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To reflect exactly in the 1984 formalism the intuitions behind the interpretation of the formula 
Occ(nS, t) that was given in the 1980 theory, we assume the following: If nS is a process or state 
then Hold(r'S, t) is true if and only if for every member e of S, Hold(et) is true. If nS is an event, 
then Hold(nS, t) is true (i. e. nS is in development at t) if for some member e of S, Hold(et) is true 
(i. e. e is in development at t): this reflects the idea that the composite event nS is in development if 
one member of S is in development. Cul(r'S, t) is true if for some member e of S Cul(e, t) is true, 
and for every other member e of S, Cul(e', t) is true for some time t' earlier than t: this reflects the 
idea that the composite event nS culminates when the last member of S culminates. 
We have replaced rule R9n with the rule R9n' in order to incorporate Parsons' analysis of 
quantification into the 1984 theory. The change to rule R9n is just a consequence of replacing the 
one predicate Occ with two predicates, Cul and Hold. The rule R9n' still captures the intuitions 
concerning quantification elucidated in (Parsons 1980). 
2.2 Parsons' Progressive and Quantification 
I will now investigate the semantic analysis of (1), to see if Parsons can explain why the rule 
of universal instantiation fails with respect o it. 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
To reflect how (1) is interpreted we might invoke the following tree. 




Max was kissing every girl 
R4 
Max be kissing every girl 
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In this chapter, we will not only have to talk about the semantic representation of (1), but we 
will also have to talk about the relations between its syntactic constituents. This is because we will 
ultimately have to modify Parsons' representation of (1), and this will involve revising the relations 
between its syntactic constituents in the hope that it will give rise to a change in the semantics that 
will get the results we want. 
I will talk about the relation between (1)'s syntactic constituents in terms of the order in 
which the rules are applied in analysing (1) 'bottom-up'. e. g. in the above tree the progressive rule 
R7 is applied before the quantification rule R9n'. One can intuitively think of this as quantification 
having wider syntactic scope than the progressive. 
Now that we have discussed the relations between some of the syntactic constituents of (1), 
let us discuss (1)'s semantic representation. The semantic translation of (1) is as follows: 
"kiss" translates as Idssing*(e) RI 
"it " translates as x Basic Expression n "Max" translates as max* Basic Expression 
"kiss it " translates as R2 
Xe[kissing*(e) & Object(x , e)] n "be kissing it " translates as R7 n Xe[kissing*(e) & Object(x , e)] n "Max be kissing it " translates as R3 n XeXt[kissing*(e) & Object(x , e) ß & Agent(max*, e) & Hold(e, t)] 
"girl" translates as R8' 
XxXt(3e)[Girl*(e) & Agent(x, e) & Hold(e, t)] 
"Max be kissing every girl" translates as R9n' 
XeXt[Hold(e, t) &e= n*(s: (3xn)[(3eX(girl*(e') 
& Agent(x 
, e') 
& Hold(e', t)) &s= 
, e") (e": (3t")(kissing*(e") & Object(x n & Agent(max*, e") & Hold(e", t"))) ]) ] 
"Max was kissing every girl" 
translates as (1a). 
R4 and R5 
(la) At(3e)(3t')[t'< t& Hold(e, t') &e= n* 
(s: (3xn)[(3e')(gel*(e7 
& Agent(xn, e') & Hold(e', t')) &s= 
{e": (2t")(kissing*(e") & Object(xn, e") 
& Agent(max*, e") & Hold(e ', t"))) ]) ] 
In words, (la) expresses a property of times, which is true of a time t just in case there is an even- 
tuality e and time t' such that t' is earlier than t and e holds at t', where e is the eventuality n*S 
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and S is the set (s" there is an individual x such that x is a girl at t', and s is the set of eventualities 
e" such that e" is a kissing with Max as the agent and x as the object and e" holds at some time 
t"). This reflects the intuition that (1) is about the composite event made from the set S which con- 
tains for each girl, the set of all of her kissings by Max that hold at some time. 
I The rules R7 and R9n' fail to give a satisfactory account of the relationship between sen- 
tences (1) and (2). 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
(2) Max was kissing Susan 
According to the analysis so far, (1) entails (2), contrary to intuitions. This is shown as follows: 
Let S be the set (i) defined in (la), which is the representation of sentence (1). 
(la) It(3e)(3t')[t'<t & Hold(e, t') &e= n* 
(i) (s: (3an)[(3e')(gir1*(e') & Agent(xn, e') & 
& Hold(e', t')) &s= 
(e": (3t'l(kissing*(e') & Agent(max*, e") 
& Object(xQ, e") & Hold(e", t")))])] 
Suppose that sentence (la) is true of a time to. Then formula (12) is true, for some eventuality e 
and some time tt earlier than to. 
(12) e= n*S & Hold(e, tl) 
Hold(e, tt) is true. So by the definition of n*, every member of S is non-empty, for otherwise n*S 
(which is e) would not hold for any time t1. Choose an arbitrary individual constant c*, such that 
the formula (13) is true (i. e. "c is a girl"). 
(13) (3el(girl*(e) & Agent(c*, e) & Hold(e', t1)) 
Then let s be the set of eventualities that are kissings, whose agent is Max and whose object is c* 
which hold at some time t". i. e. s is the set (14). 
(14) (e": (3t''(kissing*(e") & Object(c*, e") & Agent(max*, e") & Hold(e", t"))} 
The set (14) is a member of S. Therefore, since all members of S are non-empty, formula (15) is 
true (i. e. there are eventualities that are kissings of c by Max which hold at t"). 
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(15) (3e')(3t")(kissing*(e") & Object(c*, e") & Agent(max*, e") & Hold(e", t")) 
So, substituting the individual constant susan* for c* (c* was an arbitrary constant), we know that 
(15) is true. 
(15) (3e")(3t")(kissing*(e") & Object(susan*, e") & Agent(max*, e") & Hold(e", t")) 
Hence the formula (2a) is true of some time t later than t". 
(2a) Xt(3e")(3t')( t"<t & kissing*(e") & Object(susan*, e") & Agent(max*, e") & Hold(e", t")) 
But this is the representation of sentence (2). 
(Z) Max was kissing Susan 
Hence sentence (1) entails sentence (2). 
According to intuitions, the rule of universal instantiation fails with respect to (1). However, 
according to the analysis, the rule of universal instantiation does not fail, for (1) entails (2). How 
can we modify Parsons' analysis of the progressive and quantification to account for the lack of 
inference from (1) to (2)? 
If one were to destroy the logical status of quantification, i. e. if we do not define "r)", but 
instead consider its interpretation to be primitive, then one would no longer have an entailment 
from (1) to (2). But then one is unable to explain entailments, involving quantifiers that traditionally 
have been viewed as logical entailments, such as the entailment between (3) and (4). 
(3) Max kissed every girl 
(4) Max kissed Susan 
Destroying the logical status of quantification is thus a heavy-handed attempt to solve the problem. 
How else may one account for the inferential properties of (1)? We will consider various definitions 
of the progressive in Parsons' framework, and show that for each of these definitions, one cannot 
provide an analysis of quantification which interacts with that definition to explain why universal 
instantiation fails for (1). So we will ultimately argue that Parsons' formulation of the Event-based 
Strategy fails on the analysis of (1). 
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3 Modifying Parsons' Analysis 
What changes are necessary to the rules R7 and R9n' in order to explain why universal 
instantiation fails in the case of (1)? I start with rule R7. 4 -, 
3.1 R7 Must Not Classify the Progressive as Stative 
By rule R7, sentence (1) is classified as stative. This is because (1) refers to an eventuality 
n*S, where the members of S are the eventualities representing "Max be kissing x" for each girl x. 
By rule R7, these eventualities are states. Hence (1) refers to n*S where the members of S are 
states, and so, according to Parsons' theory, n*S is a state. 
But stative sentences containing universal quantifiers do not display the inferential properties 
of (1). For example, sentence (16) entails (17), and so, unlike (1), the rule for universal instantia- 
tion applies. 
(16) Max loved every girl 
(17) Max loved Susan 
The fact that (1) and (16) are different in this way causes problems for Parsons' account. The rule 
R9n' for quantification applied to the CL "Max be kissing ito" gives the representation of (1), and 
R9n' applied to the CL "Max love itn" gives the representation of (16). But however R9n' is 
defined, Parsons will not be able to explain why R9n' applied to "Max be kissing it,, " has different 
semantic import from R9n' applied to "Max love itn", because thanks to rule R7 the CLs "Max be 
kissing it 
n" and 
"Max love itn" are semantically indistinguishable (they are both stative). Hence 
under rule R7, Parsons cannot explain why (1) and (16) have different entailments. 
On the other hand, if we change R7 so that the progressive is no longer classified as stative, 
then CLs like "Max be kissing itn" are different from sentences like "Max love i Ä" because they are 
of different aspectual classes. We might then be able to define the rule R9n' so that R9n' applied to 
the CL "Max be kissing it 
n" 
has different semantic import from R9n' applied to "Max love itn 
hence (1) and (16) would have different semantic import. 
What implications does this have for Parsons' analysis of the progressive? Could one revise 
the aspectual classification of progressive VPs in the rule R7 so that they are no longer stative, and 
still preserve Parsons' intuitions concerning the progressive? 
125 
This puzzle is related to another issue: the relation between the syntactic constituents in the 
analysis of (1), which are given in the above derivation tree. The rule R9n' for quantification is 
applied after the rule R7' in the analysis of (1) (where we use the convention of going 'bottom-up' 
with respect to the above analysis tree). 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
We have argued, however, that we must change rule R7 because we must change the aspectual 
classification of progressive VPs. Could one do this, and still preserve not only Parsons' intuitions 
concerning the progressive, but also the relations between the syntactic constituents of (1)? 
Suppose that B is a NAME and A is an event VP. Then the intuition Parsons wishes to cap- 
ture is that "B be A-ing" asserts that the event is in development and not culminating. To capture 
this, rule R7 may be revised as follows: 
R7': If B is a name and A is a non-Stative VP, then "B be A-ing" is an untensed CL 
of the same aspectual type as A, and 
(B be A-ing)* = XeXt(A*(e) & Agent(B*, e) & Hold(e, t)) 
3s 
Rule R7' captures the above intuition because the predicate Hold is featured in the semantic transla- 
tion of the event case of "B be A-ing" and not the predicate Cul, indicating that the event is in 
development and not culminating. Thus rule R7' still captures Parsons' intuitions even though, 
unlike his original analysis, progressive sentences are no longer classified as Stative. Hence now the 
rule for quantification may be sensitive to the distinction between "Max be kissing it n 
", which is 
about an event in development, and "Max love itn", which is about a state. 
Although R7' gives the logical form of whole progressive clauses, instead of getting down to 
the logical form of progressive VPs, the order of application of rules R7' and rule R9n' is preserved 
in the analysis of (1). Hence rule R7' not only captures the intuitions Parsons desires, but it also 
preserves the relations between the syntactic constituents in the analysis of (1). 
How does rule R7' fare against the data? We will now investigate the interaction between 
R7' and R9n', and we will show that they cannot account for the fact that universal instantiation 
fails with respect to (1). The representation of sentence (1) is still (la), where S is defined, infor- 
mally speaking, as the set (s: for each girl, s is the set of kissings of her by Max which hold at 
35 We assume here that the classification of aspect classifies clauses as well as verb phrases. 
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some time Cl. 
(la) at(3e)(3t'(t<t' & Hold(et) &e= n*S) 
The representation appears to be exactly the same as the original representation, but there is one 
crucial difference: the aspectual category of the sentence has been revised from a state to an event 
(in development). 
Even so, given the current analysis of quantification, (1) entails (2). 
(2) Max was kissing Susan 
For if (la) is true of a time to, then n*S holds for some time tt. But by the definition of n*, n*S 
holds at some time tl only if every member of S is non-empty. So for each girl, there exists some 
event et which is a kissing of her by Max which holds at some time t2. In particular, there is some 
time t2 such that a kissing event el that has Max as the agent and Susan as the object holds at tý. 
Hence (2a), the representation of (2), is true of some time t3 which is earlier than t2. 
(2a) at(3e")(9t")(t"<t & kissing*(e") & Agent(max*, e") & Object(susan*, e") & Hold(e", t")) 
So (1) entails (2). 
Suppose one were to preserve rule R7'. Then how may one modify the existing analysis of 
quantification to explain the inferential properties of sentence (1)? The problem Parsons has in 
accounting for the inferential properties of (1) arises directly from the fact that he treats the eventu- 
ality n*S in terms of its existential import: by the definition of n*, n*S can hold only if every 
member of S is non-empty. But by the definition of S in the representation of (1), every member of 
S is non-empty only if every member of S contains an event that holds at some time (i. e. every girl 
has a corresponding kissing event that holds at some time). In the case of (1) we know that inter- 
preting the eventuality n*S in these terms will not work. 
How could we revise our definition of when n*S holds in the representation of (1), so that it 
is not characterised in terms of every member of S being non-empty and therefore every member of 
S containing an event that holds at some time? We must either change the definition of n*, or 
change the definition of S in the analysis of (1). Given Parsons' Davidsonian framework, there 
seem to be no plausible changes to the definition of S36. However, one might try to change the 
definition of n*. The occurrence of the eventuality n*S should not depend on every member of S 
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being non-empty; by doing this we destroy the existential import of n*S and we no longer impose 
the condition that n*S can hold only if every member of S contains an event that holds at some 
time. Does this change improve the analysis of (1)? 
3.2 A Change to the Definition of n* 
Sentence (1) reports an event in development, and so one should modify the definition of r)* 
in the way we described only for the event in development case. Thus n*X is defined as follows: 
When X is a class of sets of processes or states or events that culminate, then 
n*X = r'X', where X' is the union of the members of X, provided that each member of 
X is nori empty; otherwise n*X is to be some eventuality that never holds. 
When X is a class of sets of events that are in development, then 
n*X =r X', where X' is the union of the members of X, regardless of whether or not 
the members of X are non-empty. 
Let us investigate what follows from the changed interpretation of n*. One no longer obtains 
an entailment from sentence (1) to (2). 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
(2) Max was kissing Susan 
The representation of (1) is still (la). 
(la) k(3e)(3t')(t<t & Hold(e, t') &e= n* 
(i) (s: (3x 
n)[(3e')(Gir1*(e') & Agent(xn, e') & Hold(e', t')) &s= 
(e": (3t")(kissing*(e") & Agent(max*, e") 
& Object(xn, e") & Hold(e", t")))])) 
But now by the new definition of n*, (1a) maybe true and the set (14) (the set of kissings of Susan 
by Max that hold at some time) may be empty, even though (14) is contained in the set (i) defined 
in (1a) above. 
36 If one did not wish to preserve the Davidsonian semantics, one could entertain the possibility of revising the definition of S so that S is the set (s: for each girl, s is the set of possible kissings of her by Max). The idea is that under 
the new analysis eventualities may exist without actually happening, and instead they possibly happen. So even if M'S holds 
making (1) true, and so by the definition of n* every member of S is non-empty, there is no guarantee that there is a kissing 
of Susan by Max that actually holds, and so (2) may be false. Developing this strategy would involve incorporating possible 
worlds into parsons' ontology. This is a departure from Davidsonian semantics, and fairly extensive revisions of the frame- 
work would be required. For this reason, I do not investigate this strategy here. One can. however, show that it is inade- 
quate. 
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(14) (e": (Tt'"(kissing*(e") & Agent(max*, e") & Object(susan*, e") & Hold(e", t")} 
If (14) is empty, then (2a), which is the representation of (2), is false for all times t. 
(2a) Xt(3e)(3t')(1dssing*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(susan*. e) & Hold(e, t')) 
Hence there is no entailment from sentence (1) to (2). 
But now one obtains an entailment from (2) to (1), which is clearly undesirable. If (2) is 
true, then (2a), which is the representation of (2), is true of a time tt. So there is an event el and a 
time t2 (earlier than tl) such that (18) is true. 
(18) kissing*(et) & Agent(max*, et) & Object(susan*, et) & Hold(et, t2) 
We now show that (2a) entails (1a). Let S be the set defined by (i) in (la). By the new definition 
of n*, n*S is nS' where S' is the union of the members of S (regardless of whether the members 
of S are non-empty). So (la) is true of a time t if there is a time t' earlier than t such that 
Hold(nS', t) is true. By the interpretation of when the event nS' is in development, Hold(r'S', t) is 
true for a time t' if there is a member e" of S' such that Hold(e", t) is true. But since the event et 
that makes (18) true is contained in the set (14) that is a member of S. et is a member of S. 
Furthermore, Hold(el, t2) is true (since (18) is true). Hence by the interpretation of when the event 
nS' is in development, Hold(nS', t2) is true. Hence (la) is true of the time ti where t2 is earlier 
than t1. Hence (1) is true, and so (2) entails (1). 
We argued (in section 3.1) that if one is to fix rule R7', then the only way we could possibly 
account for the inferential properties of (1) is to revise the definition of n*. so that if n*X is about 
an event in development, then it can hold even if some members of X are empty. But we have 
shown here that such a definition for n* fails. So we must preserve Parsons' original definition of 
n* and change rule R7'. 
In defining rule R7' in the way we did, we were attempting to preserve Parsons' original 
analysis of the syntactic structure of (1). This syntactic analysis corresponds intuitively to the 
quantifier having 'wider syntactic scope' than the progressive. But this has failed, indicating that if 
Parsons' formalism is to account for (1) at all, then it must do so with a different syntactic analysis. 
One might try to modify the theory so that the rule for the progressive dominates the rule for 
quantification in the analysis of (1). This would correspond intuitively to the progressive having 
6 wider syntactic scope' than the quantifier. It is hoped that changing the relations between the 
129 
syntactic constituents of (1) in this way will result in a change in the semantic interaction between 
the progressive and quantification which will get the results we want. 
Changing the syntactic analysis of (1) involves re-defining the rules so that they have 
different input, and so they can be applied in different places in the derivation of (1). So two ques- 
tions now arise: (i) How can we change rule R7' so that it still captures the intuitions Parsons 
desires, but we derive the representation of (1) in such a way that the progressive rule dominates 
the quantification rule, and (ii) if we were to do this, would it improve the analysis of (1)? 
3.3 Changing the Syntax 
We will show that the following rule R7" captures Parsons' intuition on the progressive, but 
it can dominate the rule for quantification in the analysis of (1) because it has different input (CLs) 
to Parsons' original progressive rule R7, which took VPs as input. 
R7": If A is an untensed non-stative CL, then the progressive form of A is a CL of the 
same aspectual class as A and its semantic translation is the same as A* would 
have been if A were an untensed state CL. 
Rule R7", like the other rules for the progressive we have entertained, still captures the idea 
that the progressive form of a sentence denoting an event asserts that that event is in development 
and not culminating. To see how this works, consider how it transforms the non-progressive CL 
(19) to the progressive CL (20). 
(19) Max build a house 
(20) Max be building a house 
(19) is an event CL, and the representation of (19) is (19a). 
(19a) %e? t(building*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(house*, e) & Cul(e, t)) 
By rule R7", (20) is an event CL, and the representation of (20) is the same as the representation of 
(19) would have been if (19) were a state CL. If (19) were a state CL, then rule R3 would translate 
it as (20a), and therefore (20a) is the representation of (20). 
(20a) ), eXt(building*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(house*, e) & Hold(e, t)) 
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(19a) and (20a) are the same save that the formula Cul(e, t) appears in (19a) and Hold(et) appears 
in (20a). Thus rule R7" captures the intuitions concerning the progressive that Parsons desires. 
(19a) and (20a) were the translations of (19) and (20) under the original rule for the progres- 
sive, and so we don't seem to have changed the analysis at all. However, there is a crucial 
difference between R7" and the original analysis: R7" is different from R7' in that it can dominate 
the rule for quantification in the representation of (1) whereas R7' cannot. 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
This difference in the syntax may give rise to the desired change in the semantics of (1). Is this the 
case? 
The representation of sentence (1) is derived as follows; note that the rule Ri" dominates the 
rule for quantification. 
Max was kissing every girl 
R5 
Max was kissing every girl 
Max be kissing every girl 
R4 
R7' 
Max kiss every girl 
R91 
girl Max kiss it 
z lsý R3 




k ss tn 
The new translation of (1) is as follows: 
"Max kiss it " translates as 
W, t[kissing*(e) & Agent(max*, e) & Object(xn, e)] 
"Max kiss every girl" translates as 
XeXt(Cul(e, t) &e= n*(s: (3xn)(3e)(girl*(e) 
& Agent(xn, e') & Hold(e', t) &s= 
(e': (3t'j(kissing*(e") & Object(xn, e'1 
& Agent(max*, e") & Cul(e", t")))))] 
"Max be kissing every girl" translates as 
AeXt(Hold(e, t) &e= n*(s: (3xn)(3el(girl*(e) 
& Agent(xn, e) & Hold(e', t) &s= 
(e": (3t')(kissing*(e) & Object(xn, e") 







"Max was kissing every girl" translates as (lb) R4 and R5 
(lb) a 
, t(3e)(3t')(t'<t & Hold(e, t') &e= n* 
(ii) (s: (3xn)(3ee(girl*(e) 
& Agent(xn, e) & Hold(e', t)) &s= 
(e": (3t")(kissing*(e") & Object(x", e") 
& Agent(max*, e") & Cul(e", t"))}))] 
(lb) is different from the previous analysis, in that the events e" in the set (ii) above are described 
in terms of the predicate Cul instead of Hold. This change in the semantics is a direct result of the 
change we have proposed in the syntax. 
But the analysis of sentence (1) presented here does not account for its natural inferential pro- 
perties. There is the same problem in using R7" as was encountered with R7'. To see this, con- 
sider the case when (lb) is true of a time t. Then the event n*S, where S is the set denoted by (ii) 
above, holds at some time t' earlier than t. By the (original) definition of n*, Hold(n*S, t) is true 
only if each member of S is non-empty. In particular, the set (21) below is non-empty. 
(21) (e": (3t")(kissing*(e") & Agent(max*, e") & Object(susan*, e") & Cul(e", t"))) 
Thus there exists a time t0 of which the predicate (4a) is true. 
(4a) We")(3t")(t'<t & kissing*(e") & Agent(max*, e") & Object(susan*, e") & Cul(e", t")) 
But (4a) is the logical form of (4). 
(4) Max kissed Susan 
Thus there is an entailment from (1) to (4), contrary to intuitions. Changing the relation between 
the syntactic constituents in the analysis of (1) has therefore failed to give the change in the seman- 
tics that we want. 
The problem in analysing (1) with rule R7" is exactly the same as the problem in using rule 
R7', and that is that the event n*S has existential import. By the definition of n*, the eventuality 
n*S in (lb) holds at a time t' only if all the members of S are non-empty, and by the definition of 
S in (lb) this is the case only if all the members of S contain an event that culminates at some 
time, and so one cannot account for the failure of universal instantiation in the case of (1). As we 
argued before, one could try to overcome this by changing the definition of n*, so that one relaxes 
132 
the condition that n*S holds only if every member of S is non-empty (so one relaxes the condition 
that every member of S contains an event that culminates at some time). But I have already argued 
that this revision is not satisfactory, for then one obtains an entailment from (2) to (1), which is 
clearly contrary to intuitions. 
We have tried to account for the inferential properties of sentence (1) while preserving Par- 
sons' Event-based Strategy in defining the progressive. However, with every possible definition of 
the progressive under this strategy that we entertain, we come up against the same problem: the rule 
for quantification cannot be defined so that we explain the lack of inference from (1) to (2). So 
Parsons' formulation of the Event-based Strategy in defining the progressive fails on the analysis of 
(1). Hence a puzzle remains: How may one account for the inferential properties of the progres- 
sive with universal quantification? 
4 Dowty's Progressive and Universal Quantification 
Dowty's (1979) Eventual Outcome analysis of the progressive accounts for the inferential pro- 
perties of (1) with a standard analysis of quantifiers. 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
We will show this by deriving the representation of the `tenseless' sentence (22) (note that (22) is 
categorised as a tenseless sentence in Dowty's framework because its representation does not invoke 
a tense operator). 
(22) Max is kissing every girl 
Dowty's analysis of (22) is derived from the representation of the sentence "Max kisses her", 
the progressive operator PROG and the standard analysis of quantification. According to Vendler 
(1967), the sentence "Max kisses her" denotes an achievement, and therefore it is represented in 
Dowty's theory using the sentential operator BECOME, with the truth conditions defined below37: 
[BECOME cD] is true at the interval I if and only if there is an interval J which contains 
the initial bound of I such that d> is false at J. and there is an interval K containing the 
final bound of I such that 4 is true at K. 
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"Max kisses her" is represented as [BECOME kissed'(x, max')], where the formula kissed'(x, max') 
corresponds to the state that x (i. e. she) has been kissed by Max (note that kissed' is a stative predi- 
cate). 
The quantifier and the operators PROD and BECOME all have sentential scope, and so there 
are several representations of (22) that one could entertain due to the possible scope relations 
between them. The possible representations of (22) are listed below, where the formula 
kisscd'(x, niax') corresponds to the state that x has been kissed by Max38. 
(22) Max is kissing every girl 
(22a) [FROG (Vx)(girl'(x) -4 [BECOME kissed'(x, max')])] 
(22b) (Vx)[PROG (girl'(x) -- [BECOME kissed'(x, max)]]) 
(22c) (Vx)(girl'(x) -' [PROG [BECOME kissed'(x, max')]]) 
(22d) [FROG (Vx)[BECOME (girl'(x) -ý kissed'(x, max'))]] 
(22e) (Vx)[PROG [BECOME (girl'(x) -a kissed'(x, max'))]] 
(22! ) [PROG[BECOME (Vx)(gir1'(x) -9 kissed'(x, max'))]] 
Which formula captures the natural interpretation of (22)? Are all these formulae semantically dis- 
tinct? 
Dowry's truth conditions for PROG were discussed at length in chapter 3. The definition is 
repeated below: 
PROG(A) is true at <I, w> if and only if there exists an interval I' such that I is contained in I' but I is not a final subinterval of I', and for all w'e Inr(<I, w>), A is true at <I', w>. 
Given this definition for PROG, one can show that for any formula CD, the following entailment 
holds: 
PROG(`dx)-O -4 (`dx)PROGcb 
Suppose that PROG(Vx)» is true at an index <I, w> with respect to the model M and assignment 
function g. This holds if and only if there is an interval I' containing I such that I is not the final 
subinterval of I' and for every world Ve Inr(d, w>), (Vx)(D is true at <I', w'> with respect to M and 
g; this is the case if and only if 0 is true at <I', w> with respect to M and every g' exactly like g 
37 The truth conditions for BECOME were examined in detail in chapter 2. 
38 One intuitively feels that "Max kisses every girl" denotes an accomplishment, and so one might think that (22) 
should be represented in Dowty's theory using not only the operator BECOME but the operator CAUSE as well (since this 
operator also normally features in the logical form of accomplishments). However, Dowry's grammar does not allow for this 
possibility, because "Max kisses her" is an achievement and the analysis of quantification is such that it cannot affect the as- 
pectual class of a sentence. 
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except possibly in the value assigned to x. But by the definition of PROG, this entails that PROGd 
is true at <I, w> with respect to M and every g' that is like g except possibly in the value assigned 
to x, and this holds if and only if (Vx)PROG(D is true at an index <I, w> with respect to M and g. 
Hence PROG(Vx)(D entails (Vx)PROG I. Hence (22a) entails (22b) and (22d) entails (22e). 
The universal quantifier has wide scope in (22b), (22c) and (22e), and so we know that these 
formulae cannot represent the readings of (22) where universal instantiation fails (we formally prove 
that universal instantiation applies to (22b), (22c) and (22e) in appendix 4). So by the above entail- 
ment, (22a) and (22d) also cannot explain why universal instantiation fails with respect to (22). 
This leaves just one possible representation for the reading of (22) where universal instantiation 
fails; namely (22f). 
Let us investigate the truth conditions of (220. (22f) is true at d, w> with respect to M and g 
if and only if there is an interval I' containing I such that I is not a final subinterval of I' and for all 
WEInr(<I, w>), (22f1) is true at d', w'>. 
(22f1) [BECOME (Vx)(girl'(x) -ý kissed'(x, max'))] 
(22f1) is true at d', w'> if and only if there is an interval J containing the initial bound of I' such 
that (2212) is false at <J, w'>, and there is an interval K containing the final bound of I' such that 
(22f2) is true at <K, w'>. 
(22f2) (Vx)(girl'(x) -a kissed'(x max)) 
Let us investigate the relationship between (22f) and the formula (23a), which is the represen- 
tation of (23) (the formula kissed'(susan', max) corresponds to the state that Susan has been kissed 
by Max). 
(23) Max is kissing Susan 
(23a) [PROG [BECOME kissed'(susan', max')]] 
Suppose that (221) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g. It is consistent with the truth of (221) at 
<I, w> with respect to M and g that kissed'(susan', max) is true at all times in all the w'e Inr(<I, w>). 
For even though (22f2) is false at <J, w'>; this may be due to the fact that Max has not kissed Jane, 
and not the fact that Max has not kissed Susan. Suppose that kissed'(susan', max') is true at all 
times in all the inertia worlds w' to <I, w>. Then the formula (24) is false at all times in 
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w'e Inr(d, w>), and therefore by the definition of PROG, (23a) is false at all times in w with respect 
toMandg. 
(24) [BECOME kissed'(susan', max')] 
(23a) [PROG [BECOME kissed'(susan', max')]] 
Hence (22f) does not entail (23a), and thus we have an explanation for why (22) does not entail 
(23). 
(22) Max is kissing every girl 
(23) Max is kissing Susan 
We have found that (22f) is the only representation of (22) that explains why (22) does not entail 
(23). One obtains a satisfactory analysis of sentence (22) in Dowty's framework only because the 
logical form of (22) may assign both the operator PROG and the operator BECOME wider scope 
than the quantifier. 
5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have investigated the behaviour of the progressive in sentences containing 
universally quantified noun phrases. The rule of universal instantiation fails with respect to sen- 
tence (1): (1) does not entail sentence (2). 
(1) Max was kissing every girl 
(2) Max was kissing Susan 
I argued that this cannot be accounted for in Parsons' event-based framework. 
Dowty (1979) is able to account for the relationship between (1) and (2) by defining the pro- 
gressive in terms of inertia worlds. Thus Dowty's Eventual Outcome Strategy in defining the pro- 
gressive yields an analysis of (1), whereas Parsons' Event-based Strategy does not. But in chapter 
3, the Eventual Outcome Strategy was found to be inadequate in other respects. So a puzzle 
remains: how can one combine the Eventual Outcome Strategy's advantage on the analysis of (1) 
with an account of the progressive that does not suffer its fatal flaw? In chapter 7, I will offer a 
definition of the progressive that is not based on the Eventual Outcome Strategy but that neverthe- 
less can explain why universal instantiation fails with respect to (1). In the next chapter however, I 





A Formal Characterisation of Aspectual Taxonomy 
1 Introduction 
A prerequisite to solving the imperfective paradox is the semantic interpretation of a 
classification of aspect, and this is the main concern of this chapter. The formal theory offered will 
rely on two different tools. The first is a temporal logic developed by Richards and known as IQ 
(Richards 1986). The second is an Al model of temporal reference that has been developed by 
Moens and Steedman (Moens and Steedman 1987, Moens 1987). 
The formal semantic characterisation of aspectual taxonomy presented here will be used in 
the next chapter to solve the imperfective paradox. However, this chapter is concerned solely with 
setting up the semantic analysis of aspectual taxonomy; it is not concerned with the virtues of the 
resulting theory. 
2 The Classification of Aspect 
Moens provides a taxonomy of aspect containing five categories. He distinguishes between 
the category of states (cf. "know", "understand") which correspond to Vendler's (1967) states, and 
the other four categories which are classified as belonging to the genus of events. 
In the genus of events, there is a distinction between events that are extended and those that 
are not, corresponding to Vendler's (1967) distinction between events that constitute processes and 
events that do not. There is also a distinction between events that have a definite 'goal' or 
`conclusion' and events that do not. Thus Moens distinguishes among four types of events: 
processes (cf. "run", "swim") are extended events that do not have a 'conclusion' and they 
correspond to Vendler's activities; culminated processes (cf. "build a house", "eat a sandwich) are 
extended events that do have a `conclusion' and they correspond to Vendler's accomplishments; 
culminations (cf. "win the race", "reach the summit") are 'punctual' events that have a 
'conclusion' and they correspond to Vendler's achievements; and points (cf. "wink", "tap"), are 
`punctual' events that do not have a 'conclusion', and they do not have a corresponding category in 
Vendler's classification. 
Moens argues that linguistic context determines the aspectual class of expressions. To find 
where an expression rests with the classification, one investigates what adverbials it can co-occur 
with, what changes of meaning occur when it appears with certain tense and aspect markers, and so 
on.. For example, it is assumed that the "for"-adverbial "for four minutes" qualifies only expressions 
that denote processes, and the "in"-adverbial "in four minutes" qualifies only expressions that 
denote culminated processes. So "Max ran" is classified as a process, because it combines with the 
"for"-adverbial "for four minutes" felicitously, as in sentence (1). 
(1) Max ran for four minutes 
However, "Max ran" may be classified as a culminated process, because sentence (2) is felicitous in 
a situation where Max runs a fixed distance every morning. 
(2) Max ran in four minutes (this morning) , 
To account for sentence (2), Moens does not conclude that the expression "Max ran" is ambiguous 
between a process and culminated process. Instead, he attempts to describe the phenomenon by 
stipulating that "Max ran" is basically a process that can move from one category to the other pro- 
vided the context is such as to make these transitions felicitous. 
It is not clear from a formal perspective what transitions are. We will propose a slightly 
different view to Moens' on the classification of aspect. We will view the expression "Max ran" as 
ambiguous, and we will use the process sense of "Max ran" to define the culminated process sense 
of "Max ran". Our formalism will reflect Moens' claim that linguistic context determines the aspec- 
tual class of an expression as it appears in a particular utterance. For example, our formalism will 
yield an analysis of sentence (2) where it is false unless "Max ran" as it appears in (2) denotes a 
culminated process. But unlike Moens, we will view the linguistic context as disambiguating the 
aspectual class of the expression, rather than determining which 'transitions' between the aspectual 
classes took place. 
We propose that "Max ran" refers to a culminated process in (2). We now have the task of 
characterising that culminated process. A culminated process is a process that leads to a culmina- 
tion. So the culminated process "Max ran" must be identified in terms of, among other things, the 
appropriate culmination. Moens claims that the culminated process "Max ran" has a context- 
sensitive element to it, because the appropriate culmination is determined by extra-linguistic con- 
text. For example, if Max runs the distance of a mile every morning, then we intuitively interpret 
(2) to mean that it took Max four minutes to run the distance of one mile, and in this case, the suit- 
able culmination is Max reaching the distance of one mile. Alternatively, if Max runs the distance 
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of two miles every morning, then we intuitively interpret (2) to mean that it took Max four minutes 
to run the distance of two miles, and in this case, the suitable culmination is Max reaching the dis- 
tance of two miles. There are, of course, many alternatives to these. 
We propose to define the culminated process sense of "Max run" in terms of the process 
sense of "Max run", plus some appropriate culmination which will be determined by extra-linguistic 
context. This reflects Moens' observation that extra-linguistic context determines what culminated 
Process "Max ran" refers to in an utterance of (2). So we are introducing here two different notions 
of. context. The linguistic context disambiguates the aspectual classification of "Max ran" as it 
appears in particular utterances. The extra-linguistic context establishes exactly what culminated 
Process "Max ran" refers to in an utterance of (2), e. g. it determines whether the culminated process 
is Max running one mile, or Max running two miles, etc. 
So to conclude, we intend to characterise the culminated process sense of "Max ran" in terms 
of an operator that operates on the process sense of "Max ran", and this operator will involve refer- 
ence to a culmination which is picked according to extra-linguistic context. 
3 The Formulation of the Classification of Aspect 
3.1 What Should the Formalism Look Like? 
What apparatus is required to formulate the aspectual taxonomy described above? We will 
view the classification of aspect as a classification of propositions (and the way we view proposi- 
tions will be formally defined below). Suppose one aims to distinguish among the five aspectual 
categories on the grounds of semantics. Then the classification of aspect is a classification of propo- 
sitions that divides the set into at least five classes, corresponding to the five aspectual categories: 
state propositions, process propositions, culmination propositions, culminated process propositions 
and point propositions. 
As we've just mentioned, we intend to characterise the culminated process sense of "Max 
ran" as it appears in sentence (2) in terms of an operator that operates on the process sense of "Max 
ran". and this operator will also involve reference to a culmination, where the culmination is picked 
according to extra-linguistic context. 
(2) Max ran in four minutes 
In order to formulate this in a logical environment we must achieve two tasks; we must identify the 
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culmination proposition according to the context of utterance of (2) and we must characterise the 
operator that operates on the the process sense of "Max ran" (where the process sense of "Max ran" 
denotes a process proposition). 
Given that the operator will operate on process sentences (i. e. sentences that denote process 
propositions) but will also involve reference to a culmination proposition, we will give the operator 
a complex syntactic structure. It will be represented as a complex operator CPb ("CP" is glossed as 
"culminated process"), where b is a referring expression that denotes a culmination proposition. So 
the culminated process sense of "Max run" will be represented as a sentence of the form CPb(A), 
where CPb is a complex operator, b is a referring expression that denotes a culmination proposi- 
tion, and A is a sentence which denotes a process proposition. 
Suppose that the formula run(max) (where "run" is a one-place predicate and "max" is a con- 
stant) unambiguously denotes a process proposition in the theory. Then run(max) represents the 
process sense of "Max run", and so the culminated process sense of "Max run" in sentence (2) must 
be represented in the formalism by the formula CPb(run(max)) for some appropriate culmination 
proposition denoted by the referring expression b (i. e. this formula will be embedded in the logical 
form of (2)). We now have the task of specifying the culmination proposition denoted by b in the 
logical form of (2). 
We have argued that this culmination is not identifiable independently of extra-linguistic con- 
text. Indeed, the context of utterance of (2) will determine whether there is a suitable culmination 
at all (and if there is not, then sentence (2) is anomalous with respect to that particular context). In 
particular, the context of utterance of (2) may determine the suitable culmination as Max reaching 
the distance of one mile, or Max reaching two miles, etc. To reflect this in the formal theory, the 
semantics of the formula CPb(run(max)) that represents (2) must be such that the value of the cul- 
mination proposition denoted by b is identified by the context of utterance of (2). But how may the 
semantics of the formula CPb(run(max)) that represents (2) be defined so as to refer to a proposition 
denoted by b whose value is determined by context? How may the logical analysis of sentences of 
the form CPb(A) refer to context? 
The preceding discussion concerning sentence (2) suggests that in some cases the relation of a 
sentence to its context of utterance may be a matter of logical form. So one must pick a framework 
that appreciates the role of context in truth definitions. I suggest that IQ is such a framework. 
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3.2 An Informal Introduction to IQ 
IQ is an interval-based framework originally designed to provide a formal semantic treatment 
of tense and temporal quantification in English (Richards 1986). The theory is further developed in 
(Oberlander 1987a). Propositions are functions from world-interval pairs to truth values; this is why 
IQ is viewed as an interval-based framework. However, it is only superficially similar to other 
interval-based accounts, such as Dowty's (Dowty 1979). Intervals are treated differently in Dowty's 
theory, making it difficult to compare Richards' theory to it. In particular, the framework of IQ 
maintains a notion of homogeneity whose nature we will define below, and this notion of homo- 
geneity has no status in Dowty's representation of natural language (cf. chapter 2). 
IQ offers a technique whereby temporal expressions can have representations that achieve 
their semantic interpretation with respect to context. This is achieved by invoking in the object 
language of IQ a set of referring expressions known as parameters which refer in virtue of context: 
a possibly partial function gg, which is part of the model, assigns values to the parameters relative 
to the context c. So any expression in the object language that invokes a parameter receives its 
semantic interpretation with respect to context, for its semantic value will depend on the denotation 
of the parameter assigned by the function gC for the context c. 
How may this help us to specify the culminated process "Max run" as it appears in sentence 
(2)? 
(2) Max ran in four minutes (this morning) 
We have argued that the analysis of (2) has embedded in it the formula CPb(run(max)) where CPb 
is a complex operator that operates on the process sentence run(max), and b denotes a culmination 
proposition which is determined by the context of utterance. This idea may be expressed in an 
extended version of IQ, which contains parameters that refer to entities in the domain of proposi- 
tions 39. The culminated process "Max run" described in sentence (2) will be denoted by 
CPý(run(max)), where e is a propositional parameter whose value is determined by the function g,: 
in the truth definition of CP (run(max)) to be defined below, the value of gc(e) will be the suitable 
culmination proposition given the context c of utterance. 
39 An extended version of IQ, that includes the set of constants, variables and parameters ranging over propositions, is 
used by Richards (1987) to account for temporal connection. 
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When we define the truth conditions of CP (A), we will see that CPS is an operator modulo e; 
it is multiply ambiguous because of the different possible values assigned to e. 
4 The Syntax and Semantics of the Extended Version of IQ 
This section concerns the syntax and semantics of the extended version of IQ, as a prelim- 
inary to investigating how the taxonomy of aspect that we have described may be expressed in it. 
But first, it is worth taking a little time to note some of IQ's leading ideas, before proceeding to 
describe the formal apparatus invoked and its accompanying semantics. 
The IQ framework is proposed as part of a formal semantics for a fragment of natural 
language containing a wide variety of temporal expressions. The language of IQ (henceforward 
referred to as Liq) is an extension of the ordinary predicate calculus, which contains the usual con- 
stants, variables, n-place predicates, truth functional connectives and quantifiers. The constants and 
variables are sorted into four domains in the extended version of IQ that we are considering here; 
they range over individuals, possible worlds, intervals of time and propositions. I stress that this is 
an extended version of the framework of IQ, where the language has referring expressions that 
denote propositions. The standard framework of IQ does not invoke any such referring expressions, 
for in this framework the constants and variables are sorted into the three domains of individuals, 
possible worlds and intervals of time. 
Richards (1986) proposes a basic division between tense and temporal quantification. In the 
former category he includes the three traditional logical tenses, past, present and future; in the latter 
category he includes adverbs such as "always", "never" and "exactly twice". He argues that the 
former category involves essential reference to speech time, whereas the latter does not. In this 
respect, Richards follows Russell for tenses and Prior for temporal quantifiers. Liq is designed to 
reflect this distinction: tenses are deictic sentential operators explicitly representing the Russellian 
view that tensed utterances are in some sense about the time of speech. In contrast to tense, the 
quantifiers refer to time, but not necessarily to speech time. . 
To achieve a deictic analysis of tense, Richards incorporates into Liq a set of referring 
expressions over and above constants and variables. These are parameters. Unlike constants and 
variables, parameters refer in virtue of context: a function gC is part of the model and g. assigns the 
parameters their denotations with respect to the context c. The parameters are `sorted' like the con- 
stants and variables, and in the extended version of IQ that we are discussing here they range over 
the four domains of individuals, worlds, intervals and propositions. Parameters occur in the syntax 
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of Liq on deictic sentential operators such as tense. They appear as subscripts on the operators: for 
example the past tensed version of an untensed sentence A (such as win(max, race)) is represented 
as PAST (VIO (A) where v is a parameter which ranges over the domain of possible worlds, and t 
is a 
parameter which ranges over the domain of intervals of time. PAST (VA 
(A) is true if the following 
holds: 
PAST (A) is true at the world-time index (w, i) if and only if gý(v) = w. gc(t) =i and 
there MG an interval j earlier than i such that A is true at (wi). 
In the above definition the function gc assigns the parameters v and t the 'place' (i. e. possible 
world) and time of speech. Thus Richards' analysis of tense is Russellian in that it refers essen- 
tially to speech time 40. 
A model for Liq is a septuple <D, W, I, E, <<, gc, f> where the four non-empty sets D, W, I, and 
E correspond respectively to the domains of individuals, possible worlds, intervals of time and pro- 
positions; « is a partial ordering relation on the domain I of intervals; gC is the function that 
assigns parameters their denotations; and f is the interpretation function which assigns the non- 
logical constants of Liq their intensions. 
The interpretation function f is designed so as to maintain a high degree of homogeneity. 
That is, the truth clauses for the expressions of Liq are such that the definition of truth will yield 
the following homogeneity property for boolean combinations of atomic formulae of Liq (which I 
will subsequently define): 
An atomic formula (e. g. win(max, race), run(max)) is true at an index (w, i) only if for all 
subintervals j of i the formula is true at (w, j). 
The above homogeneity principle is fundamental to the framework IQ, and sets it apart from other 
interval-based frameworks, such as (Dowty 1979). As discussed in chapter 2, Dowty (1979) 
represents the sentence "Max win the race" so that it may be true at an interval i and false at an 
interval j contained in i. This is not the case for IQ, for the formula representing "Max win the 
race" (i. e. win(max, race)41) is subject to the above homogeneity restriction. It must be stressed, 
however, that the homogeneity restriction will not apply to all the sentences of the language, but 
only the boolean combinations of the atomic sentences. The interpretation function f is designed to 
maintain this notion of homogeneity. 
40 IQ's tenses are deictic in a limited way, they don't invoke definite reference to (say) past time. cf. Partee (1973) for 
an alternative view of the deictic nature of tense. 
41 We will view "race" as a term in order to simplify the analysis for our purposes here. 
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So to summarise, there are basically two leading ideas in IQ. First, there are certain temporal 
expressions, such as tense, whose semantic interpretations are essentially about the context of utter- 
ance. Second, the framework of IQ is designed so as to maintain the above homogeneity restriction. 
Now that the general motivation for Liq is in place, I will give the formal definitions of the syntax 
and semantics of Liq. 
4.1 The Syntax 
The basic expressions of Liq are defined below: 
(i) Four countably infinite sets of variables: VD, VW, VI, and VE. For k2: 0 x' is a variable in 
V, V'k is a variable in VW, t'k is a variable in VI, and e' is a variable in VE. We let x', 
v', t' and e' range arbitrarily over these sets. 
(ii) Four (possibly empty) sets of name constants: CD, C W' CI, and 
CE. For kz0 x*k is a con- 
stant in CD, V*k is a constant in CW, t*k is a constant in CI, and e*k is a constant 
in CE. 
We let x*, v*, t* and e* range arbitrarily over these sets. 
(iii) Four (possibly empty) sets of parameters: PD, Pw' PI, and PE, For kýO xk is a parameter 
in PD, vk is a parameter in PW9 ý is a parameter in PI, and ek is a parameter in Pfi. We let 
x, v, t and e range arbitrarily over these sets. 
(iv) For n2: 0 a countably infinite set P" of n-place predicate constants. We let Ro be an arbi- 
trary member of P". 
(v) Quantifiers: 3, V. 
We read 3 and V as "some" and "all" respectively. 
(vi) The set of D-terms is VDUCDVPD, the set of W-terms is V` UCWUPW, the set of I-terms 
is VIVCiuPI, and the set of E-terms is VEVCEvPE. 
(vii) Tense operators: PRES(Vt) , PAST(V, O' FUT(V. 0 . We let II range over the set of tense operators. 
The well formed formulas (wff's) of Liq can now be defined inductively in the familiar way. 
(i) Where Rn is an n-place predicate constant and dl,.., dA are D-terms. Rn(dt,.., dd) is an atomic 
wff. 
(ii) Where A is a wff and x belongs to VD, 3xA and VxA are wff's. 
(iii) If A is a wff and II is a tense operator, IIA is a wff. 
4.2 The Semantics 
Although IQ is an interval-based system, points play an essential role. In effect, the seman- 
tics of IQ assumes the notion of a point-structure. A point-structure T is a pair <T, o consisting of 
a nonempty set (of points of time) T which is partially ordered by <. 
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Relative to T. an IQ-structure M is defined as follows: M is a septuple <D, W, ITE, «, g,, f> 
such that 
(a) D, W and IT are disjoint nonempty sets to be understood respectively as the set of possible 
objects, possible worlds, and intervals of moments of time. The non-empty set E is under- 
stood as the set of possible propositions (built from the sets W and Y. It consists of all 
functions from WxIT to the truth values (0,1, u) ("u" is to be glossed as "undefined"). 
Where there is no confusion I will abbreviate "IT" to "I". 
(b) L. is a subset of PT, the power set of T, such that: 
- all singletons in PT belong to IT 
-i is in IT only if for all t' and t' belonging to i if there is at such that t'<t<t", then t is in 
i, 
-0 (the empty set) does not belong to L. 
(c) « is the partial ordering of IT induced by T, i. e. for all i and j belonging to L i<<j if and 
only if for all t in i and t' in jt<t'. 
(d) gg is a function (the "indexical" function) from the parameters of Liq to the corresponding 
4 objects. 
(e) f is a function which assigns to the constants of Liq the suitable (possibly partial) inten- 
sions from WxIT,. 
The interpretation function f is subject to the following homogeneity restrictions (these will yield 
the homogeneity principle described in the previous section): 
(i) For every name constant b* and predicate r, f(b*)(w, i) and f(rn)(w, i) are defined for all 
(w, i) in WxI, where i is a singleton. 
(ii) For all name constants b*, f(b*)(w, i) = f(b*)(wj) for all j included in i (all subintervals of 
i). 
(iii) for any predicate constant n, f(r)(wj) is included in f(n)(w, i) for all subintervals i of j. 
Because of the homogeneity restrictions on f, intensions will typically be partial. However, the 
appropriate valuation space for an IQ-structure is one with three truth-values: 1 ("true"), 0 ("false") 
and u ("undefined"). A formula will have the value u whenever any of its non-logical constants are 
undefined. It must be stressed that u is a third truth value rather than a truth value gap. 
An atomic sentence rn(at,.. an) is true in m at (w, i) if the sequence f(al)(w, i),.., f(an)(w, i) 
belongs to f(rn)(w, i); it is false at (w, i) if the given sequence does not so belong; and otherwise it is 
undefined. This interpretation for atomic sentences together with the homogeneity restrictions (i), 
(ii) and (iii) on f yield the homogeneity principle expressed in (3). 
(3) An atomic sentence will be true at an index (w, i) only if for all subintervals j of i, the sen- 
tence is true at (wj). 
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-- The truth definition for Liq proceeds in terms of the notion of an IQ-interpretation based on 
an IQ-structure M. 
An IQ-interpretation is a pair <M, g> such that M is an IQ-structure and g is a function 
which assigns values to the variables of Liq. 
Given an IQ-interpretation, the denotation of a well-formed expression ß is defined recursively in 
the familiar way (we give the definitions in appendix 5). We let [ßj`M'g'(w, i) be the denotation of 
0 relative to the IQ-interpretation dvl, g> with respect to the pair (w. i)e WxI. 
Now that the syntax and semantics of the language of IQ are in place, I will explore how one 
might implement the suggestions outlined earlier: to formulate the taxonomy of aspect in the frame- 
work IQ. 
5 The Model Structure 
If the distinctions between the five aspectual classes are to be thought of as semantic distinc- 
tions, then the task ahead is to provide a suitable model structure that captures these distinctions. 
The set E of propositions, which corresponds to the set of all functions from WxI to (0,1, u), must 
be divided into at least five classes corresponding to the five aspectual categories: E must consist of 
a set S of states, a set Pr of processes, a set Po of points, a set Cu of culminations and a set Cp of 
culminated processes. One must distinguish among the functions from these five classes of E. How 
may this be done? 
First, let us consider what restrictions we require on the set Po of points. There is a reading 
of the sentence "Max winked (once)" where the event referred to is 'punctual'; it does not extend in 
time. This is the point sense of "Max winked", and to reflect the idea that points are punctual 
events, one might assume that propositions from Po have what I call moment structures. That is, a 
point proposition must return the value "true" only at minimal intervals, or, in other words, 
moments (a moment in IQ is an interval that is a singleton set). 
Given the homogeneity principle, however, this must also be true of the set Cu of culmina- 
tions and Cp of culminated processes. For suppose that an atomic untensed sentence A denoting a 
culmination (or culminated process) proposition is true at an extended interval i, however small. 
Then by homogeneity A is true at every subinterval of i. One is now committed to one of two 
undesirable consequences. The first alternative is that the structural representation of A is not 
related to the 'goal' or 'conclusion' of the culmination (or culminated process) it denotes. The 
second alternative is that A has a 'goal' or 'conclusion' associated with it, but homogeneity 
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establishes that this conclusion occurs at every interval contained in i (since A is true at every inter- 
val contained in i). Hence a homogeneous interpretation of culminations and culminated processes 
is satisfactory only if they are true only at minimal intervals, or, in other words, moments (which 
are the singleton sets). Under this restriction, the structural representation of A can talk about a 
4 goal' or `conclusion', which will occur at the moment at which A is true. 
Since as a result of homogeneity the propositions in the set Cu of culminations and the set Cp 
of culminated processes must be moment-structures, and in addition, the propositions in the set Po 
of points are also moment-structures, it is difficult to see how one may account for a distinction 
between these three classes of propositions, and so a semantic distinction between points, culmina- 
tions and culminated processes is not sustainable in IQ. 
The fact that IQ is homogeneous entails that one must drop the assumption that there are 
semantic distinctions between points, culminations and culminated processes. At this point one may 
decide that since IQ cannot sustain a semantic distinction between these three aspectual classes, it is 
not a suitable framework for formulating a classification of aspect. Alternatively, one may decide 
42 
. ,., that a semantic distinction among points, culminations and culminated processes is not necessary 
It is the latter option that we choose. 
It is important to realise that following this course does not undermine the logical form we 
proposed for sentence (2). 
(2) Max ran in four minutes (this morning) 
We have proposed that "Max ran" as it appears in (2) is represented by the formula CP (run(max)), 
and we will define CPý(run(max)) so that it denotes a proposition of the right sort, namely a 
moment structure. We will subsequently show how this is done. 
Although there are no semantic distinctions between points, culminations and culminated 
processes, we will account for semantic distinctions between processes, states and the set (points, 
culminations, culminated processes). The set E is partitioned into four classes; Pr denoting 
processes, S denoting states, Mo denoting moment-structures corresponding to the set of points, cul- 
minations and culminated processes, and 0 denoting the remaining functions in E. E can be 
42 This certainly wouldn't be the first theory to group points, culminations and culminated processes into the same as- 
pectual class. Parsons (1984) groups them together in the class of events, and Bennett (1981) groups them together in the dass of telic events. 
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represented iagramatically as follows: 
E 
Pr S Mo 0 
The conditions placed on the members from these classes are as follows: 
Condition on Pr 
pre Pr if and only if for all indices (w, i)e WxI, if pr(w, i) =1 and if for all intervals j such 
that i is contained in j pr(w, j) = 0, then i is a closed non-minimal interval. 
By the above condition, if pre Pr, then it has what I call a closed interval structure. That is, the 
function pr may be true on an open interval, but any such interval is surrounded by a non-minimal 
closed interval at which pr is true. Similarly, any minimal interval at which pr is true is surrounded 
by a non-minimal closed interval at which pr is true. Placing this condition on the set Pr of 
processes reflects in the formalism Moens' idea that processes have definite endpoints and essen- 
tially extend in time. Hence the function pr may be pictorially represented as below, where the 




The propositions in the set S of states must satisfy the following condition: 
Condition on S 
SE S if and only if for all (w, i)E WxI, if s(w, i) =1 and if for all intervals j such that i is 
contained in j s(wj) = 0, then i is open. 
So if se S, then it has what I call an open interval structure. That is, the function s may be true on 
a closed interval, but any such interval is surrounded by an open interval at which s is true. Hence 
it produces the following temporal structure, where the curved brackets represent unbound intervals, 
and s is true at every subinterval of those unbound intervals (by homogeneity). 
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c- ----------------) s=1 
The fact that the members of the set S of states all have open interval structures in our theory 
reflects Moens' idea that states do not have definite endpoints. 
The propositions in the set Mo, which corresponds to the set of points, culminations and cul- 
minated processes grouped together in one class, have to satisfy the following condition: 
Condition on Mo 
moe Mo if and only if for all (w, i)E WxI such that mo(w. i) = 1, i is a moment. 
If moe Mo, then it is a moment-structure. That is, the function mo is true only at moments (or, in 
other words, minimal intervals, which are the singleton sets). Hence it produces the following tem- 
poral structure, where "p" represents a minimal interval. 
Q 
mo =1 
The fact that the members of Mo are moment-structures reflects the idea that points are 
`punctual', and it also reflects the idea that the `conclusion' associated with a culmination or cul- 
minated process is punctual (for it happens at the moment at which the culmination or culminated 
process is true). 
The reader should bear in mind that when we now talk of points, culminations and cul- 
minated processes, we are not talking of semantically distinct entities, but instead we are using 
these terms as terms of art; we simply use them to talk about sentences that denote the same sort of 
propositions, namely moment structures. We have been limited to this interpretation of culmina- 
tions and culminated processes by the homogeneity principle that is part of the framework IQ. It 
must be stressed that we will not even distinguish among the logical forms of the sentences that 
Moens classifies as culminated processes, the sentences he classifies as culminations, and the sen- 
tences he classifies as points. However, we will not drop the terms "points", "culminations" and 
"culminated processes" altogether in this chapter because they will enable the reader to see what 
intuitions motivate the formal theory, even though these terms do not have any formal status. 
The functions that are in the set 0 satisfy the following condition: 
Condition on 0 
CEO if and only if none of the conditions on Pr, S or Mo hold. 
So the largest connected intervals at which a function ee 0 returns the value "true" are open 
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intervals, closed intervals and moments, and can be represented pictorially as follows: 
(--------) [-----------] 0 
e=1 e=1 e=1 
The set of functions 0 does not correspond to any of the aspectual categories, but is included as a 
subclass of E since E contains all possible functions from Wxl to (0,1, u). 
6 The Semantics of the Aspectual Operators 
6.1 CP 
Given the above model structure, how is one to interpret the classification of aspect? Our 
objective is to substantiate from a formal perspective the suggestions made in section 3 concerning 
the semantic interpretation of aspectual taxonomy. Consider once again sentence (2). 
(2) Max ran in four minutes (this morning) 
The suggestion we made in section 3 is that "Max ran" as it appears in (2) is a culminated process, 
which is to be defined in terms of the process sense of "Max ran" plus some culmination deter- 
mined by extra-linguistic context. To capture this in the formalism, we proposed that the analysis 
of (2) has embedded in it the sentence (4) that denotes the culminated process sense of "Max 
run"43. 
(4) CPý(run(max)) 
CP, is an operator modulo e where the proposition gc(e) will be the culmination determined by the 
context c, and run(max) is the representation of the process sense of "Max run". The semantic 
value of (4) will be a proposition in Mo (and therefore it will be a proposition of the right sort 
since culminated process sentences must denote propositions in Mo). 
The puzzle is that since we wish gc(e) to be the culmination of the process of Max running, it 
cannot be chosen in an ad hoc manner. We must somehow restrict our choice of gC(e) to proposi- 
tions of the appropriate sort. gc(e) cannot, for example, be the proposition that Max has slept for a 
week, because, as outlined by Moens, the process of Max running and its culmination must be 
43 The full analysis of sentence (2), that incorporates the representation of the adverbial "in four minutes", will be given in the next chapter. 
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`causally' related. 
That is, the culmination gc(e) must have been the result of the process of Max's running that was 
going on before it. In other words, whenever gc(e) is true, the process of Max's running, i. e. 
run(max), must have been true just before. 
This sheds some light on the relationship in IQ that we require between the proposition go(e) 
and the process proposition denoted by run(max) in our truth conditions for (4). Suppose we define 
a relation Rl as below: 
Relation R 
The process pr stands in relation RI to the moment-structure mop if for all indices 
(w , i')e WxI, if mo(w , i') =1 then there is some interval 
j' such that i' is the final bound 
of j' and pr(w', j) = 1. (So whenever mo is true, the process pr goes on just before). 
Then in the semantics of (4), we require the process denoted by run(max) to stand in the relation RI 
to the moment-structure gc(e). i. e. for any world w and moment m, if gc(e) is true at (w, m), then 
there must be some interval i of which m is the final bound and the process run(max) is true at 
(w, i) (so whenever go(e) is true, the process goes on at some interval just before). Note that Rl 
expresses a necessary relation, for it must hold for every world-time index. 
If the semantics of (4) invokes this relation between gc(e) and run(max) then our choice of 
go(e) is essentially restricted in the way we want. In a model M that reflects the intuition that there 
is no relation between Max's running and his sleeping, we cannot pick gc(e) as Max has slept for a 
week. This is because in the model M the process denoted by run(max) will not stand in the rela- 
tion Rt to the proposition that Max has slept for a week for there is some index (w', i) such that 
Max has slept for a week is true in M at (w', i) but run(max) is false in M at (w', j' for all the inter- 
vals j' whose final bound is i. 
This relation Rt between the process proposition and the proposition go(e) is captured in the 
following truth definition of CPe(A) for the sentence A: 
CPC(A) is true in a model M at (w, i) if 
(a) the proposition denoted by A, (which is referred to as [A]`M, g>) is a 
member of Pr, and g (e) is a member of Mo, and 
(b) for every possi61e world w' and for every interval of time i', if 
g (e)(w', i) =< then there is an interval j' such that i' is the final bound 
of j' and [A] . >(w'j) = 1, and 
(c) g (e)(w, i) =1 (so by condition (b) there is an interval j such that i is 
the final bound of j and A is true at (w j); 
it is false if any of conditions (a), (b) or (c) do not hold; 
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and otherwise it is undefined. 
"CPS" is an operator modulo e: it is multiply ambiguous because of the different possible values 
assigned to e. 
Let us discuss the semantic roles of conditions (a), (b) and (c) in the above definition of 
CPC(A). Condition (a) restricts the sort of propositions that A and e can denote. Sentence A must 
denote a process and ge(e) must be a member of the set Mo of moment-structures. Thus CP (A) is 
about a process (i. e. A) and a moment-structure (i. e. gc(e)), which is as required. 
Furthermore, by condition (c) any proposition denoted by the formula CPe(A) must be a 
member of Mo, for CPe(A) is true at the index (w, i) only if, among other things, gC(e)(w, i) = 1. 
But gc(e)e Mo, and so i must be a moment. Hence CPC(A) can be true at (w, i) only if i is a 
moment, and so the proposition denoted by CP(A) is a member of Mo. Hence the proposition 
denoted by CP(A) is of the right sort (because, as we argued, culminated process sentences must 
denote propositions that are true only at moments). 
But what is the relation between the process proposition denoted by A and the moment- 
structure go(e) defined by the conditions (b) and (c)? Condition (b) corresponds to the relation Rt 
that we defined above: it expresses a necessary relation between go(e) and A, for it is a relation that 
must be true of every possible world and every interval of time. It expresses the condition that for 
any index (w', i'), if gc(e)(w', i') =1 then [A]`M'P(w j) =1 for some interval j' of which i' is the 
final bound (so the truth of go(e) must always be immediately preceded by the truth of the process 
A at some interval). The result of this condition is essentially to restrict our possible choices for 
the proposition gc(e). For example in the case of (4), if the model M reflects the intuition that there 
is no relation between Max's running and his sleeping, then the proposition gc(e) cannot be that 
Max has slept for a week because as we explained before, this will not satisfy condition (b). The 
relation between g, (e) and A expressed in condition (b) captures the intuition that gc(e) is some 
appropriate culmination to A, for there is some necessary (and in fact, 'causal', ) relation between 
them. Hence CP (A) is about the process denoted by A and the culmination to the process denoted 
by A which is determined by extra-linguistic context (i. e. gc(e)): this is just as we require. 
According to condition (c), CP (A) is true at (w, i) only if gc(e)(w, i) = 1, and by the require- 
ments of condition (b), this entails that there is some interval j such that i is the final bound of j 
and A is true at (w j). So CP (A) is true at (w, i) only if the process A leads to ge(e) at (w, i). i. e. 




Let us now unravel the truth conditions of sentence (2). The analysis of (2) has embedded in 
it the formula (4) (the full analysis of (2) that incorporates the representation of "in four minutes" 
will be given in the next chapter). 
(4) CPe(nm(max)) 
To interpret (4), one must find a suitable value for go(e). Suppose that sentence (2) is uttered as 
part of the discourse (5). 
(5) (a) Max runs a mile every morning 
(b) Max ran in four minutes (this morning) 
Then given the context, a suitable candidate for go(e) is the proposition that Max completes the run- 
ning of one mile44. The truth conditions of (4) are then just as required. Certainly condition (a) is 
satisfied, because run(max) denotes a proposition from Pr, and ge(e) is a proposition from Mo. 
Condition (b) is also satisfied; in order to reflect the intuition that for Max to 'complete running one 
mile he must have been running just beforehand, the model M must be such that if gC(e)(w', i') = 1. 
then [run(max)]`M, g'(w', j) =1 for some interval j' whose final bound is i. Furthermore by condi- 
don (c), the truth of (4) at the index (w. i) requires that gc(e)(w, i) = 1, and so by condition (b), 
run(max) is true at (w, j) for some interval j whose final bound is i. This can be represented pictori- 
ally as bclow: 
run(max) 
CPc(run(max)) 
44 How this reference for g (e) is achieved is not a matter we shall consider here. However, note that the proposition 
ge(e) will be referred to in the object language by a sentence that has a logical form distinct from (4). If gC(e) is the proposi- 
tion that Max completes the running of one mile, then we will assume that g (e) is referred to in the object language by the 
sentence [DISTANCE-of-one-mile(run)](max), where DISTANCEof-one-mile is a function symbol that modifies predicates. We will not consider here how DISTANCE-of-one-mile would be defined. 
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The sentence (4) refers to a proposition from Mo, but its interpretation also offers information about 
what goes on just before it is true. The information is that the process sentence run(max) is true 
just beforehand. 
6.2 PR 
Moens categorises the sentence "Max built a house" as a culminated process, for we naturally 
interpret it as denoting a process that leads to a culmination. To reflect this in IQ, the formula 
build(max, house) will refer to a proposition from Mo and therefore it will be true only at moments 
- one can think of the moment at which build(max, house) is true as the time when the house is 
completed - so the logical form of "Max built a house" will be PAST(V, t)(build(maxhouse)). 
Moens argues for the intuition that the progressive aspect qualifies only process propositions. 
For example from an intuitive point of view, (6) asserts that the process of building a house is 
going on, without asserting that the culmination point occurs. I 
(6) Max was building a house 
We will reflect this in our theory by viewing sentence (6) as talking about the process sense of 
"Max build a house". 
Our aim is to define the process sense of "Max build a house" in terms of the culminated pro- 
cess sense of "Max build a house" which is represented in the theory by the formula 
build(max, house). This formula refers to a proposition that is true only at moments. The puzzle is 
to relate the extended intervals at which the process sense of "Max build a house" is true to the 
moments at which the culminated process build(max, house) is true. 
We described in the previous section the relation that must hold between a culminated pro- 
cess and its corresponding process, and that relation is stated in Rt. That is, the process pr of Max 
building a house must stand in the relation Rt to the proposition denoted by build(max, house) so 
that, as we explained in the previous section, our theory will reflect the intuition that the completion 
of the house was the result of some building process that was going on before. 
But the relation Rl will not uniquely specify the proposition pr that is the process of building 
a house. There are many distinct propositions in Pr that will satisfy the relation Rt to the proposi- 
tion mo denoted by build(max, house). This is because Rl does not stipulate how far the process 
extends back from the time when the house is completed, nor does it specify at the indices where 
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mo is false whether the process pr is true. For example, suppose that we define the process pre Pr 
so that if mo(w', i) = 1, then pr(w'sj) =1 on the interval j' whose final bound is i' where j' is two 
years in length. Then pr stands in the relation Rl to mo. We may also define pr'ePr so that if 
mo(w', i) = 1, then pr'(w, k) =1 on the interval k' whose final bound is i' where k' is three years in 
length. Then pr' also stands in the relation Rt to mo, but pr' is distinct from pr. 
So which is the process of Max building a house? We will propose that the process (6) refers 
to is not uniquely specified independently of its context of utterance. Extra-linguistic context will 
determine the process that (6) refers to, but the semantics for (6) will be such that the possible 
choice for this process is subject to the restriction that it must satisfy the necessary relation Rt to 
the function mo that is denoted by build(max, house). Since context determines the suitable process 
of Max building a house, I will represent the process sense of "Max build the house" so that it 
refers deictically to the process proposition. Hence, we intend to define the process sense of "Max 
build a house" in terms of the culminated process sense of "Max build a house" (i. e. the formula 
build(max, house)), and this definition must also invoke deictic reference to a process proposition. 
So the process sense of "Max build a house" will be represented by the formula 
PRR(build(max, house)) ("PR" is to be glossed as a process), where the value assigned to go(e) will 
be the suitable process of building a house that is determined by extra-linguistic context, and the 
truth conditions of PR. (build(max, house)) will be defined so that whatever the value of go(e), it 
must satisfy the necessary relation Rt with the proposition mo that is denoted by build(max, house). 
Since gc(e) must satisfy the necessary relation Rt with the proposition mo denoted by 
build(max, house), g. will never determine the process e refers to as the process "John swim", for 
example, as long as the model reflects the intuition that there is no necessary relation between John 
swimming and Max building a house. But g. will determine whether or not the process of Max 
spending money on building materials is the process referred to by e. In the context where Max is 
spending money on house-building materials with every intention of building a house, (6) will be 
true, and Max spending money on house-building materials will be the process referred to by e. 
But in the context where Max is spending money on house-building materials with no intention of 
building a house, (6) will be false, and Max spending money on house-building materials will not 
be the process referred to by e. 
PRA is defined as follows: 
PR, (A) is true in a model M at (w, i) if 
(a) the proposition denoted by A (which we refer to as [A]`Ml5>) is a 
member of Mo, and gC(e) is a member of Pr, and 
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(b) for all indices (w', i')E WxI, if [A]`M5>(w', i) =1 then there in an in- 
terval j' whose final bound is i and gý(e)(w', j) = 1, and 
(c) gC(e)(w. i) = 1; 
it is false if either conditions (a), (b) or (c) do not hold; 
and otherwise it is undefined. 
Let us discuss the semantic roles of the conditions (a), (b) and (c) in the above definition. 
Condition (a) ensures that PRe(A) is false when the proposition denoted by A is not a member of 
Mo or the proposition gc(e) is not a member of Pr, because condition (a) must be satisfied if PRe(A) 
returns the value "true". Hence the operator PR e operates 
on a moment-structure sentence, and it 
also invokes reference to a process whose value is determined by context, which is as required. 
Condition (b) states that the process gc(e) and the moment structure denoted by A are related 
by the necessary relation Rt. For any index (w', i'), if A is true at (w , i'), then gc(e) must be true at 
some interval just beforehand. The result of condition (b) is effectively to restrict our possible 
choices for go(e). It captures the intuition that the truth of A must be the result of the process gc(e) 
that was going on just beforehand. 
According to condition (c), PR, (A) is true at (w, i) only if gC(e)(w, i) = 1. It is important to 
note that PR, (A) is defined in terms of, among other things, the sentence A, but the truth of PR (A) 
at (wj) does not entail the truth of A at any time. This reflects the intuition that the process sense 
of A may go on without the `conclusion' ever being reached. Our ability to formulate this intuition 
in IQ will prove important when it comes to solving the imperfective paradox in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, by conditions (a), (b) and (c), we can show that the sentence PRC(A) denotes a 
proposition from Pr. For suppose that PR. (A) is true at the index (w, i). Then by condition (a) 
g, (e)E Pr and by condition (c) g, (e) is true at (w, i). So by the properties of propositions in Pr, 
either i is a non-minimal closed interval, or i is contained in a non-minimal closed interval j such 
that go(e) is true at (wj). But given that PRC(A) is true at (w, i), conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied 
for the evaluation of PRe(A) at (w j) (because these conditions are independent of the index of 
evaluation), so if ge(e) is true at (wj), then by condition (c) so is PRe(A). Hence if PRC(A) is true 
at (w, i) then either i is a non-minimal closed interval or i is contained in a non-minimal closed 
interval j such that PR, (A) is true at (w, j). Hence the proposition denoted by PR, (A) satisfies the 
condition on the set Pr of processes, and so it must be a process. This is just as required: we want 
PR(A) to denote a process since it represents the process sense of the sentence A. 
Let us go back to sentence (6). 
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(6) Max was building a house 
The analysis of (6) will have embedded in it the sentence (7) (the full analysis of (6) that incor- 
porates the representation of the progressive will be given in the next chapter). 
(7) PRVbuild(max, house)) 
The value of e relative to a context, i. e. go(e), is some proposition that is picked out deictically45 
The choice of go(e) - e. g. whether it is the process pr corresponding to Max preparing to build the 
house as well as building it, or the process pr' corresponding only to the action of building - deter- 
mines which process is said to be in progress when we utter (6). Note that sentence (7) is true at 
(w, i) only if gc(e) is true at (w, i), but it does not assert that build(max, house) is ever true. 
6.3 INC I 
We will now introduce an aspectual operator INC that operates on processes to identify the 
moments at which the process starts. The introduction of this operator will be motivated by the 
analysis of sentence (8). 
(8) Max ran at 3pm 
The point adverbial "At 3pm" is currently represented in IQ as a sentential operator whose 
definition is as follows: 
AT3pm(A) is true at (w, i) if and only if A is true at (w, i) and i is 3pm; it is false if either 
A is false at (w, i) or i is not 3pm, and otherwise it is undefined. 
This raises a puzzle concerning sentence (8). The natural interpretation of (8) is an inchoative one; 
(8) is true only if 3pm is the time at which Max starts to run. Assuming the logical form of (8) is 
(8a), the above truth conditions for "AT3pm" do not capture (8)'s inchoative interpretation. 
(8a) PAST(v, 
t)[AT3pm(run(max))] 
(8a) may be true if Max starts to run at 2pm rather than 3pm. To see this, suppose that run(max) is 
true on the interval of time stretching from 2pm to 4pm (i. e. the interval (2pm, 4pm)); this indicates 
45 How this inference is achieved is not a matter we shall discuss here. 
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that Max started to run at 2pm and finished at 4pm. 3pm is contained in the interval (2pm, 4pm), 
and so by homogeneity, run(max) is true at 3pm. So by the above truth conditions for "AT3pm", 
AT3pm(run(max)) is true at 3pm, and so by the truth conditions of PAST , (8a) is true at some 
index (w, i) such that 3pm is earlier than i. Hence (8a), which represents (8), is true even though 
Max started to run at 2pm, contrary to intuitions. 
To overcome this problem, one might revise the definition of AT3pm(A) so that 3pm 
identifies the initial bound of the interval at which A is true. That is, AT3pm may be defined as 
follows: 
AT3pm(A) is true at (w, i) if 3pm is the initial bound of i and A is true at (w, i) and for 
every interval j such that i is strictly contained in j. A is false at (w j); it is false if 3pm is 
, not the initial bound of i or A is false at (w, i) or there exists an interval j such that i is 
strictly contained in j, and A is true at (wj); and otherwise it is undefined. 
This new definition for AT3pm(A) now identifies 3pm as the initial bound of an interval i at which 
A is true such that if j contains i then A is false at j, and hence 3pm is the time at which A starts 
to be true. This temporal structure can be pictorially represented as follows: 
A 
3pm 
Hence the formula (8a) is now true only if 3pm is the time at which Max starts to run, and hence 
the new definition for AT3pm allows the formula (8a) to capture (8)'s inchoative interpretation. 
However, the new definition of AT3pm does not capture the natural reading of the Stative 
sentence (9). 
(9) Max was asleep at 3pm 
The representation of (9) is (9a), and by our revised definition of AT3pm, (9a) entails that Max 
starts to sleep at 3pm. 
(9a) PAST(,, 
t)(AT3pm(asleep(max))] 
Clearly, this is not the natural interpretation of (9), for (9) may be true when Max starts to sleep 
before 3pm (but is still sleeping at 3pm). 
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For this reason, we propose an alternative way to account for (8)'s inchoative interpretation, 
which involves barring (8a) as the representation of (8) and proposing a different representation. 
We do this by re-defining the definition of "At 3pm"; we add to Richards' original analysis 
of "At 3pm" the condition that AT3pm(A) can be true only if A denotes a proposition from Mo or 
S. So AT3pm is now defined as follows: 
AT3pm(A) is true in a model M at (w, i) if `M'g'eMo or [A]`M. 5>ES and A isjue at 
(w, i) and i is 3pm; it is false if either [A]141 > is not a member of Mo and QA] 'g' is 
not a member of S, or A is false at (w, i) or i is not 3pm; and otherwise it is undefined. 
This will allow (9a) to represent the natural interpretation of (9) (the proof of this is postponed until 
later), but it will bar (8a) as a representation of (8), because now (8a) will always be false (since 
run(max) denotes a process). 
We now have the task of proposing another representation of (8a). In order to represent (8) 
with our new definition of AT3pm, we will introduce an operator "INC" (glossed as "inchoative") 
that works on the process run(max) to identify the time at which the process starts. INC(run(max)) 
will denote a proposition from Mo (and so AT3pm(INC(run(max))) can be true) and INC(run(max)) 
will be true at (w, i) only if i is the initial bound of an interval j such that run(max) is true at (wj) 
and if k contains j then run(max) is false at (w, k). Thus the formula INC(run(max)) will be true 
only at the initial bounds of the largest connected intervals at which run(max) is true, and hence it 
will be true at (w, i) only if Max starts to run at (w, i). So INC(run(max)) will denote the inchoative 
sense of "Max ran" as it appears in sentence (8) and this formula will be embedded in our analysis 
of (8); in fact, our new representation of (8) will be (8b). 
(8b) PAST(v, 
t)[AT3pm(INC(run(max)))] 
We will define INC as follows: 
INC(A) is true in a model M at (w, i) if [A]`Ms'e Pr and there is an interval j such that A 
is true at (w, j) and i is the initial b nd of j, and for any k such that j is contained in k, A is false at (wk); it is false if [A]` 5> is not in Pr or there is no interval j such that A is 
true at (w j) and i is the initial bound of j, or there is an interval k such that j is contained 
in k and A is true at (wk); and otherwise it is undefined. 
Any sentence INC(A) is true only if A denotes a process. INC(A) refers to a proposition from Mo 
(because the initial bounds of intervals are moments), and it is true at those moments at which the 
process A starts, since it is true at the initial bounds of the largest connected intervals at which A is 
true. This temporal structure can be pictorially represented as below: 
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1N C(A) 
The representation of (8) is now (8b) (it cannot be (8a) because (8a) is now always false), and 
by the above definitions of AT3pm and INC, (8b) captures the natural interpretation of (8): 3pm 




Note that INC(aslcep(max)) is false because asleep(max) denotes a state, and so (9) has a 
very different logical form to (8). In fact, we will preserve the logical form of (9) as (9a). But we 
will postpone until the next chapter the proof that the above definition of AT3pm can also capture 
the natural reading of (9) in the formula (9a), for we are concerned here only with defining the 
aspectual operators CPS, PR,, INC etc. in our interpretation of the classification of aspect. 
It is important to note that the operators INC and CP both define mappings from the set Pr to e 
the set Mo, but they are distinct, for in general the proposition referred to by INC(run(max)) is 
different from the proposition referred to by CPP(run(max)). 
6.4 START 
There is a natural reading of sentence (10) in which Max starts to run to the station at 3pm. 
and this process eventually culminates; i. e. Max eventually reaches the station. 
(10) Max ran to the station at 3pm 
This raises a puzzle. Since we intuitively regard (10) to be about a culminated process (since (10) 
entails the culmination), the representation of (10) must invoke the representation of the culminated 
process "Max run to the station". Suppose that, in agreement with Thomason and Stalnaker (1973), 
we represent the adverbial "To the station" as a modifier on predicates, and suppose that the for- 
mula [TOstation(run)](max) represents the culminated process sentence "Max run to the station". 
So this formula denotes a proposition from Mo such that if it is true at the moment m, then the 
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`conclusion' of the culminated process (i. e. Max reaches the station) is true at mom. Then since (10) 
intuitively entails the `conclusion', the formula [TOstation(run)](max) must be part of the represen- 
tation of (10). 
Suppose that "AT3pm" is as we defined it above, and the representation of (10) is (10a). 
(10a) PAST(vý)[AT3pm([TOstation(run)] (max)])] 
Then by the above definition of AT3pm, (10a) asserts that 3pm is the time that Max reaches the 
station, contrary to (10)'s inchoative reading. The puzzle is: how can one represent (10) to account 
for its inchoative reading? 
The inchoative reading of (10) must be represented with the formula AT3pm(B) for some for- 
mula B, such that B is true at (w, i) only if Max starts the process of running to the station at (w, i), 
and the process must then culminate in Max reaching the station, i. e. B will entail that 
[TOstation(run)](max) is eventually true. For with this condition on the truth of B and the above 
definition of AT3pm, the formula AT3pm(B) will be true at (w, i) only if Max starts the process of 
running to the station at 3pm and this process will culminate, which is what we require. 
But as we have already argued, we cannot identify the process that leads to the culmination 
[TOstation(run)](max) independently of context (cf. section 6.2). In the example under considera- 
tion here, the suitable process may start when Max puts on his coat and hat, or when he opens the 
door to go out, and so on. To reflect this in the formalism, we will refer deictically to the process. 
So I will replace the formula B in the above representation of (10) with the formula 
STARTe([TOstation(run)](max)), where gC(e) will pick out the suitable process given the context of 
utterance of (10). STAR T([TOstation(run)](max)) will be defined so that it is true at (w, i) only if 
the process go(e) starts at (w. i), and this process will eventually `culminate'; i. e. 
[TOstation(run)](max) will eventually be true. 
The Operator START is like the operator INC in that it must identify the times at which a e 
process starts. However, START 
e 
is distinct from INC in two crucial respects: first, the parameter e 
that appears in START refers deictically to the process and there is no deictic reference to a pro- 
cess in the interpretation of INC (INC(A) simply characterises the start of the process A); and 
second, START, will assert that the process culminates, whereas INC does not. 
46 We will not speculate here on how the modifier TOstation is to be defined. 
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The operator START, is defined below: 
STARTý(A) is true in a model M at (w, i) if 
(a) QA]`M'9'E Mo and g (e)r= Pr, and 
(b) for all indices (w , iie WxI, if [A]`M'8'(w', i) =1 then gý(e)(w' j') _ 
1 for some interval j' such that i is its final bound, and 
(c) g (e)(wj) =I for some interval j such that i is the initial bound of j 
and there is no interval k such that k contains j and go(e) is true at (w, k), 
and 1 is the final bound of j and A is true at (w, 1); 
it is false if any of the conditions (a), (b) or (c) do not hold; 
and otherwise it is undefined. 
Condition (a) in the above definition ensures that STARTe(A) is true only if A refers to a pro- 
position from Mo and gC(e) is a process. So STARTC(A) is about a moment structure (i. e. A) and a 
process (i. e. gc(e)) that is determined by context, which is as required. As with the definitions of 
CP, and PR,, the semantic role of condition (b) is to restrict our choices of gc(e) to a process that is 
necessarily related to the moment structure denoted by A: if A is true then the process go(e) must 
have been true just beforehand. This is intended to reflect the intuition that the culmination of A 
was the result of the process gc(e). 
Condition (c) states that START (A) is true in the model M at (w, i) only if i is the initial 
bound of an interval j such that gc(e)(w, j) =1 and A is true at (w, I) where I is the final bound of j, 
and for all the intervals k that contain j, gc(e)(w, k) = 0. Thus START (A) is true at (w, i) only if i 
identifies the start of the process ge(e), which in turn culminates in A. This can be represented pic- 
torially as below: 
STARTT(A) A 
The representation of sentence (10) that captures the reading where Max starts to run to the station 




< Note that by condition (c) in the truth conditions of STARTB, the truth of 
START (A) at (w, i) 
entails that A is true at (w, l) for some interval 1 that is later than i. There are two important pro- 
perties of our theory that arise directly from this that are worth mentioning. First, any natural 
language culminated process sentence remains a culminated process sentence under adverbial 
modification with AT3pm, because (assuming that A represents a culminated process sentence) 
STARTý(A) entails A and so entails that the 'conclusion' associated with A occurs. Hence in our 
theory natural language expressions maintain their culminated process status under adverbial 
modification. Second, the truth conditions of STARTe have a suppressed future tense element to 
them, because START (A) entails that A is true at some time in the future. Hence a sentence like 
(11) may be true with respect to a model M, but when we utter (11) we will not know if what we 
uttered was true until a few days later when we see if the QE2 actually reaches America. 
(11) The QE2 sailed to America at 3pm today 
This is related to the long-standing philosophical debate that concerns the relationship between the 
truth of future tensed sentences like "It will rain tomorrow" and their assertability. 
A problem we now have given our proposed representation of (10) is to decide which expres- 
sions denoting members of Mo invoke the operator START when combining with point adverbials 
and which do not. For example, we have argued that (10b) is a possible representation of (10), but 
one would not wish (12b) to be possible representation of (12). 
(12) Max won the race at 3pm 
(12b) PAST(vt)[AT3pm(STAR T(win(max, race)))) 
There is only one natural interpretation of (12), and that is that the `conclusion' of winning the 
race, i. e. Max crosses the finish line in first place, occurs at 3pm. Given our definition of AT3pm, 
this reading is captured in the formula (12a) and not (12b), and so the only possible representation 
of (12) must be (12a). 
(12a) PAST(,, 
)[AT3pm(win(max, race))] 
The principle that decides whether we can have START e 
in the representation of the sentence con- 
taining a point adverbial seems to be based on whether the main verb is represented by a process 
47 The phenomenon of how culminated process expressions combine with point adverbials such as "At 3pm" is very 
puzzling. Some culminated processes seem not to combine with them at all, such as "? Max wrote a dissertation at 3pm". Our theory fails to say anything about these sentences. 
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predicate or a culmination predicate (a process (n-place) predicate p is one where for any terms 
x1,.., xn, p(xl,.., xddenotes a proposition from Pr, and a culmination (n-place) predicate p is one 
where for any terms xt,.., x, p(xt,.., x) denotes a proposition from Mo). In the case of (10), the 
main verb, i. e. run, is represented by a process predicate and the analysis of (10) can be given in 
terms of START. In the case of (12), the main verb, i. e. win, is represented by a culmination 
predicate and the analysis of (12) is not given in terms of START If we were to construct a 
grammar to accompany our semantic interpretation of the classification of aspect, this grammar 
would have to formulate this principle. 
There are other possible representations of (10) and (12) given the aspectual operators we 






Given the definitions of AT3pm, INC and PR e, 
(12c) is true only if 3pm is the time when Max 
starts the process of winning the race, and this process does not necessarily culminate; the interpre- 
tation of (10c) is similar. This clearly doesn't capture any natural interpretation of (10) or (12), and 
so (10c) and (12c) should be barred as possible representations. 
We will bar (10c) and (12c) as representations of (10) and (12) by proposing that the operator 
PR, can be used to represent a natural language expression only if that expression contains a verb 
in the progressive -ing form. In other words, if we were to construct a grammar to accompany our 
representation of natural language expressions, then when we construct the progressive -ing form of 
a culmination verb in the syntax, it is only then that we introduce the operator PR, in the 
corresponding semantics. As a result, the formula (13) cannot represent the clause "Max win the 
race", but it can (and will) represent the clause "Max winning the race. 48 
(13) PRR(win(maxrace)) 
So clauses like "Max win the race" and "Max build the house" are not ambiguous at all, as we sup- 
posed when we discussed sentences like "Max was winning the race" and "Max was building the 
house" (cf. section 6.2). Instead, "Max win the race" and "Max build the house" always denote an 
event that culminates and "Max winning the race" and "Max building the house" always denote a 
48 The rule for constructing the progressive -ing form of a process verb like "run" would not have any semantic effect though: Le. "Max run" and "Max running" are both represented by the formula run(max). 
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process49. As a result, the formula (12c) cannot represent (12), as desired. 
7 Our Approach Compared with Previous Interval-Based Approaches 
We have formulated the classification of aspect in an interval-based framework, so let us see 
how it compares with previous interval-based accounts. 
Dowry's interval based formulation of the classification of aspect adopts the Heterogeneous 
Strategy discussed in chapter 2. He characterises a heterogeneous semantics for accomplishments 
(i. e. culminated processes) such as "Max build a house" where this sentence may be true at an inter- 
val i and false at a subinterval j of i. We have argued that this approach is unworkable. 
Our interpretation of the classification of aspect takes on a wholly different approach to 
Dowty's. We do not adopt the Heterogeneous Strategy, for we do not give an analysis of the sen- 
tence "Max build a house" such that this sentence may be true at an interval i and false at some 
subinterval j of i. Indeed, such truth conditions for "Max build a house" would not even be expres- 
sible in the framework IQ because of the homogeneity principle (3), which entails that if 
build(max, house) is true at (w, i), then it is true at (w j) for all subintervals j of i. 
(3) An atomic sentence A is true at the index (w, i) only if for all subintervals j of i, A is true 
at (w j). 
IQ, unlike (Dowty 1979), is an interval semantics which maintains homogeneity for boolean combi- 
nations of atomic sentences. Thus one important original feature of our theory is that it is the first 
formulation of the classification of aspect to be stated in a homogeneous interval-based framework. 
We proposed that one can classify the sentence "Max ran" as a culminated process, and we 
represented the culminated process sense of "Max ran" by the formula CPe(run(max)). This formula 
received its semantic interpretation in virtue of context, because its truth depended on the value 
assigned to the parameter e by the function ge with respect to the context c. This is another origi- 
nal feature of our formulation of the classification of aspect: context is allowed to play a non-trivial 
role in the semantics of the classification of aspect. This allows us to account in our semantic 
theory for the fact that sentence (2) is acceptable in certain contexts but not in others. 
49 The progressive operator PROG will operate on the representation of the clause "Max winning the race" and not "Max win the race". and adding the progressive operator PROG to the formula (13) in the semantics will correspond in the 
syntax to adding the progressive auxiliary "be" to the clause "Max winning the race" to form "Max be winning the race". 
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(2) Max ran in four minutes (this morning) 
(2) is acceptable in our theory with respect to a context c if gc assigns the parameter ea value in 
the interpretation of CP (run(max)), and if gc does not assign the parameter ea value, then sentence 
(2) is unacceptable. Dowty's theory cannot account for this. 
8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have offered a formal interpretation of the taxonomy of aspect in the frame- 
work IQ. The theory offered a new approach to formalising the taxonomy of aspect because it con- 
tained essentially two original features; the theory is stated in a homogeneous interval-based frame- 
work, and context plays a central role in describing the semantics of the classification of aspect. 
Thus this formulation of the taxonomy of aspect provides an arena in which to tackle the imperfec- 
tive paradox anew. Can our theory yield a solution to the imperfective paradox, in a way that over- 
comes the problems encountered in previous attempts? This is explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
A Solution to the Imperfective Paradox 
1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to build on the classification of aspect described in the previ- 
ous chapter in an attempt to solve the imperfective paradox. We aim to give a principled solution, 
and to this end, the theory laid out in the previous chapter must not only lead to a solution to the 
imperfective paradox, but it must also account for other temporal phenomena. For example, it must 
fit together with a satisfactory analysis of point adverbials such as "At 3pm" as it appears in sen- 
tences (1) and (2). 
(1) Max ran at 3pm 
(2) Max won the race at 3pm 
Our definition of the progressive must also explain why sentence (3) does not entail (4). 
(3) Max was kissing every girl 
(4) Max was kissing Susan 
The object of this chapter is to provide definitions in IQ of the progressive aspect and various 
temporal adverbials that achieve these tasks. 
2 The Semantics of Temporal Adverbials in IQ 
2.1 "In"-Adverbials 
In the previous chapter we proposed that an "in"-adverbial such as "in four minutes" operates 
only on culminated process expressions to produce a culminated process expression. This reflects 
Moens' idea that an "in"-adverbial takes a culminated process as input and it outputs a culminated 
process. Consider sentence (5). 
is) Max built ahouse in two years 
Intuitively, (5) entails that the house was completed, and the "in"-adverbial "in two years" qualifies 
the length of time over which the process of building a house took place. But as we argued in the 
previous chapter, the process of Max building a house is not uniquely specified independently of 
context. For example, a suitable process may be Max preparing to build the house, finding the 
funds and so on, as well as doing the actual building. Alternatively the process may be just the 
action of building. Context determines which of these we are talking about when we utter (5), and 
so determines which process is said to be two years in length. 
I, To represent the fact that context determines which process the "in"-adverbial refers to, we 
may refer deictically to the process in the representation of "in"-adverbials. That is, one may 
represent the "in"-adverbial "in ten minutes" in IQ as an indexical operator of the form IN10mins., 
where the value of g. (e) in IN10mins(A) will be the suitable process associated with the cul- 
minated process A and the truth of IN10mins, (A) will require the process gc(e) to go on for ten 
minutes and then culminate in A. 
In addition, as we argued in the previous chapter, the possible choices for go(e) in the truth 
conditions of IN10mins, (A) must be restricted by the relation RI in that go(e) must stand in the 
relation Rl to the denotation of A: this captures the intuition that whenever the culminated process 
A is true, then gc(e) must have been true just before. The relation RI is repeated below. 
Relation R 
The procesls proposition pr stands in the relation R to the moment-structure proposition 
mo if for all (w', i')e Wxl, if mo(w, i) =1 then therA is some interval j' such that i' is the final bound of j' and pr(w', j) = 1. 
The truth of IN10minse(build(max, house)) will require gc(e) to stand in the relation Rt to the deno- 
tation of build(max, house), and the result is to effectively restrict our possible choices for gc(e). 
For example, gC(e) could not be the process "John swim" in a model M that captures the intuition 
that there is no necessary relation between John swimming and Max building a house. The adver- 
bial "in ten minutes" is defined as below so as to incorporate these ideas: 
IN10minse(A) is true in a model M at (w, i) if 
(a) the proposition denoted by A (which we refer to as [A]`Mg') is a 
member of Mo and g (e) is am ber of Pr, and 
(b) for all (w', i')E WXI, if [A]` 9'(w', i) =1 then there is an interval j' 
such that i' is the final bound of j' and g(e)(w' j') = 1, and 
(c) A is true at (w, i) and the largest interval j such that i is the final 
bound of j and gc(e)(w, j) =1 is ten minutes long; 
it is false if any of the conditions (a), (b) or (c) do not hold; 
and otherwise it is undefined. 
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Let u9 discuss the semantic roles of conditions (a), (h) and (c) in the above definition. First 
by condition (a), IN10mins, (A) is false where [AI'M'S' is not a member of Mo or gC(e) is not a 
member of Pr. The fact that the proposition denoted by A must be a member of Mo reflects the 
intuition that the "in"-adverbial qualifies only culminated process expressions (since these expres- 
sions all denote propositions from Mo). 
Condition (b) expresses the necessary relation Rt between the proposition denoted by A and 
the proposition ge(e). It essentially represents the idea that whenever A is true, then go(e) must 
have been true just beforehand, and so it captures the intuition that A is the result of the process 
ge(e). As we discussed in the previous chapter, this condition effectively restricts our possible 
choices for gC(c). For example, if A is build(max, house), then we know that ge(e) cannot be the 
process denoted by "John swim" if the model M captures the intuition that there is no relation 
between John swimming and Max building a house. 
By condition (c), IN10mins, (A) is true at (w, i) only if A is true at (w, i). But by condition (a) 
we know that A denotes a proposition from Mo, so i must be a moment. Hence IN10mins(A) is 
true at (w, i) only if i is a moment, and so it denotes a proposition from Mo. The fact that 
IN10minse(A) denotes a proposition from Mo reflects the intuition that expressions containing the 
adverbial "in ten minutes" are culminated processes. 
Furthermore according to condition (c), IN10mins 
C 
(A) is true at (w, i) if A is true at (w, i) and 
in addition the largest connected interval j such that i is the final bound of j and go(e) is true at j 
(we know such an interval exists by condition (b)) is ten minutes long. This produces the following 
temporal structure: 





Note that since condition (c) stipulates that the ten minute long interval j must be the largest 
interval at which gc(e) is true, our truth conditions for IN10minse produces an interpretation of 
"Max won the race in ten minutes" that is synonymous with "It took (exactly) ten minutes for Max 
to win the race". The reading of "Max won the race in ten minutes" that corresponds to "Max won 
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the race in less than ten minutes" would be represented using a different operator to IN10minsc . 
Let us examine a particular example. Consider sentence (5). 
(5) Max built a house in two years 




go(e) corresponds to the contextually determined process of Max building a house. Let us evaluate 
the truth conditions of (5a). (5a) is true in a model M at (w, i) if gc(v) = w, gc(t) =i and there is an 
interval j earlier than i such that (5a1) is true at (w j). 
(5a1) IN2yearse(build(max, house)) 
This is the case if and only if (a) [build(max, house)]<M'g>E Mo and gC(e)E Pr and (b) for all indices 
(w', i)E Wxl, if build(max, house) is true at (w', i) then gc(e)(w' j) =1 for some interval j' whose 
final bound is i, and (c) build(max, house) is true at (w j) and the largest interval k such that j is the 
final bound of k and gc(e)(w, k) =1 is two years long. The truth of (5a) thus requires the following 
temporal structure, as desired. 





IN2ycarse(build (max, housc)) 
Under very special circumstances, "in"-adverbials such as "in four minutes" may combine fel- 
icitously with the expression "Max ran". Consider sentence (6) in the context where Max runs a 
mile every morning. 
50 The definition of the past tense operator PAST (". u was given 
in chapter 6. 
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(6) Max ran in four minutes 





Note that we have two distinct parameters e and e'. gc(e') will be the culmination to run(max) 
given by the context c. In this particular context, gc(e) must be the proposition that Max completes 
running a mile. gC(e) will be the process that leads to the culmination denoted by C P, (run(max)); 
i. e. gc(e) will be the proposition denoted by run(max). How e and e' achieve these denotations is 
not a matter we will consider here. 
Let us examine the truth conditions of (6a) with these assignments to e and e'. (6a) is true at 
(w, i) if and only if gC(v) =w and gC(t) = i, and there exists an interval j such that j is earlier than i 
and (6al) is true at (wj). 
(6a1) IN4minse[CP'(ran(max))] 
This is the case if and only if (a) CPý, (run(max)) denotes a proposition from Mo and go(e) (i. e. the 
proposition denoted by run(max)) is a proposition from Pr, and (b) for every index (w', i')e WxI, if 
CPe (run(max)) is true at (w', i) then run(max) is true at (w j) for some interval j' whose final 
bound is i', and (c) CP , (run(max)) is true at (w, j) and the 
largest interval k such that j is the final 
bound of k and run(max) is true at (wk) is four minutes long. Condition (a) is satisfied since as we 
observed in the previous chapter, CP,, (run(max)) denotes a proposition from Mo and run(max) 
denotes a proposition from Pr. Furthermore condition (b) is satisfied directly as a result of the con- 
dition (b) in the truth definition of CP , (run(max)) given 
in the previous chapter (we will not go into 
the proof here). So one can see from these truth conditions that the truth of (6a) requires the fol- 
lowing temporal structure, as desired 
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II 
k is four minutcs long 
run(max) 
E-- k 
IN4mins, CJP,, (run(max)) 
2.2 Point Adverbials 
The definition of the point adverbial "At 3pm" must capture the contrast between the 
inchoative interpretation of sentence (1), where Max starts to run at 3pm, and the natural interpreta- 
tion of (2), where Max actually wins at 3pm rather than starts to win. 
(1) Max ran at 3pm 
(2) Max won the race at 3pm 
The definition for "At 3pm" should also allow sentence (7) to be true if Max starts to sleep before 
3pm (and is still sleeping at 3pm). 
(7) Max was asleep at 3pm 
I suggest that the following truth definition of "At 3pm", which was first introduced in the previous 
chapter, captures these properties. 
AT3pm(A) is true at (w, i) if (a) [A]<M'g> Mo or [A] <Mg> S and (b) A is true at (w, i) 
and i is 3pm; it is false if either condition (a) or condition (b) does not hold; and other- 
wise it is undefined. 
Let us investigate the analyses of sentences (1), (2) and (7) above. The representation of (1) 
cannot be (la) because run(max) denotes a process and so by condition (a) of the definition of 
AT3pm. AT3pm(run(max)) is always false. 
(la) PAST(vet)[AT3pm(run(max))] 
As argued in the previous chapter, we will analyse (1) in terms of the inchoative sense of "Max 
run", which in our theory is represented by INC(run(max)) (the operator INC was defined in the 




(lb) is true in a model M at (w, i) just in case g, (v) = w, g, (t) = i, and there exists an interval j ear- 
lier than i such that (lbl) is true at (w j). 
(Ibl) AT3pm[INC(run(max))] 
This is the case if and only if j is 3pm and (1b2) is true at (w j). 
(1b2) INC(run(max)) 
This is the case if and only if [run(max)] <MpE Pr, and there is an interval k such that run(max) is 
true at k and j is the initial bound of k and for any interval I such that k is contained in 1, run(max) 
is false at 1. Hence the truth of (1) requires the following temporal structure where Max starts to 
run at 3pm, which is just what is required to capture its inchoative interpretation. 
--ý run(max) 
3pm 
The logical form of (2) is (2a). 
(2) Max won the race at 3pm 
(2a) PAST 
(v, t)(AT3pm(win(max, race))] 
(2a) is true at (w, i) if and only if gc(v) = w, ge(t) = i, and there exists an interval j earlier than i 
such that (2a1) is true at (wj'). 
(2a1) AT3pm(win(max, racc)) 
This is the case if and only if j is 3pm and win(max, race) is true at (w, j). The moment at which 
win(max, race) is true is understood as the time at which the `conclusion' to winning, i. e. Max 
crossing the finish line, occurs. So according to the truth conditions of (2a), 3pm coincides with the 
time that Max crosses the finishing line. This agrees with the natural interpretation of (2). 
The truth conditions of sentences (1) and (2) substantiate the claim that the above definition 
of point adverbials captures the natural interpretations of (1) and (2). Thus this theory overcomes 
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the problems encountered in Dowty's (1979) heterogeneous interval-based theory and Parsons' 
(1984) event-based theory (cf. chapters 2 and 4). 
Now let us consider the semantics of sentence (7). The logical form of (7) is (7a). 
(7) Max was asleep at 3pm 
(7a) PAST 
(VIO[AT3pm(aslcep(max)))j 
(7a) is true at (w, i) if ge(e) =w and ge(t) =i and there is an interval j earlier than i such that 
AT3pm(aslecp(max)) is true at (w, j); if and only if the proposition denoted by aslccp(max) is a 
member of Mo or S (it is, in fact, a member of S), and asleep(max) is true at (wj) and j is 3pm. 
Since the proposition denoted by asleep(max) is a member of S it must satisfy the condition 
(stated in chapter 6) that if it is true on a closed interval, then there is an open interval at which it 
is true. Since j is 3pm (and so j is a moment), j is contained in an open interval k such that 
asleep(max) is true at (w, k). So (since k is open) there must be some interval 1 such that 1 is con- 
tained in k and 1 is earlier than j. By the homogeneity principle maintained by the framework of 
IQ, asleep(max) is true at 1 where 1 is earlier than j. So if the logical form of (7) is (7a), then (7) 
entails that Max was asleep before 3pm, i. e. the temporal structure is as below. 
E- aslccp(max) ---> 
3pm 
This may seem puzzling, since it is not clear that (7) should entail that Max was asleep 
before 3pm, cf, sentence (8). 
(8) At 3pm, Max was suddenly asleep 
I would propose that "Max was suddenly asleep" does not refer to a state, but instead refers to a 
culmination, where the `conclusion' of the culmination is that Max falls asleep. Under this 
classification, one would be able to get the right representation of (8). (I will not consider here the 
semantics of "suddenly" or how such an analysis of "Max was suddenly asleep" would be achieved 
however). 
It has been observed that some expressions that denote propositions from Mo can be inter- 
preted inchoatively with point adverbials such as "At 3pm". Sentence (9) is an example of this. 
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(9) Max ran to the station at 3pm 
t. 
(9) can be interpreted to mean that Max starts to run to the station at 3pm, rather than reaches the 
station at 3pm (although I do assume that (9) entails that Max reaches the station at some time). 
This is compatible with the general strategy presented here. As I argued in the previous chapter, 





(9a) identifies 3pm as the time when the process of Max running to the station starts, and this pro- 
cess eventually culminates. Thus (9a) accounts for the inchoative reading of (9)5t. 
In this section, I have suggested the truth definitions of various temporal modifiers. These 
truth definitions build on the taxonomy of aspect in IQ that was presented in the previous chapter. I 
claim from this that were the imperfective paradox to be solved in this theory, then this solution 
would fit together with explanations of other temporal phenomena, and so what we would have is a 
principled solution to the imperfective paradox. In the subsequent sections, I will present this solu- 
tion. 
3 The Progressive and the Imperfective Paradox 
A satisfactory solution to the imperfective paradox must explain the entailment from sentence 
(10) to (11), and at the same time explain why there is no entailment from (12) to (13). 
(10) Max was running 
(11) Max ran 
(12) Max was winning the race 
(13) Max won the race 
One would also like an explanation of the entailments from (11) to (10), and (13) to (12). This sec- 
tion is concerned with providing an analysis of the progressive that accounts for these intuitions. 
Solving the problem of the imperfective paradox consists of two tasks. The first is to 
represent a semantic distinction between sentences (11) and (13). The second is to provide a 
51 We suggested in the previous chapter that although (9a) is one possible representation of (9), we will not allow PAST(,. 
U[At3pm[STAR , (win(maa, race))]] to be a representation of (2). 
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definition of the progressive that is sensitive to this distinction and thereby results in a solution to 
the imperfective paradox. I dealt with the first of these tasks in the previous chapter by formulating 
a classification of aspect in the framework of IQ. This chapter will deal with the second; i. e. we 
will now define the progressive. 
We will represent the progressive as an operator PROG, that will operate on the process sen- 
tence A, so that PROG(A) denotes a state which describes the process A as being in progress. That 
is, PROG(A) will assert that the process A began at some earlier time and has not yet stopped. 
This reflects Moens' idea that the progressive requires a process as input and it outputs a state 
which describes the process as being in progress. The truth definition of PROG is given below: 
PROG(A) is true in a model M at (w, i) if and only if [Aj<mIs>EPr and there exists a 
closed interval j suc that i is a proper subinterval of j and A is true at (w j); it is false at 
(w, i) if either [A] 19> is not a member of Pr, or there is no closed interval j such that i 
is a proper subinterval of j and A is true at (wj); and otherwise it is undefined 
The sentence PROG(A) is false where A does not denote a process proposition. Furthermore. 
the sentence PROG(A) must denote a state proposition, since the largest connected intervals at 
which PROG(A) is true are the open interiors of the largest connected intervals at which A is true, 
and so PROG(A) satisfies the condition on the members of S stipulated in the previous chapter. 
The truth of PROG(A) requires the following temporal structure, where curved brackets represent 
open intervals and square brackets represent closed intervals: 
(<-- PROG(A) -->) [<------ A ------ >] 
Since PROG(A) is true at the open interior of the interval where A is true, our definition of 
PROG(A) reflects the idea that it is true if the process A started at some earlier time and has not 
yet stopped. 
3.1 The Entailments from the Progressive to the Non-Progressive 
At first glance, the operator PROD does not seem to offer anything interesting towards a solu- 
tion to the imperfective paradox. However, the combination of the operators PROD and PR,, where 
PR, was defined in the previous chapter, provide us with the desired analysis of sentence (12); (12) 
does not entail (13). 
(12) Max was winning the race 
(13) Max won the race 
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{" The formula (14) is not a possible representation of (12) because the formula win(max, race) 
denotes a proposition from Mo and not a proposition from Pr, and so by the definition of PROG, 
(14) is always false. 
(14) PAST(v jPROG(win(max, race))] 
In fact, the only possible representation of (12) in our formalism is (12a), since PR C(win(max, race)) 
represents the process of Max winning the race. 
(12a) PAST(vA)[PROG[Plý(win(maxrace))] 
I will now show that our theory blocks the entailment from (12) to (13). I will do this by con- 
structing a model M such that (12a) is true in M at (w, i) and (13a), which is the logical form of 
(13), is false. 
(13a) PAST(v, 
t)(win(max, race)) 
Suppose that sentence (12a) is true in a model M at an index (w, i). This is the case if and 
only if gc(v) =w and gc(t) = i, and there exists an interval j<i such that (12a1) is true at (wJ). 
(12a1) PROG[PRR(win(max, race))] 
This is the case if and only if (12a2)ePr, and there exists a closed interval k such that j is a proper 
subinterval of k and (12a2) is true at (w, k). 
(12a2) PRR(win(maxrace)) 
This is the case if and only if (a) [win(max, race)] <M's>E Mo (which it does) and gc(e)e Pr and (b) 
for all indices (w', i)E WxI, if win(max, race) is true at (w', i'), then there is an interval j' such that i' 
is the final bound of j' and gc(e) is true at (w j') (this, as we have argued, restricts our possible 
choices for gc(e)), and (c) gc(e) is true at (w, k). 
Now the truth of go(e) in the model M at (wk) is consistent with the formula win(max, race) 
being false at all times in w. If win(max, race) is false at all times, then sentence (13a) is false in 
M at (w, i). 
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(13a) PAST(vý)(win(max, race)) 
But this is the logical form of (13). Hence (12) does not entail (13). 
t 
The semantics of PROG provides an explanation of the entailment from (10) to (11). 
(10) Max was running 
(11) Max ran 





We can show that the truth of (10a) in a model M at an index (wj) entails the truth of (Ila) at 
(w, i). For suppose that (10a) is true in a model M at (w, i). Then gc(v) = w, gc(t) = i, and 
I[PROG(run(max))] is true at an index (wj) where j<i; so [run(max)]`M'g'ePr (which it does), and 
there exists a closed interval k such that j is a proper subinterval of k and run(max) is true at (w, k). 
By the homogeneity principle satisfied by the framework IQ, if run(max) is true at (w, k), then it is 
also true at (wd) since j is a proper subinterval of k. But j<i and so (1 la) is true in the model M at 
(w, i). Hence (10) entails (11), as required. 
3.2 The Entailments from the Non-Progressive to the Progressive 
Let us investigate in this section the entailments from (11) to (10), and (13) to (12). First 
consider sentence (13), whose formal representation is (13a). 
(13) Max won the race 
(13a) PAST(vt)[win(max, race)] 
Suppose (13a) is true in the model M at (w, i). Then gC(v) = w, ge(t) =i and there is an interval j<i 
such that win(max, race) is true at (wj). Suppose that context provides a suitable process to 
win(max, race) at (w j), i. e. this process satisfies the relation RI with the denotation of 
win(max, race). Let g, (e) be this process in (12a), the logical form of (12). 




gc(e) is a suitable process to win(max Tace) at (wj), and so (by relation R1) since win(max, race) is 
true at (wj) there exists an interval k whose final bound is j such that go(e) is true at (w, k). Hence 
by the definition of PR,, PRe(win(max, race) is true at (w, k), and by the definition of PROG, (12a1) 
is true in w at the open interior of k. 
(12a1) PROG[Plý(win(max, race))] 
But since jai, k<i, and so the open interior of k is earlier than L Hence (12a) is true at (w, i). 
Hence (13) entails (12), modulo context providing a process for Max winning the race. 
Problems appear to arise when one investigates whether sentence (11) entails sentence (10). 
(11) Max ran 
(10) Max was running 
One can show that the current analysis does not account for a logical entailment from (11) to (10). 
I will show this by constructing a model M where (11) is true at an index (w, i) but (10) is false at 
(w, i). Let run(max) be true in the model M only at the index (w j) and at subintervals of j. Then 
let intG) be the open interior of j. Since run(max) denotes a proposition from Pr, j must be closed, 
and so the initial bound k of the interval j is not contained in into) and so k is earlier than int(j). 
Furthermore by homogeneity, run(max) is true at (wk) (since k is contained in j). Now let us 
evaluate the truth value of (11a), which is the representation of (11), at (w, int(j)).. 
(1 la) PAST()(run(max)) 
(1la) is true in the model M at (w, int(j)) if g. (v) =w and gc(t) = into) and there is an interval 1 ear- 
lier than into) such that run(max) is true at (w, 1). Assuming that g. (v) =w and ge(t) = into), (1la) 
is true at (w, int(j)) since k is earlier than into) and run(max) is true at (wk). 
However, we can show that (10a), the representation of (10) is false in the model M at 
(W. int(j))" 
(10a) PAST(vI)[PROG(run(max))] 
(10a) is true at (w, int(j)) if g, (v) =w and gC(t) = into) (these assignments hold by our assumption), 
and there is an interval 1 earlier than int(j) such that PROG(run(max)) is true at (w, l). We will now 
show that there is no such interval 1. Since run(max) is true in M only at (w j) and the subintervals 
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of j, by the definition of PROG, PROG(run(max)) is true in M only at (w, int(j)) (int(j) is the open 
interior of j) and subintervals of into). Hence there is no interval 1 earlier than into) such that 
PROG(run(max)) is true at (w, l) and so (10a) is false at (w, int j)). Thus we have constructed a 
model M where (1la) is true at (w, int(j)) and (10a) is false at (w; int(j)), and so there is no logical 
entailment from (1la) to (10a). We are able to construct such a model as a direct result of the fact 
that PROG(run(max)) is true only at the open interiors of the interval j at which A is true, and it is 
not necessarily true at j itself. 
In view of the apparent inability to explain why (11) entails (10), the analysis seems to be 
flawed. However, following Taylor (1977,1985), one could explain away this flaw by appealing to 
the distinction between truth and assertability. We appeal to the hypothesis that even though in the 
above model M (11) is true at the open interval int(j) in virtue of run(max) being true at the initial 
bound of into), one is not in a position to assert at the open interval into) that run(max) was true at 
the initial bound of int(j). This hypothesis is motivated by the intuition that an action must go on 
for an extended period of time before one can assert that it is going on; for example, one cannot tell 
from a snap shot taken of Max at some moment m whether Max was running at m, and so one can- 
not assert that run(max) is true at the moment m even if run(max) is true at m. If one assumes this 
hypothesis, then one explains that the assertion of (11) entails the assertion of (10). 
4 The Progressive and Homogeneity 
In chapter 2, I evaluated the Heterogeneous Strategy for formulating the classification of 
aspect. I showed how theories such as Dowty's (Dowty 1979) that adopt the Heterogeneous Stra- 
tegy provide a heterogeneous analysis of achievements (i. e. culminations): the sentence "Max win 
the race" may be true at an interval i and false at an interval j contained in i. This analysis was 
supposed to reflect the intuition that not every part of an event where Max wins the race is itself an 
event where Max wins the race. I suggested that even if the heterogeneous analysis of achieve. 
ments were to lead to a solution to the imperfective paradox, it would never be able to lead to an 
account of point adverbials such as "At 3pm" as it appears in sentences (1) and (2). 
4 
(1) Max ran at 3pm 
(2) Max won the race at 3pm 
Hence the Heterogeneous Strategy could not lead to both a solution to the imperfective paradox and 
an analysis of "At 3pm". 
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I have suggested here an alternative to the Heterogeneous Strategy. The interpretation of the 
classification of aspect presented here is given in the framework of IQ, which maintains the homo- 
geneity principle (i) below. 
(i) A primitive untensed sentence A is true at an index (w, i) only if for all subintervals j of i, 
the sentence is true at (wj). 
Our formulation of the classification of aspect does not give a heterogeneous analysis of achieve- 
ments (i. e. culminations). Indeed, such an analysis could not be expressed in IQ given the homo- 
geneity restriction in (i): win(max, race) (which represents "Max win the race") cannot be true at the 
index (w, i) and false at (w j) where j is contained in i. Furthermore, we have shown that our homo- 
geneous formulation of the classification of aspect not only leads to a solution to the imperfective 
paradox, but it also leads to an adequate semantic account of point adverbials such as "At 3pm" as 
it appears in sentences (1) and (2). I suggest, therefore, that our homogeneous interpretation of the 
classification of aspect overcomes the problems that were encountered in the heterogeneous 
approach. 
S The Progressive and Quantification 
As we argued in chapter 5, there is a reading of sentence (3) where universal instantiation 
fails, for it does not entail sentence (4). 
(3) Max was kissing every girl 
(4) Max was kissing Susan 
How can one account for this failure? 
In chapter 5, I investigated how to account for sentences (3) and (4) in Parsons' (1984) 
event-based framework and I demonstrated that the analysis fell short. On the other hand, I argued 
that Dowty's (1979) Eventual Outcome Strategy in defining the progressive was able to account for 
the failure of universal instantiation with respect to (3). However, in chapter 3, I demonstrated that 
Dowty's Eventual Outcome semantics for the progressive was inadequate in other respects, and so it 
would be desirable to find some other way to account for (3). 
I claim that one can account for the lack of inference between sentences (3) and (4) in the 
theory presented here. Let us investigate the truth conditions of (3). A possible representation of 
(3) is (3a)52. 
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(3a), PAST(,,, 
)[PROG[PRý, [(dx)(Gir1(x) -> kiss(max, x))]] 
Sentence (3a) is true in a model M at (w, i) if and only if gc(v) = w, g. (t) = i, and there exists an 
interval jd such that (3a1) is true at (w j). 
(3a1) PROG[PR,, [(b'x)(Girl(x) -> kiss(max, x)]] 
This is the case if and only if (3a2)e Pr, and there exists a closed interval k such that j is a proper 
subinterval of k and (3a2) is true at (w, k). 
(3a2) PRR[(Vx)(Girl(x) -> kiss(max, x)] 
This is the case if and only if (among other things) go(e) is true at (wk). Now go(e) can be true at 
(w, k) without (15) ever being true. 
(15) PROG[PRe, (kiss(max, susan))] 
This is due to the fact that gc may assign different values to the propositional parameters that 
appear in (3a) and (15). The value of e in (3a) is the process of Max kissing every girl, and the 
value of e' in (15) is the process of Max kissing Susan. In general, these are different. If in the 
model M (15) is never true, then (4a) is false at (w, i). 
(4a) PAST(vi)[PROG[PRR, (kiss(max, susan))]] 
But (4a) is the logical form of (4), and so (3) does not entail (4), as required. 
' The failure of the inference from sentence (3) to (4) is accounted for in the analysis presented 
here, without resorting to a definition of the progressive in terms of eventual outcome. Thus our 
approach to the imperfective paradox overcomes the problems encountered in Parsons' theory, and 
since our analysis of the progressive does not adopt the Eventual Outcome Strategy, it also over- 
comes the problems of that strategy that were described in chapter 3. 
52 . ham are other possible representations of (3) that one could entertain, due to the scope ambiguities of the universal 
quantifier, and the sentential operators PROG and PR .I shall not consider these possible representations here. 0 
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6 Conclusion 
Solving the imperfective paradox consists of two tasks. The first is to represent a semantic 
distinction between sentences like (11) and sentences like (13). 
(11) Max ran 
(13) Max won the race 
The second is to provide a definition of the progressive that is sensitive to this distinction and so 
results in a solution to the imperfective paradox. I presented an account of the semantic distinction 
between (11) and (13) in the previous chapter by formulating a classification of aspect in the frame- 
work of IQ. In this chapter, I have investigated how one might build on this taxonomy of aspect 
and thereby solve the imperfective paradox. Our aim was to provide a solution to the imperfective 
paradox that could fit in a respectable theory of tense and time, and to this end I offered not only a 
definition of the progressive that solves the imperfective paradox, but I also offered accounts of 
various temporal modifiers such as "in ten minutes" and "at 3pm". 
Two properties of IQ play a central role in the analysis of aspect. The first is the homo- 
geneity condition which is fundamental to the framework IQ. Homogeneity plays a crucial role in 
explaining the entailment between (10) and (11), for example. 
(10) Max was running 
(11) Max ran 
The second important feature of the analysis is the role played by context. The theory is con- 
structed so that extra-linguistic context determines exactly what process an expression like "Max 
was building a house" refers to in a particular utterance. 
I offered an account of the entailment from (10) to (11), and at the same time showed why no 
such entailment holds between (12) and (13). 
(12) Max was winning the race 
(13) Max won the race 
I also offered an account for why (11) entails (10) and (13) entails (12), and thus I solved the 
imperfective paradox. 
184 
In addition, I accounted for the natural interpretations of sentences (1) and (2). 
(1) Max ran at 3pm 
(2) Max won the race at 3pm 
Thus our theory overcomes the inadequacies of the Heterogeneous Strategy (chapter 2) and the 
current formulations of the Event-based Strategy (chapter 4), for the theories that adopt these stra- 
tegies could not account for (1) and (2). Moreover in chapter 3, we argued that the Eventual Out- 
come Strategy lead to a circular definition of the progressive, but our definition of the progressive is 
not subject to this problem since it does not adopt the Eventual Outcome Strategy. 
We were also able to account for the failure of universal instantiation with respect to sentence 
(3), and so our definition of the progressive overcomes the problems encountered in Parsons' 
definition of the progressive that we described in chapter 5. 
i3) Max was kissing every girl 
In formulating the solution to the imperfective paradox in a homogeneous interval-based 
framework, we have obtained a solution to the imperfective paradox that transcends the problems 
encountered in previous theories. We not only provide a solution to the imperfective paradox, but 
we also provide a satisfactory analysis of point adverbials such as "at 3pm", where Dowty, Taylor 
and Parsons cannot We can also provide an explanation of why universal instantiation fails for 
sentence (3). Thus the solution to the imperfective paradox that we have offered is a significant 
improvement on previous attempts. 
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Appendix 1 
The Logical Forms of Dowty's Aspectual Classes 
The aspectual operators and connectives that form the aspectual classes out of stative predi- 
cates are treated as logical constants, and the stative predicates are treated as non-logical constants. 
The logical form of statives is as follows: 
la. Simple statives: pn(a,,..., a) (e. g. Max knows the answer), where pn is a n-place sta- 
tive predicate, and a ,.., a are 
Angular terms. 
lb. Stative Causatives: rpm(al,.., a )CAUSEgn(b1,..., bn)] (e. g. Max's living nearby causes 
Mary to prefer this neighbourhood: 
The logical form of activities is derived from the logical form of statives with the aid of the 
operator "DO", taking a singular term and a stative as its arguments. This is supposed to capture 
the intuition that activities are agentive; a, in the logical form below is the agent: 
2. Simple Activities: DO(at, [p (al,..., a )]), where a is a singular term, and p is a sta- 
tive predicate. (e. g. "Max walýCS"will%ave the logical form [DO(Max', in-tha-state-of- 
walking'(Max'))]). 
The logical form of achievements, given below, captures the intuition that an achievement is 
the coming about of a particular state of affairs. 
3. Simple Achievements: BECOME[pn(al,..., an)], where pn is a stative predicate. (e. g. 
Max discovers the solution) 
The logical form of accomplishments, given below, is obtained with the aid of the sentential 
connective "CAUSE", and the application of the sentential operator "BECOME" to a stative for- 
mula. The logical form of accomplishments is supposed to capture the intuition first observed by 
Kenny, that an accomplishment always involves the coming about of a particular state of affairs, as 
the result of some activity (Kenny 1963). 
3. Accomplishments: ['I' CAUSE [BECOME O]], where 0 is a stative sentence. The logical form of 'I' determines whether or not the accomplishment is agentive. For exam- 
ple, if `Y has the logical form of an activity, then the accomplishment is agentive. e. g. 
"Max breaks the window" will have the logical form [[DO(Max', breaking-state'(Max', the 
window')] CAUSE [BECOME (broken'(the window')]] 
The logical forms of accomplishments and achievements both include the operator "BECOME". 
This turns out to be significant when Dowty solves the imperfective paradox. 
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Although Dowty claims that activities and accomplishments are derived from stative predi- 
cates, one can see that they are in fact derived from stative formulas, since the operators and con- 
nectives used to form activities and accomplishments out of statives take formulas as their argu- 
ments. Hence Dowty's semantic analysis of the aspectual classes is a formula-based semantics, and 
this analysis should be separated from the syntactic claims made for verb classes. 
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Appendix 2 
Dowty's Analysis of Tense 
Dowty assumes that the simple present tensed sentences are the tenseless sentences in his 
theory. Hence sentence (1) is an example of a tenseless activity, and sentence (2) is an example of 
a tenseless accomplishment. 
(1) Max works in the garden 
(2) Max crosses the street 
The two-place operator "AT", taking a point of time t and a formula 0 as its arguments, 
features in the logical form of tensed sentences. The truth definition of [AT(t, c)] is given below: 
[AT(t, (D)]is true at t'if 0is true at t. 
Note that although the truth conditions of [AT(t, b)] are given relative to a point of time t', there is 
no relationship between t' and t. So [AT(t, 1)] is an eternal sentence; it is true at all points in time 
or at none. In particular, it is not affected in truth value by affixing any further tense operator. 
The way in which Dowty represents tense is as follows: If 0 is a formula, then the logical 
form of the past tensed form of (D is (3). 
(3) ((t)(Past(t) & AT(t, «)) 
The truth conditions of (3) in words are the following: (3) is true at tt if and only if there exists a 
point in time t which is in the past - i. e. before tl - and b is true at t. The future tense is 
represented in a similar manner. 
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Appendix 3 
Taylor's Revised Postulates for E and K-verbs 
Postulate 5 
If e is an E-predicate, then it meets the following condition: 
Vnt --4 Per(t) & (@a)(Maxv(a) & tca & (3b)(lvlinv(b) & bca) & (Vc)(cca -ý (3b)(Minv(b) & bcc))) 
Postulate 6 
If P" is a K-predicate, then it meets the following condition: 
Vnt -_> Per(t) & (2a)(Maxl, (a) & tca & (3b)(Minv(b) & bCa) & (Vc)((Minv(c) & cca) 
-a (Sd)(ccd & dc--a & -, V d))) 
The definitions of Max(t, z) and Min(t, z) are given below: 
(D 1) t is maximal with respect to a set z of times 
Max(t, z) <=> (tE z&-, (3t')(tct' & t'E z)) 
(D 2) t is minimal with respect to a set z of times 
Min(t, z) <=> (tE z& -ý(3t)(tIct & t'e z)) 
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Appendix 4 
The Possible Representations of "Max is kissing every girl" 
in Dowty's Theory 
We will now show that (22b), (22c) and (22e) cannot explain that the rule of universal instan- 
tiation fails in the case of (22), and so they are inadequate representations of (22). 
(22) Max is kissing every girl 
(22b) (Vx)[PROG [girl'(x) -+ [BECOME kissed'(x, max')]]] 
(22c) (Vx)(girl'(x) --' [PROG [BECOME kissed'(x, max')]]) 
(22e) (b'x)[PROG [BECOME (girl'(x) -). kissed'(x, maxD)]] 
I start with (22b). 
(22b) is true at ä, w> with respect to M and g just in case for all g' exactly like g except pos- 
sibly in the value assigned to x, formula (22b1) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g', 
(22b1) [FROG (girl'(x) -ý [BECOME kissed'(x, max')])] 
just in case there is an interval I' containing I such that for all w'e Inr(d, w>), (22b2) is true at 
<I', w'>, 
(22b2) girl'(x) -*[BECOME kissed'(x, max')] 
just in case either (22b3) or (22b4) is true at ä'. w'>. 
(22b3) -, girl'(x) 
(22b4) [BECOME kissed'(x, max')] 
Suppose that the formula (22b) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g. Then the formula 
(24) must be true at <I', w'> at some interval I' and for all w'E Inr(d, w>) (we assume that 
girl'(susan) is true). 
(24) [BECOME kissed'(susan', max')] 
Hence by the definition of PROD, (23a), which is the representation of (23), is true at d, w> with 
respect to M and g. 
190 
(23) Max was kissing Susan 
(23a) PROG [BECOME kissed'(susan', maf)] 
Hence we have an entailment from (22b) to (23a). But we do not wish to capture such an entail- 
ment, and therefore (22b) cannot explain that universal instantiation fails with respect to (22). 
Now consider (22c). (22c) is true at an index <I, w> with respect to model M and value 
assignment g if and only if for every g' exactly like g except possibly in the value assigned to x, 
(22c1) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g'. 
(22c1) girl'(x) -' [PROG [BECOME kissed'(x, max')]] 
Suppose that (22c) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g. Then the formula (23a) must be 
true at <I, w> with respect to M and all the g' like g except possibly in the value assigned to x (we 
assume that girl'(susan') is true). Hence (23a) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g. Hence 
(22c) entails (23a). Therefore (22c) cannot explain that universal instantiation fails with respect to 
(22). 
Now let us consider the truth conditions of (22e). (22e) is true at d, w> with respect to a 
model M and value assignment g if and only if for g' exactly like g except possibly in the value 
assigned to x, formula (22e1) is true at ä, w> with respect to M and g', 
(22e1) [PROG [BECOME (girl'(x) -- kissed'(x, max'))]] 
if and only if there is an interval I' containing I such that I is not a final subinterval of I' and for all 
wE Inr(<I, w>), formula (22e2) is true at <I', w>, 
(22e2) [BECOME (girl'(x) --- kissed'(x, max')) 
if and only if there exists an interval J containing the initial bound of I' such that (22e3) is true at 
<J, w'>, and there is an interval K containing the final bound of I' such that either (22e4) or (22e5) 
are true at <K, w'>. 
(22e3) girl'(x) & -, kissed'(x, max') 
(22e4) -, gir1'(x) 
(22e5) kf ssed'(x, max) 
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Suppose that (22e) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g. Suppose furthermore that 
girl'(susan') is true in w and in the wE Inr(d, w>). Since (22e) is true at <I, w>, there exists an 
interval J containing the initial bound of I' such that (25) is true at <T, w> with respect to M and g. 
(25) gir1'(susan) & -, kissed'(susan', max') 
Furthermore, there is an interval K containing the final bound of I' such that (26) is true at <K, w> 
with respect to M and g. 
(26) ldssed'(susan'. max') 
Hence by the definition of BECOME, (24) is true at <I', w'> for all we Inr(d, w>) with respect to M 
and g. 
(24) [BECOME kissed'(susan', maxD] 
So by the truth conditions of the progressive, (23a) is true at <I, w> with respect to M and g. So 




The Truth Definitions in IQ 
Given an IQ-interpretation <Mg>, the denotation of a well-formed expression ß is defined 
recursively in the following way. We let [ß]`M's>(w, i) be the denotation of ß relative to the IQ- 
interpretation <M, g> with respect to the index (w, i) belonging to WXI. 
(a) Where ß is a variable, [ß]`M'g>(w, i) = g(ß). 
(b) Where is either a name constant or a predicate constant, [ß]`M. 5>(w, i) = f(b)(w, i). 
(c) Where ß is a parameter, [0]`M5>(w, i) = ge(ß). 
(d) Where ß is an atomic wff p"(dt,.., d ), [01<M'g>(w, i) _ 
1 if <[d ]`M's'(w, i),.,, [d ] '8>(w, i)> belongs to [pj]`M'g'(wJ)" 
0 if <[d1] s'(w, i),.., [dn]`M'g>(w, i)> does not belong to [pjf M'9>(wjý, 
u if [di]<5'(w, i) is undefined for any i where 1SiSn or [p'j1<m'9 (w, i) is 
undefined. 
(e) Where ß is a wff (A <-> B), [0]`Mg>(w, i) is 
1 if [A]<m g>(w, i) = [B]`M's'(w, i) =1 or [A]`ivtV(w, i) = [B]`M's'(w, i) = 0, 
0 if [A]`M'e>(w. i) =1 and [B]`Ms>(w, i) =0 or [A]`sts>(w, i) =0 and 
[B]<M, s>(w, i) =1 
u otherwise. 
(f) Where ß is a wff 3xA with the individual variable x, [ß]<'9>(w, i) is 
1 if [A]<M'9( )>(w, i) =1 for some e belonging to D, 
0 if [A]`M's(x, e >(w, i) =0 for all e belonging to D, 
u otherwise. 
(k) Where ß is a wff VxA with the individual variable x, [ß]`M's'(w, i) is 
1 if [A]`Mg("'°)>(w, i) =1 for all e belonging to D. 
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